Information Content of Credit Default Swaps: Price Discovery, Risk Transmission, and News Impact by SHI, SHIMENG
Durham E-Theses
Information Content of Credit Default Swaps: Price
Discovery, Risk Transmission, and News Impact
SHI, SHIMENG
How to cite:
SHI, SHIMENG (2017) Information Content of Credit Default Swaps: Price Discovery, Risk Transmission,
and News Impact, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12097/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
 
 
 
 
Information Content of Credit Default Swaps: Price 
Discovery, Risk Transmission, and News Impact 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
Shimeng Shi 
 
Department of Economics and Finance 
Durham University Business School 
Durham University 
April 2017 
 
 
 
 
I 
 
Information Content of Credit Default Swaps: Price Discovery, Risk 
Transmission, and News Impact 
Shimeng Shi 
Abstract 
This thesis comprises three empirical studies regarding information content of credit 
default swap (CDS). The first study provides further evidence of credit risk discovery 
between CDS and stock of the U.S. non-financial firms. Stock generally leads CDS in 
discovering credit risk information, with the exception of the stressful financial crisis 
period of 2008–2010. The CDS of investment-grade firms generally possesses higher 
informational efficiency than that of speculative-grade firms. High funding cost and 
central clearing counterparty hinder CDS from rapidly incorporating credit risk news. 
The second study investigates dynamics and determinates of credit risk transmission 
across the global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs). The aggregate 
credit risk transmission across G-SIFIs dramatically increases from mid-2006 to mid-
2008 and then fluctuates around 90% until 2014. Global systemically important banks 
(G-SIBs) and the U.S.–based G-SIFIs are major credit risk providers. More interbank 
loans, more non-banking income, higher extra loss absorbency requirement, and lower 
Tier 1 leverage ratio are positively related to a G-SIB’s role in credit risk transmission. 
Global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs) which have more non-traditional non-
insurance activities, larger sizes, and more global sales tend to be credit risk senders. 
The final study examines the impact of sovereign credit rating and bailout events on 
sovereign CDS and equity index, especially their contemporaneous correlation, in the 
U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone countries. The two assets are less negatively correlated 
at the arrivals of domestic rating events or surprises. Good and bad rating events present 
II 
 
asymmetric effects on the asset correlation in Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland, Finland, 
and the U.S., while their symmetric effects are found in Spain, Italy, and Cyprus. Two 
assets become more negatively correlated on the announcement days of major bailouts. 
Bailout events have a stronger impact than domestic rating events. Greek rating news 
exerts spillover effect and generally has positive impact on the asset correlation in other 
economies.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Informational Role of Credit Default Swap  
The derivatives markets, such as futures, options, and swaps, provide alternative venues 
for risk management and information-based trading (e.g., Garbade and Silber, 1983; 
Fleming et al., 1996; Easley et al., 1998; Longstaff et al., 2003). Therefore, one of the 
main economic functions of the derivatives markets is producing information (Stulz, 
2004). To be specific, the derivatives provide price discovery. Price discovery refers to 
the process of how the new information related to the fundamental value of one security 
gets incorporated into the relevant markets (Hasbrouck, 1995). Given that the central 
question of price discovery has several dimensions, one may address this question from 
different perspectives (Andersen et al., 2007). For instance, how quickly do asset prices 
incorporate news? Is the impact of news on returns and volatility different across assets, 
and whether the interrelations across assets are also affected by the news? Besides price 
discovery, as the promised payoffs of the derivatives are mainly depend on the value of 
the underlying asset, the derivatives also provide information regarding the underlying 
asset. For example, it is argued that credit derivatives offer a simple and straightforward 
measure of default risk of the underlying reference entity (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2013).  
Credit default swap (CDS) is an important credit derivatives. It provides insurance to 
investors who own defaultable bonds or other risky fixed-income securities issued by 
one or more reference entities. In a predetermined credit event, the CDS seller agrees 
to either repay an obligation of the reference entity underlying the contract at par in the 
case of physical settlement or pay the difference between par value and the market price 
of the obligation in the case of cash settlement. To purchase this protection, the CDS 
buyer pays a regular premium during a specified period. This premium is referred to as 
 2 
 
CDS spread and denominated in basis points. CDS spread is calculated by equating the 
present value of the protection leg (protection seller) with the present value of the 
premium leg (protection buyer) (Markit, 2008). As an important credit derivatives, CDS 
is expected to produce credit risk information via contributing to credit risk discovery 
and indicating default risk of the underlying reference entity (Stulz, 2010). Therefore, 
the general motivation and focus of this thesis is to investigate several issues with regard 
to the informational role of CDS in capturing credit risk news and in directly indicating 
market expectation of the default risk of the underlying reference entity. 
1.2 Institutional Background of the Credit Default Swap Market  
Based on the number of the underlying reference entities, CDS contracts are classified 
as single-name instruments, multi-name instruments, and index products. In December 
2015, the notional amounts outstanding, in billions of U.S. dollars, of the three products 
are 7,183, 5,110, and 4,737, respectively (BIS, 2016). Since single-name instruments 
have relatively large notional value and attract increasing attention from the academia, 
this thesis focuses only on single-name CDS contracts. Based on the characteristics of 
the underlying reference entities, the single-name CDS products are further divided into 
three types: the CDS contracts for non-financial firms, for financial institutions, and for 
sovereigns. In contrast with corporate CDS contracts (including both non-financial and 
financial companies), sovereign CDS contracts have different natures of credit events, 
less concentrated trading in the 5-year maturity, higher currency risk, and the capacity 
to hedge country default risk exposures of portfolios (Augustin et al., 2014). Figure 1.1 
presents the proportions of the notional amounts outstanding of three categories of 
single-name CDS instruments during the period of 2004–2015. The figure indicates that 
the single-name CDS contracts for non-financial firms have the highest notional value, 
followed by that for financial institutions and sovereigns.  
 3 
 
According to the European Commission (2011), market participants in the CDS market 
consist of dealers, non-dealer banks, hedge funds, and asset managers. The dealers are 
by far the major players in the market. Market participants engage in the CDS market 
for three main purposes. First, they use CDS for hedging. For example, bondholders are 
exposed to the default risk of the bond issuers; therefore, they use CDS to transfer the 
credit risk to the CDS sellers. Second, CDS is used for arbitrage. Capital structure 
arbitrage and CDS-bond basis arbitrage strategies are employed largely by hedge funds 
to earn risk-free profits. The final purpose is speculation, when investors exploit price 
changes by trading CDS in and out. Overall, the CDS market offers market participants 
an additional venue to manage credit risk and generate profits.   
However, many questions have been raised about the CDS market, especially during 
the recent financial crises. For example, Acharya and Johnson (2007) uncover insider 
trading issue in the CDS market. Cecchetti et al. (2009) criticise the opacity of its over-
the-counter (OTC) market structure and the abuse of CDS contracts by large financial 
institutions. The speculations with uncovered sovereign CDS positions are accused of 
exacerbating the European sovereign debt crisis (Pu and Zhang, 2012).1 Owing to the 
controversy related to the CDS market, stricter regulations are imposed on this OTC 
derivatives market. For example, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) initiated a CDS ‘Big Bang’ Protocol and implemented it in April, 2009. The 
Big Bang Protocol standardises CDS contracts to benefit compression mechanisms and 
the development of central clearing counterparty (CCP). Moreover, to facilitate CDS 
contract settlements, ISDA, Markit, and CreditEx jointly designed and administered a 
CDS auction process (Augustin et al., 2014). Also, as encouraged by regulators, CDS 
                                                          
1 As explained by the European Commission (2011), an uncovered or naked CDS position is taking a 
CDS position without owning the underlying securities. 
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contracts should be traded through CCP to improve market transparency and reduce 
counterparty risk. Figure 1.2 presents the ratios of the notional amounts outstanding of 
single-name CDS contracts cleared by CCP to that traded by all types of counterparties 
from 2010 to 2015. The figure shows that settling CDS positions through CCP has been 
a trend. Compared with financial institutions and sovereigns, a higher percentage of 
non-financial companies’ CDS contracts is centrally cleared. In addition, in Europe, to 
curb the deterioration of the sovereign debt crisis, a permanent short-selling ban on 
‘naked’ sovereign CDS contracts was enacted in 2011. Table 1.1 presents a timeline of 
the major developments in the CDS market from 1994 to 2016. The CDS market can 
be considered as an attractive laboratory for investigating the impact of new regulatory 
policies on its market transparency, liquidity, and counterparty risk, see, e.g., Duffie 
and Zhu (2011), Slive et al. (2012), and Loon and Zhang (2014).   
1.3 Objectives  
Based on the general motivation mentioned in Section 1.1 and the three products of the 
single-name CDS market introduced in Section 1.2, this thesis examines three different, 
but interrelated, topics regarding informational content of single-name CDS contracts. 
Chapter 2 studies credit risk discovery function of CDS and stock of the U.S. non-
financial firms. Chapter 3 employs CDS spread as default risk proxy to investigate 
credit risk transmission across the global systemically important financial institutions. 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of sovereign rating and bailout events on sovereign CDS 
and equity index in major developed economies.   
1.3.1 Credit Risk Discovery of Non-Financial Corporate CDS  
Recently, a stream of literature related to credit risk discovery has emerged. Credit risk 
discovery analysis involves credit risk sensitive assets, such as CDS, bond, stock, and 
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stock option. Given structural differences of markets and various trading purposes of 
market participants, prices of credit risk sensitive assets are not likely to simultaneously 
respond to news (Norden and Weber, 2009). Accordingly, it is a key interest to identify 
which market incorporates new credit risk information more promptly than the others, 
so that investors can receive an early warning on impending and possible large changes 
of asset prices and policymakers can monitor and assess information spillovers across 
markets (Avino et al., 2013). However, compared with the price discovery literature 
related to internationally or domestically cross-listed stocks, e.g., Eun and Sabherwal 
(2003), and derivatives with underlying assets, e.g., So and Tse (2004), credit risk 
discovery has not been fully explored.  
Previous credit risk discovery research tries to address the question of which credit risk 
sensitive asset firstly incorporates credit risk news. It seems to be a consensus that CDS 
leads bond in credit risk discovery. For instance, Blanco et al. (2005) find that in 
contrast to bond, CDS contributes about 80% of price discovery. Similar conclusions 
are drawn in other works, e.g., Longstaff et al. (2003), Zhu (2006), and Forte and Peña 
(2009). In terms of the relationship between CDS and equity option, Avino et al. (2013) 
document that option dominants CDS in the sub-prime crisis (2007–2009), while during 
the European sovereign debt crisis (2009–2012) and the pre-crisis period, CDS leads 
option. Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2014) find bidirectional information flows between 
CDS and equity option markets and detect that information in option trading volumes, 
especially the put option, spills over to the CDS market. 
Regarding the credit risk discovery relationship between CDS and stock, mixed results 
are obtained–for example, Longstaff et al. (2003), Norden and Weber (2009), and Xiang 
et al. (2013)–and several research gaps exist. Hence, further research is necessary. First, 
prior studies use traditional price discovery contribution measures, that is, Hasbrouck’s 
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(1995) information share (IS) and Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component share 
(GG). However, these measures have drawbacks, such as non-uniqueness and/or the 
one-to-one cointegration restriction. Generalised Information Share (GIS) proposed by 
Lien and Shrestha (2014) is a unique measure and relaxes the one-to-one cointegration 
assumption. Due to different market structures and various levels of market frictions 
that limit arbitrage activities, credit risk proxies of CDS and stock markets may not be 
one-to-one cointegrated in the long run. Therefore, GIS is a more suitable measure for 
studying credit risk discovery between CDS and stock markets. Also, in the U.S. market, 
the question of whether transitory components in CDS spreads and stock prices, such 
as liquidity risk, would affect credit risk discovery process has not been answered. In 
addition, the determinants of credit risk discovery leadership between CDS and stock 
are not well investigated. Although Forte and Lovreta (2015) propose several factors, 
e.g., market liquidity, reference entity’s credit condition, and adverse shocks, the impact 
of the funding cost and the newly introduced CCP on the informational efficiency of 
CDS and stock markets is unknown. Hence, the objectives of Chapter 2 are providing 
further evidence about credit risk discovery between CDS and stock markets of the U.S. 
non-financial firms and proposing new determinants of the credit risk discovery process. 
1.3.2 Credit Risk Connectedness of Systemically Important Financial Firms 
The failures of major financial institutions and the following global financial crisis in 
late 2008 have made it necessary to regulate the large and closely interrelated financial 
institutions. A widespread regulatory consensus has emerged among governments and 
central banks that ad-hoc bailouts of financial companies (as in the case of the bailout 
of AIG) should not be the way forward and that no individual bank or insurer should 
be ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’. Since 2010, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has 
formally identified and released two lists of financial institutions that are considered as 
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systemically important to the global economy (G-SIFIs) in the sense that the failure of 
one of them may trigger contagious defaults in the whole financial system, i.e., global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and global systemically important insurers (G-
SIIs). More intensive regulations and extra capital surcharges have since been imposed 
on these G-SIFIs to ensure that these G-SIFIs are less likely to disorderly default with 
an adverse impact on other financial institutions. Since the releases of the lists of G-
SIFIs, policymakers, academics, and practitioners have devoted time to measure their 
systemic importance and financial connectedness. While the financial linkages among 
financial institutions may not always pose devastating effects on financial stability, it 
is critical to identify which financial company poses the most credit risk to the financial 
system and understand when the dependency across financial firms would impair the 
health of the financial sector and subsequently disrupt the real economy.   
There are several streams of growing literature associated with G-SIFIs. For instance, 
different approaches are proposed to define systemic risk and identify potential G-SIFIs, 
which can complement the current indicator-based methodology designed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2013) and the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) (2013) (e.g., Yang and Zhou, 2013; Castro and Ferrari, 
2014). Also, applying event study method, several papers compare stock and/or CDS 
reactions of G-SIFIs with that of large financial institutions which are not deemed to be 
systemically important to the news announcements related to G-SIFIs (e.g., Abreu and 
Gulamhussen, 2013; Bongini et al., 2015). Moreover, returns and volatility spillovers 
among G-SIFIs’ stock prices are studied, as well as the dependent structures between 
CDS indices and G-SIFIs’ stock prices (e.g., Elyasiani et al., 2015; Calice, 2014).   
Furthermore, using default risk information provided by CDS market data, Billio et al. 
(2013) and Yang and Zhou (2013) have presented the first attempt to analyse credit risk 
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transmission across financial firms. However, these studies either track only pairwise 
interconnection or do not monitor the time-varying credit risk spillovers across financial 
institutions. Although several papers have examined factors affecting financial firms’ 
systemic importance or risk spillovers (e.g., Yang and Zhou, 2013; Bierth et al., 2015), 
they either use systemic risk measures calculated by using stock market data or omit 
several important factors. Therefore, Chapter 3 is motivated to employ CDS market 
data and the VECM-based connectedness measures of Diebold and Yilmaz (2015a) to 
investigate the dynamic credit risk transmission across the designated G-SIFIs. CDS 
market data have been argued to be better than stock market data in analysing financial 
firms’ systemic importance since CDS spread can be considered as a direct and simple 
indicator of default probability of financial institution (e.g., Chiaramonte and Casu, 
2013; Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña, 2013; Acharya et al., 2017). Complementing the 
existing market-based systemic risk indicators, e.g., Billio et al.’s (2012) connectedness 
measures, Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2015a) approach not only allows for cointegration 
relations shared by default risk of financial institutions, but also provides diverse types 
of directed and weighted connectedness matrices, from firm-level pairwise directional 
measures to system-wide aggregate measures. In addition, we suggest an approach to 
complement the indicator-based methodology used by the FSB to identify the potential 
G-SIFIs. Additionally, this chapter examines the possible factors that explain credit risk 
connectedness across the G-SIFIs.  
1.3.3 Credit Risk News Impact on Sovereign CDS and Equity Index 
In early May 2010, the unsustainable Greek sovereign debt was on the brink of 
imminent default. Due to significant holdings in Greek sovereign debt, the European 
governments and financial institutions also suffered from financial troubles and faced 
higher risk of default. Hence, the ‘Greek crisis’ rapidly propagated throughout Europe. 
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Since the European sovereign debt crisis, default risk of the developed economies has 
become a major concern of academics, policymakers, and international investors. Thus, 
after investigating two issues associated with the information content of corporate (non-
financial and financial firms) CDS in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, Chapter 4 focuses on 
studying the informational role of sovereign CDS in reacting to sovereign default risk 
news in major advanced countries.  
The assets sensitive to sovereign default risk include, but are not limited to, sovereign 
CDS, equity index, government bond, and exchange rate and its derivatives. Carr and 
Wu (2007) and Hui and Fong (2015) examine dynamic interrelations and cointegration 
relationships between sovereign CDS and currency option, respectively. Ammer and 
Cai (2011) and Fontana and Scheicher (2016) discuss the relations between sovereign 
CDS and government bond in emerging markets and developed Eurozone countries, 
respectively. Sovereign CDS and equity index are linked by a country’s sovereign credit 
risk (Ngene et al., 2014). On the one hand, sovereign CDS spread offers compensation 
to investors for assuming sovereign credit risk. Hence, it is directly driven by sovereign 
default risk. On the other hand, sovereign credit risk and equity market are exposed to 
common economic shocks (Jeanneret, 2017), and information delivered by sovereign 
default risk influences equity market via at least three channels: a) economic prospects 
(Jeanneret, 2017); b) corporate borrowing costs (Bedendo and Colla, 2015); c) investors’ 
portfolio rebalancing (Hooper et al., 2008). A few researchers study the relationship of 
these two markets in terms of sovereign default risk pricing (e.g., Chan-Lau and Kim, 
2004), lead-lag relation in discovering sovereign credit risk news (e.g., Ngene et al., 
2014), and possible cross-asset arbitrage and hedge activities (e.g., Chan et al., 2009). 
However, limited studies examine the contemporaneous correlation of the two assets. 
Asset correlation is critically important for policymakers to monitor risk contagion and 
 10 
 
for international investors to manage portfolios and control risk (Karolyi and Stulz, 
1996; Fleming et al., 1998). In this regard, Chapter 4 aims to measure the correlation 
of sovereign CDS and equity index in the U.S., the U.K., and the states in the euro area. 
According to Andersen et al. (2007), besides examine the lead-lag relationships across 
assets, one may address the central price-discovery question from the perspectives of 
studying whether the impact of news on returns and volatility is different across assets 
and whether the links of assets are also affected by news. A strand of literature discusses 
the news impact on assets and asset correlations. For example, using a modified Engle’s 
(2002) GARCH-DCC model, Brenner et al. (2009) analyse how macroeconomic news 
surprises affect the conditional mean, volatility, and covariance of the U.S. stock, 
government bond, and corporate bond markets. They find that the comovement across 
assets changes around the arrival of the U.S. macroeconomic news. They explain that 
when macro news is announced, cross-asset trading activities caused by information 
transmission (e.g., Karolyi and Stulz, 1996), wealth effects (e.g., Kyle and Xiong, 2001), 
portfolio rebalancing (e.g., Fleming et al., 1998), and raised dispersion of expectations 
among investors (e.g., Kallberg and Pasquariello, 2008) may explain the changes of the 
comovement across assets. Using diagonal tail-dependence coefficients, Chui and Yang 
(2012) find that besides the U.S. macroeconomic news, stock market uncertainties and 
business cycle significantly affect the correlation of stock–bond futures in the U.S., the 
U.K., and Germany. While several papers have separately studied the impact of macro 
news on sovereign CDS and equity index, limited studies have addressed the question 
of whether their correlation can be driven by such news or it simply indicates the 
general linear relationship between them. By using asymmetric dynamic conditional 
correlation model with exogenous variables (ADCC-X), Chapter 4 not only takes into 
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account the impact of macro news releases on returns and volatility of sovereign CDS 
and equity index, but also provides evidence of the news impact on their correlation. 
Among a wide range of macro news, Chapter 4 concentrates on two events related to 
sovereign default risk, that is, sovereign credit rating changes and bailouts. Sovereign 
credit ratings reflect the capacity and willingness of sovereigns to fulfil debt obligations 
and are mainly determined by one country’s economic circumstance, default record, 
and political risk, and they are crucial inputs of evaluating investment opportunities 
(Christopher et al., 2012). Regarding bailouts, during the global financial crisis, the U.S. 
and the U.K. authorities provided bailouts to the distressed banking sector or financial 
institutions to stabilise the financial system. According to Acharya et al.’s (2014) ‘two-
way feedback’ model, the bailouts of the domestic financial sectors could induce credit 
risk transfer from the private sector to the public sector, so that sovereign default risk 
is more likely to increase. In the Eurozone, the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF), the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), and the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) were created to relieve the sovereign debt crisis and save 
the indebted Eurozone members from bankruptcy. These stabilisation mechanisms and 
the International Monetary Fund issued large scale of funding to Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus. As a result, the probabilities of default of these five 
sovereigns are expected to be lower. However, as the guarantors of the funding facilities, 
the rest of the Eurozone members have to share the financial burden of those indebted 
states and their sovereign credit risk may be adversely affected. Since the bailouts of 
the domestic financial institutions or the bailouts of indebted Eurozone states could 
exert effects on sovereign credit risk of relevant countries, the financial markets in these 
economies are expected to be affected by the bailout news. In sum, Chapter 4 aims to 
 12 
 
provide further empirical evidence with regard to the impact of sovereign credit rating 
and bailout events on sovereign CDS and equity markets in major advanced economies. 
1.4 Major Findings and Contributions  
Employing generalised information share (GIS) of Lien and Shrestha (2014), Chapter 
2 addresses the issue that CDS spread and stock implied credit spread may not have a 
one-to-one cointegration relation required by Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share (IS) 
and Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component share (GG). Nevertheless, all the three 
measures provide qualitatively similar empirical results. The stock market generally 
leads the CDS market in capturing credit risk news, except for the period of 2008–2010. 
Eliminating transitory price components, such as the liquidity effect, increases the 
informational efficiency of the CDS market in the earlier period of the sample. Another 
finding is that the CDS of investment-grade firms contributes more to credit risk 
discovery compared with that of speculative-grade firms. Further, the overall economy 
condition and funding cost negatively affect the credit risk discovery contribution of 
the CDS market. Finally, CCP seems to hinder CDS from capturing credit risk news 
first, which supports that the CDS market may be driven largely by insider trading.  
Chapter 2 contributes to the existing literature in the following aspects. First, while GIS 
technique may be theoretically stronger than IS and GG methods, our findings suggest 
that it does not make material difference in the relative price discovery contribution of 
CDS contracts. Second, this chapter provides support to several previous papers which 
demonstrate the general dominant role of the stock market in credit risk discovery, e.g., 
Forte and Peña (2009) and Narayan et al. (2014). However, during the period of 2008–
2010, the CDS market is found to dominate the stock market, which supports Xiang et 
al. (2013). Third, the current understanding of the impact of eliminating transitory 
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components on credit risk discovery is extended. This chapter finds that for the U.S. 
firms, the impact is generally insubstantial but time-varying, complementing Forte and 
Lovreta’s (2015) study. By suggesting new factors, it adds to the extant literature of the 
drivers of the informational efficiency of CDS and stock markets. The negative effects 
of funding cost and central clearing service on the market efficiency of the CDS market 
may help investors to design better trading strategies and benefit regulators in terms of 
effectively regulating the CDS market. 
Using Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2015a) VECM-based connectedness measures, Chapter 
3 finds a significant rise in the total credit risk transmission among the G-SIFIs during 
the period of severe financial events; as the financial crises intensified, so too did the 
cross-border spillovers of default risk, with a significant threat carrying over from the 
large U.S. banks and insurers to the other G-SIFIs in the EU and Asia. While there are 
bilateral linkages between G-SIBs and G-SIIs, the threat to the global financial stability 
that a large bank would pose if it were to fail is generally greater than that of an insurer. 
The changes in interbank lending, unconventional banking activity, regulatory leverage 
ratio, and extra loss absorbency requirement can have a significant impact on a G-SIB’s 
role in credit risk transmission. A G-SII’s role in credit risk spillovers can be positively 
determined by its non-traditional non-insurance activity, size, and global business.  
Chapter 3 adds to the literature in a number of aspects. Firstly, it improves the current 
understanding of credit risk transmission across financial firms, e.g., Yang and Zhou 
(2013), by focusing on the G-SIFIs identified by the FSB. Second, unlike Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2015a), this chapter suggests that the empirical findings of VECM model and 
that of VAR model are qualitatively similar. It implies that although VECM model is 
econometrically more robust than VAR model as it allows for possible cointegration 
relations shared by the G-SIFIs’ credit risk, it may not necessarily provide substantially 
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different empirical results. Third, this study adds to the existing literature of systemic 
importance of each financial firm by proposing a ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking 
to identify which G-SIFI is the major credit risk provider or receiver. Since this ranking 
is derived directly from CDS market data, it is complementary to the FSB’s list that is 
based on accounting data. Regulators may combine the two lists to obtain a ‘composite’ 
ranking that considers diverse sources of information. Finally, it offers further evidence 
of the drivers of credit risk spillovers of financial institutions, which complements the 
extant literature, e.g., Yang and Zhou (2013). The findings of regulatory leverage ratio 
and extra loss absorbency requirement may help regulators improve regulation in terms 
of curbing the G-SIBs to be more systemically important. 
Using asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation model with exogenous variables 
(ADCC-X), Chapter 4 finds that in contrast with equity market, sovereign CDS market 
is more sensitive to domestic sovereign rating events or surprises. The arrivals of rating 
events/surprises are accompanied with an increase of the negative correlation of the two 
assets. Both symmetric and asymmetric reactions of returns and volatility of two assets 
to positive and negative rating news are found. Two rating events symmetrically affect 
the negative asset correlation in Spain, Italy, and Cyprus, while they exert asymmetric 
influence on the correlation in Portugal, Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, and the United 
States. Bailout news is accompanied by wider CDS spreads and worse equity market 
performance. Asset volatility increases and two assets are more correlated. Compared 
with domestic sovereign rating events, bailout news has stronger and more significant 
influence on individual assets as well as asset correlation. Greek rating events generate 
spillover effect on sovereign CDS and equity markets in several sample countries. The 
two assets becomes less negatively correlated when Greek rating events occur.  
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Chapter 4 contributes to the existing literature on several dimensions. First, this chapter 
adopts a more general measure to define sovereign credit rating events and it calculates 
rating surprises, which complements the existing methods used by Gande and Parsley 
(2005) and Drago and Gallo (2016). Second, it adds to the existing literature relating 
macro news to the returns and volatility of different assets as well as the correlation 
between assets, such as Andersen et al. (2007) and Brenner et al. (2009). It finds that 
the conditional correlation of sovereign CDS and equity index is not a simple indicator 
of their relationship, but can be driven by the releases of sovereign credit rating and 
bailout events. Brenner et al. (2009) suggest that the changes of asset correlation on the 
announcement days of macro news may be attributable to any cross-asset trading which 
is jointly induced by information spillovers, portfolio rebalancing, wealth effects, and 
increased degree of disagreement among investors. Moreover, bailout news exerts more 
significant impact. Finally, it extends the current understanding of the spillover effect 
of sovereign rating events, e.g., Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), by showing that Greek 
sovereign rating news can affect not only the returns and volatility of two assets, but 
also their correlation in several sample countries. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 analyses the dynamics 
and drivers of credit risk discovery of CDS and stock of the U.S. non-financial firms. 
Chapter 3 investigates the time variations and determinants of credit risk connectedness 
across multinational systemically important financial institutions. Chapter 4 examines 
the influence of sovereign credit rating and bailout news on sovereign CDS and equity 
index in the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone countries. Chapter 5 summaries the three 
empirical studies and indicates the limitations of the thesis and further research. The 
tables, figures, and appendices are presented at the end of each chapter. 
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Table 1.1: Timeline of the CDS Market Development 
1994 CDS was created by JP Morgan 
1999 ISDA published the Credit Derivatives Definitions 
2000 CDS and other derivatives were exempted from regulation, according to 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
2001 ISDA published Restructuring Supplement to the 1999 Credit 
Derivatives Definitions 
2003 ISDA updated the 1999 Credit Derivatives Definitions 
2004 CDS index was introduced 
2005 General Motors/ Ford Motor was downgraded; Delphi defaulted 
2006 Loan credit default swap (LCDS) was introduced  
2007 Loan credit default swap index (LCDSX) was launched 
2008 AIG was downgraded; Ecuador defaulted 
2009 ISDA published ‘Big Bang’ and ‘Small Bang’ protocols; central 
clearing operations (CCP) began 
2010 More CDS position and trading volume data are available at the 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC); The Dodd-Frank 
Act set regulatory framework; Germany banned the naked (uncovered) 
short-selling of CDS written on euro-denominated government bonds 
2011 The European regulators enacted permanent short-selling ban on naked 
(uncovered) sovereign CDS contracts 
2012 JP Morgan suffered from large losses because of CDS trading, which is 
referred to as ‘London Whale’; Greece defaulted 
2013 Mandatory central clearing of eligible CDS indices commenced 
2014 ISDA updated the 2003 Credit Derivatives Definitions; Deutsche Bank 
AG stopped trading most single-name CDS contracts 
2015 BlackRock discussed with banks and other debt investors to revive the 
credit derivatives trading, especially the single-name CDS contracts 
2016 Due to a rise of downgrades and defaults of firms, China launches CDS 
market to provide investors an alternative venue to hedge credit risk 
Notes: This table briefly summaries the key developments in the global CDS market. Sources: Augustin 
et al. (2014), the ISDA, and Bloomberg. 
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Figure 1.1: Notional Amounts Outstanding of Single-Name CDS Contracts 
 
Notes: This figure reports the proportions of the national amounts outstanding of three single-name CDS 
products, that is, CDS for non-financial firms, for financial firms, and for sovereigns. Data sources: The 
Bank for International Settlements.  
Figure 1.2: Percentages of Single-Name CDS Contracts Cleared by CCPs  
 
Notes: This figure depicts the ratios of the notional amounts outstanding of single-name CDS contracts 
traded by CCPs to that traded by all types of counterparties. Data sources: The Bank for International 
Settlements.  
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Chapter 2: Dynamics and Determinants of Credit Risk Discovery: Evidence from 
CDS and Stock Markets 
2.1 Introduction  
Credit default swap (CDS) is invented to benefit credit risk transfer, provide credit risk 
discovery, and generate liquidity for credit risk trading (Stulz, 2010). However, due to 
insider trading problem, potential price manipulation, the opaque over-the-counter 
(OTC) market structure, and relatively inadequate regulation, the CDS market has been 
widely criticised (e.g., Acharya and Johnson, 2007; Cecchetti et al., 2009; Marsh and 
Wagner, 2015). Among the discussions regarding the economics of the CDS market, 
whether credit risk is priced timely in CDS spread, especially during the recent financial 
crises, is an important question to academics, policymakers, and practitioners alike. 
Distinct market structures and different investors may cause the prices of different 
assets to respond to credit risk news non-synchronously (Norden and Weber, 2009). 
Accordingly, it is of interest to identify which market reflects credit risk information 
first and what factors explain its informational dominance, so that market participants 
can design optimal trading strategies and regulators can monitor information flows 
across markets (Avino et al., 2013).  
With respect to credit risk, three most important markets are stock, bond, and CDS 
markets. While it is generally agreed that bond market takes a longer time than stock 
and CDS markets to incorporate credit risk information (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2003; 
Forte and Peña, 2009), there is no consensus about credit risk discovery leadership 
between stock and CDS markets (e.g., Norden and Weber, 2009; Acharya and Johnson, 
2007; Marsh and Wagner, 2015). In this regard, it is worth of revisiting credit risk 
discovery mechanism between the two markets. Several research gaps need to be filled. 
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Firstly, an essential assumption of the widely used Hasbrouck’s (1995) information 
share (IS) and Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component share (GG) is that all the assets 
should have the same efficient price in the long run, which is referred to as one-to-one 
cointegration. However, as discussed by Lien and Shrestha (2014), this assumption may 
be only applicable to almost identical assets, e.g., cross-listed stocks. For CDS and stock, 
their credit risk proxies may fail to satisfy the one-to-one relation due to market frictions, 
e.g., transaction cost, liquidity risk, counterparty risk, and different market structures. 
Thus, it might be inappropriate to apply IS and GG methods. To address this issue, we 
use the generalized information share (GIS) developed by Lien and Shrestha (2014). 
GIS does not require the pair to be one-to-one cointegrated and is more suitable for this 
study. A comparable analysis is conducted by comparing the results of GIS with that of 
IS and GG. Second, because credit risk is related to the permanent price component, 
eliminating transitory effects from asset prices is expected to provide a clearer view on 
credit risk discovery (Forte and Lovreta, 2015). Thus, this study eliminates transitory 
components from asset quotes or prices to extract the permanent price component.  
In addition, identifying the factors that drive credit risk discovery process is another 
important topic. Previous papers have discussed the impact of market liquidity, credit 
quality of the underlying reference entity, adverse credit risk shocks, and firm-specific 
and macroeconomic news releases on the informational efficiency of CDS and stock 
markets (e.g., Forte and Lovreta, 2015; Hilscher et al., 2015). Nonetheless, these papers 
do not well consider the effects of the overall economy condition, funding cost, and the 
newly introduced central clearing counterparty (CCP) in the CDS market on credit risk 
discovery between the two markets. Specifically, previous studies use dummy variable 
or sub-sample analysis to examine the impact of financial crisis on credit risk discovery 
between CDS and stock (e.g., Xiang et al., 2013). However, both approaches suffer 
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from an arbitrary dating issue. Therefore, we suggest using the financial condition index 
(FCI). As argued by Kliesen et al. (2012), since FCIs are constructed by using a wide 
variety of financial and non-financial variables to measure systematic risk not only in 
the financial market but also in the macro economy, they are capable of quantitatively, 
continuously, and timely indicating and even predicting the circumstance of the whole 
economy. Similar to transaction cost, funding cost may impose constraints on investors’ 
trading decisions and affect their capital allocations across assets (Augustin et al., 2014). 
Hence, funding cost is expected to exert effect on credit risk discovery process. The 
advent of central clearing counterparty (CCP) results in a hybrid structure in the CDS 
market and affects its counterparty risk, liquidity, and trading (Loon and Zhong, 2014). 
This chapter concentrates on assessing the impact of CCP on the relative informational 
efficiency between CDS and stock markets. Therefore, this chapter aims at providing 
further evidence on credit risk discovery between CDS and stock by employing more 
robust methodologies and probing further into the driving forces underlying the credit 
risk discovery process. In particular, we address the following research questions.  
a) Which market, CDS or stock, discovers credit risk information first?  
b) What factors affect the credit risk discovery process between CDS and stock? 
The major findings are summarised as follows. The empirical results show that in most 
cases, credit risk proxies of CDS and stock markets are not one-to-one cointegrated, 
which justifies the use of GIS instead of two conventional price discovery contribution 
measures, that is, IS and GG. Stock generally dominates CDS in discovering credit risk 
news, except for the relatively turbulent period of 2008–2010. Eliminating transitory 
price components increases the informational efficiency of the CDS market in the 
earlier period of the sample. The CDS of investment-grade firms presents a higher credit 
risk discovery contribution compared with that of speculative-grade firms. The overall 
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economy condition and funding cost negatively affect the informational efficiency of 
the CDS market. Finally, contrary to the conventional wisdom that CCP should enhance 
CDS market efficiency, centrally clearable CDS presents a lower credit risk discovery 
contribution, suggesting that the CDS market may be driven largely by insider trading. 
This chapter adds to the existing literature in the following aspects. First, we contribute 
to the extant literature related to applying GIS in empirical studies, e.g., Shrestha (2014). 
By comparing the results of GIS and that of IS and GG, we suggest that although GIS 
is theoretically stronger than IS and GG, it may not substantially alter empirical results. 
However, since this chapter considers two assets, further research is needed to confirm 
whether this finding holds in the case of more than two assets. Second, complementing 
previous literature, e.g., Forte and Peña (2009) and Narayan et al. (2014), this chapter 
provides further evidence to support the informational dominance of the stock market. 
However, over the crisis period of 2008–2010, the CDS market generally dominates 
the stock market, which supports Xiang et al. (2013). Unlike Forte and Lovreta’s (2015) 
research which concentrates on the European firms, this study provides further evidence 
of the impact of eliminating transitory components from asset prices on price discovery. 
For the U.S. non-financial companies, the impact is time-varying, but not substantial 
on average. This chapter also extends the existing understanding of the determinants of 
credit risk discovery process of CDS and stock markets by suggesting several new 
factors. In particular, the adverse effect of CCP on the informational efficiency of the 
CDS market provides important implication to the regulators to improve their policy.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related literature 
and develops hypotheses. In Section 2.3, an improved procedure to measure credit risk 
discovery is described. This includes elimination of the transitory components from the 
price, calculation of the credit spread implied by the stock price, and calculation of GIS, 
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IS, and GG measures. This section also describes the regression we use to examine the 
newly proposed drivers of credit risk discovery. Section 2.4 presents the data and 
preliminary data analysis. Section 2.5 is devoted to empirical analyses using individual 
firm data from the United States. Section 2.6 is the conclusion.  
2.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Price Discovery Hypotheses 
Price discovery hypotheses proposed by prior literature provide intuitive interpretations 
about why one market can impound new information more rapidly than the others. This 
section reviews the hypotheses related to credit risk discovery. First, the liquidity 
hypothesis implies that informed trading is more likely to be operated in more liquid 
markets since traders can exploit the profits of their informational advantages without 
causing large market price movements (Garbade and Silber, 1983). Second, the trading 
cost hypothesis states that new information would be incorporated firstly in the lowest-
cost market because investors prefer to execute their information-based trades where 
maximum net profits can be exploited (Fleming et al., 1996). Third, the market trading 
mechanism hypothesis shows that compared with floor trading mechanism, electric 
trading platform can promote one market to reflect new information (Martens, 1998). 
Fourth, the news-specific hypothesis implies that prices of several securities may be 
more sensitive to market-wide news, while prices of others may adjust more quickly in 
response to firm-specific news (Chan, 1992). A similar hypothesis is the insider trading 
hypothesis proposed by Acharya and Johnson (2007), who find that informed traders 
are in favour of trading in one market for at least three reasons. Trading on private 
information may not be detected easily and penalised severely. Also, direct hedging can 
be done without unnecessary portfolio rebalancing. Moreover, there are limited market 
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constraints, such as short-sale restrictions. Finally, the market maturation hypothesis 
suggests that the degree of market maturation can also affect the price discovery ability 
of a market since market participants may prefer to trade securities with well-developed 
markets (Chiang and Fong, 2001).  
Based on the implications of the above reviewed price discovery hypotheses, Table 2.1 
summarises the expectations on the dominant role of credit risk discovery between 
stock and CDS markets. On the one hand, the stock market has lower transaction costs, 
relatively higher liquidity, a longer history, and a more transparent and mature trading 
mechanism. On the other hand, the CDS market has an opaque OTC market structure, 
provides investors an option to transfer credit risk directly, and possesses large financial 
institutions as major participants. Also, since the recent financial crises, regulators have 
implemented several initiatives which bring the CDS market into a new epoch, such as 
the central clearing services in 2009. However, it is important to acknowledge that the 
possible driving forces are not mutually exclusive and they may jointly determine one 
market’s dominant role in incorporating news (e.g., Ates and Wang, 2005).  
2.2.2 Price Discovery Contribution Measures 
According to So and Tse (2004), there are three approaches to study price discovery: 
lead-lag relations, volatility spillovers, and price discovery contributions (Table 2.2).2 
For lead-lag relations, the general idea is that if the lagged returns of market A can 
predict the current returns of market B, then market A leads market B in price discovery. 
Nevertheless, Hasbrouck (1995) points out that lead-lag relations provide only general 
                                                          
2 A more detailed review of econometric tools of price discovery contributions can be found in Putniņš 
(2013) and Narayan and Smyth (2015). Also, according to the seminal papers of French and Roll (1986) 
and Ross (1989), in an arbitrage-free framework, variance of asset returns can be a proxy for variance of 
information flows. Hence, volatility transmission patterns among relevant markets can indicate which 
market is the source of information flows. Since volatility spillover is beyond of the scope of this study, 
we do not review this method in detailed in this section. 
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views of informational dominance, are applicable only for short-run analysis, and rely 
on the assumption that convergence relations exist, such as futures and spot markets. 
Therefore, to quantify informational efficiency of interrelated markets and exploit long-
term equilibrium relations shared by prices, Hasbrouck (1995) proposes information 
share (IS) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) suggest component share (GG). 
Hasbrouck (1995) assumes that the observed prices of one security in multiple markets 
comprise two components: a common implicit efficient price for all the markets and 
innovations which are attributable to individual markets. He defines a market’s IS as its 
relative contribution to the total variance of the innovations in the common permanent 
component. A market with a higher IS implies that it has higher informational intensity 
of the equilibrium price than the other markets and it dominants price discovery process. 
However, due to the ordering problem of Cholesky factorisation, Hasbrouck’s (1995) 
IS measure is not unique. This issue is addressed by Lien and Shrestha (2009) and 
Grammig and Peter (2013). Also, Lien and Shrestha’s (2014) GIS relaxes the one-to-
one cointegration relation assumed by Hasbrouck (1995). Hasbrouck (2003) suggests 
using high frequency data to eliminate contemporaneous correlations of the innovations 
and to obtain a more accurate IS measure. However, for several assets, such as single-
name CDS, intraday data may not be available (Chen et al., 2011). Grammig and Peter 
(2013) alleviate this drawback by exploiting the tail dependence of return distributions. 
However, their method has the prerequisite of tail dependence and may not be robust 
to all the assets (Lien and Wang, 2016).  
Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) permanent-transitory (P-T) decomposition focuses only 
on the error correction process. Booth et al. (1999) and Harris et al. (2002) define price 
discovery as the process by which markets incorporate information to reach equilibrium 
asset prices and apply the P-T method to calculate component share (GG). One market 
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with a higher GG suggests that it contributes a higher proportion to the innovations in 
the common stochastic trend than the other markets; therefore, it leads price discovery. 
However, the GG measure also imposes the one-to-one cointegration restriction. By 
extending Garbade and Silber’s (1983) model, Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) 
elaborate the use of the P-T method to calculate the GG measure when the cointegration 
vector is unrestricted to be one-to-one.  
In Figucrola-Ferrctti et al.’s (2014) paper, they explain the differences among IS, GG, 
and GIS. IS offers the greatest weight to the market incorporating the most information, 
whereas the market with the greatest IS cannot necessarily provide the best benchmark 
for the implicit efficient price. GG quantifies the extent to which different market prices 
reflect the long-run equilibrium price. Hence, the dominant market identified by GG 
can offer the best benchmark for the fundamental price. GIS imposes a different factor 
structure on the innovations, and it is a rotation of principal component analysis (PCA) 
factors which define the weights of PCA factors as the fractions that they contribute to 
each market price. The price of the market with the greatest GIS can be interpreted as 
a weighted average of all market prices, approximating the efficient price. IS, GG, and 
GIS also share several similarities. For example, for each measure, the price discovery 
contributions of all the examined markets sum to 1 (Lien and Shrestha, 2014). Therefore, 
in the case of two markets, the higher values of these measures of one market indicate 
that this market (the other market) contributes relatively more (less) to price discovery. 
2.2.3 Previous Empirical Findings of Credit Risk Discovery  
The prior empirical evidence presents complex credit risk discovery patterns between 
CDS and stock markets. For example, using panel VAR and firm-specific VAR models, 
Norden and Weber (2009) suggest that stock dominates CDS in most cases, which is 
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supported by Forte and Peña (2009), who employ IS and GG measures. Unlike these 
two studies which examine international samples, Narayan et al. (2014) and Hilscher et 
al. (2015) focus on the U.S. firms. Hilscher et al. (2015) rely on a panel VAR framework, 
while Narayan et al. (2014) calculate IS and GG measures in a panel VECM model that 
permits the heterogeneity in CDS spreads caused by sector, credit rating, and firm size. 
Both papers confirm that stock generally leads CDS. However, by testing whether CDS 
innovations permanently affect stock prices during the period 2001–2004, Acharya and 
Johnson (2007) document that the U.S. CDS market tends to incorporate negative credit 
risk news first because of its more severe insider trading problem. The dominant role 
of the CDS of the U.S. investment-grade firms from 2005 to 2009 is detected by Xiang 
et al. (2013), who use IS and GG measures. Moreover, Longstaff et al. (2003) find that 
CDS and stock markets present similar speeds to incorporate credit risk news, which is 
supported by Marsh and Wagner (2015), who document that the similar information 
processing speeds emerge when negative firm-specific news arrives. Both papers use 
VAR model and concentrate on the U.S. financial market. Using the rolling-window 
method and IS and GG measures, Forte and Lovreta (2015) investigate the time-varying 
credit risk discovery relation between the two assets in Europe from 2002 to 2008. They 
conclude that stock dominates credit risk discovery in the financial crisis, while CDS 
impounds credit risk news more rapidly during the tranquil times.  
Table 2.3 briefly summarises the previous findings related to the driving forces of credit 
risk discovery process between CDS and stock. Forte and Lovreta (2015) confirm that 
market liquidity is positively associated with one market’s informational efficiency. 
Norden and Weber (2009) and Forte and Lovreta (2015) show that the lower credit 
quality of the reference entity is, the greater information flows from stock to CDS, while 
Acharya and Johnson (2007) find the opposite. Credit downgrades and adverse credit 
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risk shocks are generally discovered first by the CDS market (Norden and Weber, 2004; 
Wang and Bhar, 2014). Moreover, Hilscher et al. (2015) suggest that higher transaction 
costs hinder the CDS market from impounding news rapidly. Both macroeconomic and 
earnings announcements can also affect the lead-lag relations between CDS and stock 
markets (Hilscher et al., 2015; Marsh and Wagner, 2015).  
To extend the existing understanding of the possible driving forces of the informational 
efficiency of CDS and stock markets, this chapter proposes three factors, i.e., financial 
condition index, funding cost, and central clearing service. Firstly, when the economy 
is under stress, increased default risk may increase hedgers’ demand for CDS contracts, 
and the high and volatile CDS spreads may also attract arbitragers and speculators with 
inside information (Xiang et al., 2013). As argued by Garbade and Silber’s (1983), one 
market’s price discovery ability is positively related to the number of its market 
participants. Hence, during the turmoil times, more information is expected to flow into 
the CDS market, and it would be the primary market of credit risk discovery. However, 
previous empirical studies have disagreements with regard to the direction of the impact 
of financial crisis on credit risk discovery. Xiang et al. (2013) find that the dominant 
role of CDS is enhanced during the sub-prime crisis. On the contrary, Forte and Lovreta 
(2015) find that stock contributes more to credit risk discovery over the dot-com bubble 
and the sub-prime crisis. Narayan et al. (2014) claim that financial crisis can induce a 
lagged market to be a credit risk discovery leader. Based on the above argument of the 
possible negative relation between the macroeconomic and financial environment and 
the number of market participants in the CDS market, the following hypothesis is tested.  
Hypothesis 1: When the overall economy is stressful, the CDS market presents a higher 
credit risk discovery contribution.  
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The second factor that is likely to affect the dynamics of credit risk discovery is funding 
cost. Similar to transaction costs, investors’ investment decisions could be affected by 
their funding cost (Augustin et al., 2014). As suggested by the trading cost hypothesis, 
price discovery would be produced by the lowest-cost market because investors would 
like to exploit their informational advantages in the market where they obtain maximum 
net profits (Fleming et al., 1996). Also, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) emphasise 
the importance of funding constraints and argue that ‘when funding liquidity is tight, 
traders become reluctant to take on positions, especially “capital intensive” positions 
in high-margin securities’. According to the margin requirements for CDS transactions 
set by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), shorting a 5-year single-
name CDS contract requires a margin of 4% to 25% of the notional amount. In addition, 
the margin requirement for speculative-grade CDS can be three to six times higher than 
that for investment-grade CDS (Kapadia and Pu, 2012). Hence, when the funding cost 
is high and volatile, traders would prefer the stock market to the CDS market. 
Consequently, it is anticipated that a rise in funding cost would result in an increased 
contribution of the stock market to credit risk discovery. 
Hypothesis 2: The higher funding cost is, the lower contribution the CDS market makes 
to credit risk discovery process. 
The third factor is the newly introduced central clearing counterparty in the CDS market. 
In December 2009, ICE Clear Credit, the first CDS clearing house launched by the 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), started to provide a single-name CDS central clearing 
service for the U.S. market.3 Distinct views about the question of whether the central 
                                                          
3 There are two approved CCPs in the U.S., the ICE Clear Credit (previously called the ICE Trust) and 
the CME Group. The clearable instruments of the ICE Clear Credit include both single-name corporate 
CDS contracts and CDS indices, whereas the CME Group is only involved in clearing CDS indices. 
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clearing counterparty (CCP) can effectively promote CDS market efficiency exist. On 
the one hand, Duffie and Zhu (2011) argue that introducing CCP only in the CDS 
market rather than in all the relevant OTC markets and constructing multiple CCPs 
instead of a unique CCP would reduce bilateral netting benefits and raise counterparty 
risk, unless the clearable exposures in the CDS market are sufficiently larger than the 
bilaterally netted exposures. Supporting Duffie and Zhu’s (2011) theoretical analysis, 
Arora et al. (2012) empirically prove that the current risk mitigation arrangements in 
the CDS market, e.g., the overcollateralization of CDS liabilities and the use of ISDA 
master agreements, can successfully manage a dealer’s credit risk. Thus, CCP may not 
help reduce counterparty risk further. On the other hand, Acharya and Bisin (2014) 
theoretically present that by disclosing trade positions of participants, CCP can lower 
counterparty risk in CDS trades. Loon and Zhong (2014) empirically confirm that CCP 
can reduce counterparty risk and systemic risk and improve single-name CDS’s post-
trade transparency. Similar results are found by Mayordomo and Posch (2016) in the 
CDS index market. The market trading mechanism hypothesis implies that an improved 
trading mechanism facilitates one market to discover new information (Martens, 1998). 
In general, CCP is expected to enhance the CDS market transparency and accelerate 
contract settlement. Accordingly, this chapter tests the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: For a firm for which CDS contract is clearable through CCP, the credit 
risk discovery contribution of its CDS market increases.  
2.3 Methodology  
                                                          
Since this chapter focuses only on single-name corporate CDS contracts, all the clearable CDS contracts 
considered in this study are cleared by the ICE Clear Credit.  
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This section first briefly outlines an improved procedure to calculate each market’s 
contribution to credit risk discovery. The procedure consists of three steps: a) extracting 
permanent price component from stock prices and CDS spreads, b) calculating implied 
credit spreads from stock prices, and c) calculating credit risk discovery contribution of 
each market. Then, the panel regression used to test determinants is discussed. 
2.3.1 Permanent Price Component  
The observed price is driven by many factors, such as permanent change in firm value 
and transitory change in liquidity. As our focus is on the credit risk component of the 
price, which is based on the long-term value of a firm, using the price as it is could be 
misleading because it may obscure the pure credit risk component and the credit risk 
discovery relation obtained from it. Eliminating any transitory effects from the price is 
expected to provide a clearer view about credit risk discovery.4 In fact, this is briefly 
discussed by Forte and Lovreta (2015), who eliminate transitory liquidity components 
in their robustness test. They report that removing the transitory components does not 
significantly affect the credit risk informational dominance between stock and CDS 
markets in Europe. This chapter brings this forward and focuses on the U.S. firms. All 
the empirical analyses are conducted by using two sets of data: original prices and 
permanent price component time series.  
Similar to Forte and Lovreta (2015), this chapter employs Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) 
P-T decomposition method to eliminate transitory components from stock prices and 
CDS quotes. First, specify a bivariate vector error-correction model (VECM) of bid and 
ask prices/quotes for each market. 
                                                          
4 Putniņš (2013) also argues that prices usually have unequal levels of noise, such as microstructure 
frictions and liquidity; therefore, IS and GG may provide misleading conclusions about price discovery 
leadership as they measure a combination of price discovery leadership and relative avoidance of noise. 
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∆𝐵𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐶𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏1𝑖𝛥𝐵𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑑1𝑖𝛥𝐴𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖1𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1                  (2.1) 
∆𝐴𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝛼2𝐸𝐶𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏2𝑖𝛥𝐵𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑑2𝑖𝛥𝐴𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖2𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1                 (2.2) 
where 𝐵𝑡 and 𝐴𝑡 are respectively bid and ask prices/quotes at time 𝑡 and 𝐸𝐶𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1 +
𝛾0 − 𝛾1𝐴𝑡−1  is the error correction process. Lag 𝑘 is determined based on Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SBC). Then, the permanent price component (LP) is given by: 
𝐿𝑃𝑡 =
𝛼2
𝛼2−𝛼1
𝐵𝑡 +
𝛼1
𝛼1−𝛼2
𝐴𝑡                                                       (2.3) 
This estimation procedure is repeated for both stock prices and CDS quotes. 
2.3.2 Implied Credit Spread 
Forte and Peña (2009) argue that stock price is not comparable with CDS spread as 
credit spread is determined by many variables, such as firm asset value, asset volatility, 
leverage, and risk-free rate. Hence, they advocate using credit spread implied in stock 
price which considers the variations in not only stock price, but also liabilities, risk-free 
rate, and other factors related to firms’ default risk. The use of implied credit spread is 
also supported by Avino et al. (2013) and Xiang et al. (2013), among others. This study 
follows these prior studies to adopt Finger et al.’s (2002) CreditGrades model to derive 
the stock implied credit spread (ICS). Unlike other structural pricing models, the 
CreditGrades model does not suffer from an under-pricing problem and thus has been 
widely used in the literature to extract implied credit risk information (e.g., Byström, 
2006; Yu, 2006). However, apart from stock price, stock volatility, debt per share, and 
risk-free rate, other key parameters in the CreditGrades model, such as the asset-specific 
recovery rate, 𝑅, and the mean and standard deviation of the average recovery rate, 𝐿, 
are not directly observable. Following Avino et al. (2013), this study uses the Moody’s 
average historical recovery rate on senior unsecured debt as a proxy for 𝑅 and sets 𝑅 = 
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0.374.5 Given the absence of industry guidelines for setting the mean (?̅?) and standard 
deviation (𝜆) of the average recovery rate, 𝐿, both 𝐿 ̅ and 𝜆 for the firm 𝑖 are calibrated 
to minimise the sum of squared difference between CDS spread (CS) and ICS using the 
first 20 daily observations, and the calibrated values are used for the whole sample.6 
[?̅?𝑖
∗, 𝜆𝑖
∗] = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛∑ (𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑗(?̅?𝑖, 𝜆𝑖) − 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
220
𝑗=1                                 (2.4) 
Details of the CreditGrades model and ICS calculation are reported in Appendix 2A. 
2.3.3 Generalized Information Share 
After obtaining the time series of CS and ICS, the credit risk discovery contribution of 
each market can be calculated. The most commonly used measures are Hasbrouck’s 
(1995) IS and Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) GG. Both IS and GG are established under 
the assumption that the common factor shared by interrelated markets have the same 
long-run equilibrium price, i.e., a one-to-one cointegration. However, this assumption 
is realistic only for almost identical assets, such as cross-listed stocks. In fact, as shown 
in Section 2.4.3, CS and ICS do not satisfy the one-to-one cointegration requirement. 
This motivates this chapter to employ an alternative measure that has been recently 
developed by Lien and Shrestha (2014), which is unique and does not assume one-to-
one cointegration. It only requires that all the 𝐼(1) time series share one and only one 
common stochastic trend. This study uses this generalised information share (GIS) as 
the main toolkit for credit risk discovery analysis and compares it with IS and GG 
                                                          
5 The Moody’s average historical recovery rate on senior unsecured debt is reported by Ou et al. (2011). 
6 In the existing literature that uses the CreditGrades model, there are disagreements related to whether 
and how to calibrate 𝐿 ̅and 𝜆. For instance, Yu (2006) assumes 𝜆 = 0.3 and calibrates 𝐿 ̅, while Byström 
(2006) calibrates both 𝐿 ̅and 𝜆. Both of them calibrate the parameters to minimise the sum of squared 
difference between CS and ICS using the first 10 daily data and then use the calibrated parameters for 
the whole sample. Xiang et al. (2013) re-calibrate both 𝐿 ̅and 𝜆 every 30 days. Avino et al. (2013) do not 
conduct calibration and assume 𝐿 ̅ = 0.5 and 𝜆 = 0.3 reported by Finger et al.’s (2002) for all firms. 
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throughout the empirical analyses. The reminder of this section briefly describes the 
calculations of IS, GG, and GIS measures.  
First, specify the VECM model of CS and ICS as follows: 
∆𝐶𝑆𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝛼1𝐸𝐶𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏1𝑖𝛥𝐶𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑑1𝑖𝛥𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖1𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1                        (2.5) 
∆𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝛼2𝐸𝐶𝑡 + ∑ 𝑏2𝑖𝛥𝐶𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝑑2𝑖𝛥𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜖2𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1                      (2.6) 
where 𝐸𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑐 − 𝜆1𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡−1. 𝜆 = [1,−𝜆1]
′  implies the long-run equilibrium 
relationship between CS and ICS. Let 𝛼 = [𝛼1, 𝛼2]
′, with 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 denoting short-run 
adjustment speeds. Let 𝜖𝑡 = [𝜖1𝑡,  𝜖2𝑡]
′ and 𝐸[𝜖𝑡𝜖𝑡
′] = 𝛺. Equation (2.5) and (2.6) can 
be rewritten in the vector moving average form: 
𝐶𝑆𝑡 = 𝐶𝑆0 + 𝜓1(1)∑ 𝜖1𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 + 𝜓1
∗(𝐿)𝜖1𝑡                                        (2.7) 
𝐼𝐶𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝐶𝑆0 + 𝜓2(1) ∑ 𝜖2𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 + 𝜓2
∗(𝐿)𝜖2𝑡                                    (2.8) 
where 𝜓𝑖(1), 𝑖 = 1, 2, are the sum of the moving average coefficients. Let 𝛹(1) =
[𝜓1(1), 𝜓2(1)]
′. The Engle-Granger representation theorem implies that 𝜆′𝛹(1) = 0 
and 𝛹(1)𝛼 = 0. Under the assumption that 𝜆 = [1, −1]′, 𝛹(1) has identical rows. Let 
𝜓 be the identical row of 𝛹(1). Hasbrouck’s (1995) IS and Gonzalo and Granger’s 
(1995) GG are defined as: 
𝐼𝑆𝑗 =
[𝜓𝐹]𝑗
2
𝜓𝛺𝜓′
,  𝐺𝐺𝑗 = [
𝛼2
𝛼2−𝛼1
,
𝛼1
𝛼1−𝛼2
]
′
                                                     (2.9) 
where 𝐹 is the Cholesky factorisation of 𝛺 and 𝑗 = 1, 2. Baillie et al.’s (2002) approach 
is adopted and a unique IS is approximated as the midpoint of the upper and lower 
bounds. Also, as suggested by Forte and Lovreta (2015), the GG values that exceed the 
range [0, 1] are replaced with the boundary values. 
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For GIS, the factor structure of 𝜖𝑡  focuses on the diagonalization of the correlation 
matrix rather than the covariance matrix 𝛺. Denote 𝛷 as the correlation matrix of the 
residuals and 𝛬 as a diagonal matrix which has the eigenvalues of 𝛷 on the diagonal. 
The corresponding eigenvectors construct a matrix 𝐺 . Let 𝑊  be a diagonal matrix 
having the standard deviations of the residuals on the diagonal. The cointegrating vector 
is unrestricted, so that 𝜆1 is not necessary to be 1. Let 𝜓𝑗
𝜆  be the 𝑗-th row of 𝛹(1). 
According to the Engle-Granger representation theorem, 𝜓1
𝜆 = 𝜆𝑗−1𝜓𝑗
𝜆, 𝑗 = 1, 2, with 
𝜆0 = 1. Then, GIS can be computed as: 
𝐺𝐼𝑆𝑗 =
(𝜓𝑗
𝐺)
2
𝜓1
𝜆𝛺(𝜓1
𝜆)′
                                                                  (2.10) 
where 𝜓𝐺 = 𝜓1
𝜆𝐹𝑀, 𝐹𝑀 = [𝐺𝛬−0.5𝐺′𝑊−1]−1, 𝜖𝑡 = 𝐹
𝑀𝑧𝑡, 𝐸[𝑧𝑡] = 0, 𝐸[𝑧𝑡𝑧𝑡
′] = 𝐼2.  
The values of IS, GG, and GIS generally range from 0 to 1. The higher values of these 
measures indicate the higher contributions of related asset prices to price discovery. To 
obtain the dynamics of credit risk discovery contribution, we follow Forte and Lovreta 
(2015) to update these indicators daily using a 120-day rolling window. 
2.3.4 Determinants of Credit Risk Discovery 
We construct a panel regression equation using the three factors proposed above, that 
is, financial condition index (FCI), funding cost (FC), and central clearing counterparty 
(CCP). Among the existing financial condition indices, Bloomberg Financial Condition 
Index (BFCIUS) and Goldman Sachs Financial Condition Index (GSFCI) are used due 
to their daily frequency.7 Following Acharya et al. (2015), we use the spread between 
                                                          
7 BFCIUS is an equally weighted sum of three major sub-indices: money market indices, bond market 
indices and equity market indices. GSFCI is set to be 100 on the benchmark day, 20/10/2003. It is 
different from other FCIs as it is constructed by using levels of financial indicators rather than spreads 
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the 3-month financial commercial paper interest rate and 3-month T-bill rate as a proxy 
for the overall funding cost. Moreover, using a dummy variable for CCP-clearable CDS 
(which equals one from the first clearing date to the end of the sample period for the 
clearable CDS and zero otherwise), this study examines whether CCP can benefit the 
CDS market in detecting credit risk news. 
This chapter includes the four factors found significant in Forte and Lovreta (2015) as 
control variables. They are the relative market liquidity between CDS and stock markets 
(RML), the credit condition of reference entity (CCON), the relative frequency of 
adverse shocks (ADS3), and credit rating downgrade events (CRDOWN). The bid-ask 
spreads relative to the mid-quote price for the stock market and the CDS market are 
computed, respectively, and they are averaged over the past 120 days. RML is defined 
as the ratio of the average stock bid-ask spread to the average CDS bid-ask spread. 
CCON is defined as the time-varying mean of each firm’s CDS spread, calculated from 
the 120-day rolling window. ADS3 is defined by the following equation: 
𝐴𝐷𝑆3 =
𝑁𝑜.  𝑜𝑓 ((𝑥𝑡−?̅?)>3∗𝜎) 
120
              (2.11) 
where 𝑥𝑡 is CDS spread at time 𝑡, and ?̅? and 𝜎 are sample mean and standard deviation 
of the CDS spread obtained from the sample [𝑥𝑡−120, … , 𝑥𝑡−1]. CRDOWN takes value 
of 1 if a credit rating downgrade occurs during the past 120 days and 0 otherwise. The 
final panel regression equation has the following form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 +
           𝛽6𝐴𝐷𝑆3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                 (2.12)  
                                                          
or changes in those variables (Kliesen et al., 2012). To ensure that GSFCI and BFCIUS are comparable, 
we adjust GSFCI by subtracting 100 from its original values. 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a price discovery contribution measure (GIS, IS, or GG) of CDS of firm 𝑖 
at time 𝑡. Because the GIS (IS or GG) of CDS and that of stock of one firm sum to 1, 
this regression can also provide us indirect evidence about the impact of these factors 
on the price discovery contribution of stock. 
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Data Sources 
The sample consists of liquid U.S. dollar-denominated 5-year CDS contracts written on 
senior unsecured debts from January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2013. Since the focus is 
on the corporate level, CDS contracts on sovereigns are excluded. CDS contracts on 
financial firms are also excluded due to their distinguished capital structures. Given the 
changes in contract and convention since the 2009 CDS ‘Big Bang’, No Restructuring 
(XR) clauses are preferred. Finally, this chapter considers only active CDS contracts by 
dropping the firms whose CDS data are consecutively unavailable for more than 90 
business days within one year.8 Daily CDS data are collected from two data sources: 
CMA in DataStream (before September 30, 2010) and Markit in TickHistory (from 
September 30, 2010).9 Financial data of the stock market, such as stock prices, market 
capitalizations, and liabilities, are obtained from Bloomberg. After filtering, the sample 
comprises 113 non-financial firms from nine industry sectors. In addition, this chapter 
                                                          
8 Avino et al. (2013) follow Longstaff et al. (2003) to select the companies that at least 100 observations 
per year are simultaneously available for CDS, bond, stock, and option. For the same purpose, Forte and 
Lovreta (2015) remove the firms with no trades or trades available for less than 5% of trading days in 
any of the corresponding years. Compared to their methods, the filtering criterion of this chapter seems 
to be more rigorous. However, it can retain the firms with sufficient daily observations of CDS and stock, 
which may benefit the following cointegration analysis. 
9 Due to a contract issue, CMA CDS data are available in DataStream only until September 30, 2010. In 
TickHistory, the majority of Markit CDS data are available after November 1, 2010. Mayordomo, Peña, 
and Schwartz (2013) compare five CDS databases—GFI, Fenics, Reuters EOD, CMA, and Markit—and 
find that CMA and Markit are more consistent with each other. Loon and Zhong (2014) also show that 
between 2009 and 2011, differences between CDS spreads provided by CMA and Markit are negligible 
for the U.S. single-name CDS market. Hence, it is expected that the merge of two databases may not 
influence the results significantly. 
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follows Blanco et al. (2005) and Forte and Peña (2009) to employ a 5-year swap rate as 
a default-free interest rate. Table 2.4 summarises all the data required for the empirical 
analysis and their sources.  
2.4.2 Preliminary Data Analysis 
Figure 2.1 displays the distributions of the firms in the sample across credit ratings and 
industry sectors. Credit ratings are based on the S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit 
Ratings as of 31/12/2013. Among 113 firms, 94 firms (83%) are investment-grade firms 
(BBB or higher) and 19 firms (17%) are speculative-grade firms (BB or lower). The 
firms spread across industries with no highly concentrated industry. The largest sector 
is Consumer Discretionary, with 28 firms (25%). Throughout this chapter, CS refers to 
CDS spread, and ICS refers to the credit spread implied by the stock price. LCS and 
LICS respectively refer to the permanent component of CS and ICS after eliminating 
transitory components. 
Second, we plot the cross-sectional means of CS and ICS in Figure 2.2, and report the 
summary statistics of CS and ICS time series in Table 2.5 and 2.6. The figure shows 
that CS and ICS share similar development patterns except for the relatively turbulent 
period 2009–2010. While CS returns to its previous level quickly, ICS remains high for 
an extended period. This results in ICS being about 40 basis points (bps) higher than 
CS: 172.23 bps (LICS) versus 128.09 bps (LCS) and 168.69 bps (ICS) versus 127.24 
bps (CS), which can be seen in Table 2.5. Although short-term discrepancies exist 
between each pair of credit spreads during some periods, the generally comparable 
dynamics imply the existence of cointegration in most pairs. Comparing the two graphs 
in Figure 2.2, it appears that eliminating transitory components from the prices does not 
make substantial differences. As shown in Table 2.5, the overall credit spreads increase 
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slightly after eliminating transitory components: 0.85 bps for CS and 3.54 bps for ICS. 
Nevertheless, the difference is more distinguishable at the individual firm level (not 
reported here). In general, when the credit spread level is high, its standard deviation is 
high as well. This is also true across credit ratings, as shown in Table 2.6. Except for 
the reversal between B and CCC, a higher rating is associated with a lower credit spread 
and a lower credit spread variation. 
Third, using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, this chapter examines 
whether CS and ICS follow 𝐼(1) process. We also test the one-to-one cointegration 
between CS and ICS by testing the stationarity of their difference: if CS and ICS are 
one-to-one cointegrated, the difference should be stationary (Lien and Shrestha, 2014). 
Table 2.7 summarises the results and the full test statistics are in Appendix 2B. The test 
statistics show that CS (LCS) and ICS (LICS) are 𝐼(1) series and they do not satisfy 
the one-to-one cointegration assumption in most cases. This justifies the choice of GIS 
over IS or GG measures. After testing unit root, we proceed to find the cointegration 
relations using Johansen cointegration test. The number of lags is determined by SBC. 
As shown in Table 2.8, cointegration is detected in 60% of the firms in LCS-LICS pairs 
and 71% of the firms in CS-ICS pairs. Forte and Lovreta (2015) argue that the power 
of cointegration test may depend on the length of sample period and a failure to 
statistically detect cointegration may not necessarily imply the non-existence of long-
run equilibrium relation. Hence, to avoid omitting any possible cointegration relations, 
we follow them to retain all the firms in the sample regardless of the test results. In 
Section 2.5.3, the sensitivity of the results is tested by repeating the estimations for a 
sub-sample of firms for which the cointegration relations statistically exist. 
Finally, Figure 2.3 and 2.4 depict the U.S. financial condition index and the overall 
funding cost, respectively. Figure 2.3 shows that a lower (higher) BFCIUS (GSFCI) 
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indicates a higher level of stress in the U.S. economy. The sample average of BFCIUS 
(GSFCI) is -0.82 (-0.05) with a standard deviation of 2.07 (1.06). As seen from Figure 
2.4, the overall funding cost increases substantially from just above 0.2% in 2006 to 
roughly 3.7% in 2008. After 2008, accompanied with a series of monetary policies 
implemented by the U.S. government to curb the global financial crisis, the financing 
cost declines in 2009 and then remains to be less than 0.5% until the end of our sample 
period. Table 2.9 reports the first clearing dates of each clearable CDS contract. For 56 
of 113 non-financial reference entities, their CDS contracts are clearable.10 There are 
22 separate clearing dates over the period of 2010–2013. The number of CDS contracts 
cleared on each date ranges from one (e.g., June 15, 2011) to six (February 19, 2010). 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Contributions of Credit Risk Discovery 
The contribution of each market to credit risk discovery is quantified by three measures: 
GIS, IS, and GG. These indicators are updated daily using a 120-day rolling window. 
The cross-sectional averages of GIS, IS, and GG of CDS are plotted in Figure 2.5. More 
detailed views of these metrics are also reported in Table 2.10 and 2.11. Table 2.10 is 
for the results from LCS and LICS and Table 2.11 is for the results from CS and ICS. 
As the two sets of results are similar, the following analysis is based on the results of 
LCS and LICS.  
It appears that all three measures offer qualitatively similar patterns. This is consistent 
with the findings of Lien and Shrestha (2014) and Xiang et al. (2013). However, it is 
noteworthy that the level of GIS is generally higher than that of the other two measures. 
                                                          
10 The cleared CDS contracts in the sample are voluntarily cleared by ICE Clear Credit. For the clearable 
CDS, market participants have two options: either voluntarily clear their trades through the ICE Clear 
Credit or rely on the extant bilateral counterparty risk reduction arrangements. 
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For instance, the average GIS over the whole sample period is 0.45, whereas the average 
IS is 0.37 and the average GG is 0.33. These values by themselves do not suggest which 
measure should be favoured over the others. Nevertheless, if we consider the fact that 
current markets are relatively efficient, the GIS measure, which is closer to 0.5, seems 
to be more reasonable. During the entire sample period, the number of firms for which 
the average credit risk discovery contribution of CDS is larger than 0.5 is 31% based 
on GIS. This value is only 8% based on IS and 7% based on GG, which seems to be 
unrealistic. Also, GIS has a lower volatility over time and less extreme values. All these 
observations, at least partially, support using GIS for credit risk discovery analysis.  
Based on GIS results, the contribution of the CDS market to credit risk discovery is 
generally smaller than the stock market. This supports prior literature which finds the 
informational dominance of the stock market, e.g., Forte and Peña (2009) and Hilscher 
et al. (2015). It contributes to the ongoing debate of the credit risk discovery leadership 
between CDS and stock by using the advanced price discovery measure. However, over 
the crisis (February 2008–January 2010), the relative contribution of the CDS market 
raises and it often exceeds that of the stock market, which is robust to both types of 
credit spreads. Xiang et al. (2013) also find that the CDS market contributes more to 
discovery credit risk news in the financial crisis. Table 2.10 reveals another point. While 
the variation of the number of firms for which CDS is the credit discovery leader (GIS 
of CS > 0.5) is large, GIS is relatively stable over time. This is the same for IS and GG. 
It may suggest that even when the credit risk discovery leadership is handed over from 
one market to the other, the relative informational dominance does not change much. 
On average, eliminating transitory price components does not substantially alter the 
results, which is in line with the findings of Forte and Lovreta (2015). However, if we 
observe the change at individual firm level, the impact is rather striking. Figure 2.6 
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highlights the change of credit risk discovery leadership after eliminating transitory 
components. Overall, there are more firms for which the credit risk discovery leadership 
is handed over from stock to CDS. This is more apparent in the earlier period of the 
sample, especially before the sub-prime crisis. This may suggest that the role of CDS 
market in credit risk discovery was more important than normally believed when it was 
loosely regulated. 
To investigate whether credit ratings have an effect on credit risk discovery contribution, 
we divide the firms into two groups, that is, investment-grade firms and speculative-
grade firms. The GIS for each group is computed. The results are reported in Table 2.12 
and the cross-sectional average of GIS for each group is plotted in Figure 2.7. The table 
shows that the credit risk discovery contribution of CDS is higher for investment-grade 
firms, which is consistent with Narayan et al.’s (2014) finding. As shown in the figure, 
it is also less volatile over the sample period. This might result from higher liquidity of 
the CDS contracts of these firms. However, given the relatively small number of firms 
with a speculative-grade, more evidence is needed to draw a conclusion.  
We also compare the firms whose CDS are centrally clearable with the rest of the firms 
whose CDS are non-clearable. This can provide some information about the impact of 
CCP on the CDS market efficiency. The results are presented in Table 2.13. Since the 
first CCP was introduced in late 2009, the sample period starts from 2010. Although 
the difference between two groups is generally large in each period, no discernible 
pattern is observed. In fact, the overall credit risk discovery contribution of the CCP-
clearable CDS is smaller than that of non-clearable CDS. This result casts a doubt on 
the effectiveness of CCP and contradicts the positive effects of CCP documented by 
Loon and Zhong (2014). To formally and statistically examine the impact of CCP on 
CDS market efficiency, this chapter also uses panel regression analysis. 
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2.5.2 Determinants of Credit Risk Discovery 
As suggested by Hausman test, we estimate the panel regressions using the fixed-effects 
model and use robust errors to control for heteroskedasticity.11 The estimation results 
for LCS and CS are reported in Table 2.14 and 2.15, respectively. Since the results in 
the two tables are similar, the following discussions are based on the results for LCS. 
BFCIUS (GSFCI), the financial condition index which is positively (negatively) related 
to the U.S. economy condition, has a significant and negative (positive) coefficient, 
which supports Hypothesis 1. This suggests that the CDS market relatively contributes 
more to credit risk discovery when the whole economy is under considerable stress. It 
is consistent with our previous results of the increased credit risk discovery contribution 
of the CDS market during the period 2008–2010. Over the crisis time, increased number 
of corporation defaults may increase hedgers’ demand for CDS contracts, and the high 
and volatile CDS spreads may benefit arbitragers and speculators from exploiting their 
informational advantages from the CDS market. Increased number of traders may be 
one of the reasons underlying the dominant role of the CDS market when the economy 
condition is worse. Xiang et al. (2013) draw a similar conclusion in the U.S. market, 
but Forte and Lovreta (2015) find the opposite in European markets. The funding cost 
has a significantly negative relation with the credit risk discovery contribution of CDS. 
This result confirms Hypothesis 2 that a higher funding cost would prevent investors 
from entering the CDS market, resulting in slower information flows into the market.  
The coefficient of CCP dummy is significant and negative. This is contrary to the 
common belief described by Hypothesis 3 that CCP may enhance the informational 
                                                          
11 As suggested by Wooldridge (2016, pp.437), since the macro variables (BFCIUS and FC) do not vary 
across firms on each time point, we consider only firm fixed effects in the regression estimations and do 
not include time fixed effects.  
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efficiency and transparency of the CDS market. However, this result has already been 
anticipated in the previous section, where CCP-clearable CDS is found to have lower 
credit risk discovery contribution. One possible explanation for this is given by Acharya 
and Johnson (2007) and Marsh and Wagner (2015). They suggest that a higher level of 
information asymmetry may motivate insiders to trade CDS rather than stock. However, 
a more transparent CDS market and a possible rise of collateral requirement related to 
the centrally clearable CDS contracts may reduce insiders’ profits and prompt them to 
trade stock or other relatively opaque credit derivatives (e.g., Pagano and Röell, 1996; 
Loon and Zhang, 2014). Duffie and Zhu (2011) and Arora et al. (2012) also express 
doubts about the efficiency of CCP. Overall, the result supports Acharya and Johnson’s 
(2007) argument that the CDS market may be driven largely by insider trading.  
As for the four control variables, the results of RML and CCON are generally consistent 
with the findings of Forte and Lovreta (2015). When the liquidity of the CDS market is 
relatively higher than that of the stock market (high RML), the CDS market contributes 
more to credit risk discovery. Except for GIS, the credit quality of reference entity is 
positively associated with the credit risk discovery contribution of CDS. The negative 
coefficient of ADS3 imply that the adverse shocks are captured by the stock market 
first. Although downgrade is generally accompanied by a higher credit risk discovery 
contribution of the CDS market, the coefficient is insignificant. Forte and Lovreta (2015) 
find that downgrades and adverse shocks are discovered first by the CDS market. As 
they study the European firms from 2002 to 2008 and this chapter studies the U.S. firms 
from 2006 to 2013, the institutional differences, such as contract clauses and regulation 
policies, and different sample periods may explain, at least in part, the dissimilar results.  
2.5.3 Robustness Test 
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To check the robustness of the results against the assumption that CDS and stock have 
a cointegration relation for all the firms in the sample, we conduct a sub-sample analysis 
of the drivers of credit risk discovery process by excluding the firms for which the two 
assets are not statistically cointegrated. As seen from Table 2.16 and 2.17, the general 
conclusions mostly mirror those drawn in the full sample analysis, especially when GIS 
measure is used. To be specific, CDS contributes more to credit risk discovery when 
the whole financial market suffers. A higher funding cost and a central clearing option 
weaken CDS’s informational efficiency. The CDS market presents a higher credit risk 
discovery contribution when it is more liquid than the stock market. A firm’s credit 
quality is positively related to its CDS’s credit risk discovery ability. The stock market 
reacts more rapidly to adverse credit risk shocks. For downgrade events, the results in 
Table 2.17 reveal that their positive impact on CDS’s credit risk discovery contribution 
becomes significant when BFCIUS is used as the proxy for the economy condition. 
Moreover, compared with the results of the full sample analysis, the impact of all the 
determinants is amplified for GIS, which is robust to LCS and CS. However, for IS and 
GG, no clear patterns can be observed. Overall, the results may provide further evidence 
to support that GIS measure is more robust, in contrast with IS and GG measures. 
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the dynamics and drivers of credit risk discovery between stock 
and CDS markets in the United States from 2006 to 2013. It employs an improved 
procedure to calculate credit risk discovery contribution and proposes new drivers of 
credit risk discovery process between CDS and stock, such as financial condition index 
and funding cost. The impact of the newly introduced central clearing counterparty on 
informational efficiency of the CDS market is also assessed. 
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CDS spreads and the implied credit spreads from the stock prices do not satisfy one-to-
one cointegration, which is an essential assumption of Hasbrouck’s (1995) information 
share (IS) and Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component share (GG). This chapter 
addresses this issue by using the generalised information share (GIS) proposed by Lien 
and Shrestha (2014), which is free from the one-to-one cointegration assumption. The 
empirical results justify that GIS is a more suitable measure for credit risk discovery 
analysis between stock and CDS markets. When GIS is used, the relative informational 
dominance becomes much less extreme than when IS or GG is used. Nevertheless, on 
average, the three measures provide quantitatively consistent results. Stock generally 
leads CDS in credit risk discovery, except for the period of 2008–2010. Also, transitory 
components are eliminated from asset prices to obtain the pure credit risk component. 
This exercise increases the informational efficiency of the CDS market in the earlier 
sample period, possibly because the CDS market was less efficient back then. Another 
finding is that the CDS of investment-grade firms has a higher credit risk discovery 
contribution compared to that of speculative-grade firms. 
Moreover, this chapter proposes financial condition index and funding cost as potential 
drivers of credit risk discovery, and they are both statistically significant. The results 
suggest that the credit risk discovery contribution of the stock market is generally higher 
but the CDS market becomes dominant when the overall economy is suffering. A higher 
funding cost adversely affects informational efficiency of the CDS market. Finally, it 
is not found that CCP can enhance the efficiency and transparency of the CDS market. 
Rather, CCP reduces the informational efficiency of the CDS market, which supports 
the insider trading hypothesis suggested by Acharya and Johnson (2007). 
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Table 2.1: Prediction of Credit Risk Discovery Function of Stock and CDS Markets 
Hypothesis Condition for Credit Risk 
Discovery Leadership 
Dominant Market 
Trading Cost Hypothesis Low Stock 
Liquidity Hypothesis High Stock 
Market Maturation Hypothesis Mature Stock 
Firm-Specific Information 
Hypothesis/ Insider Trading 
Hypothesis 
Negative firm-specific news CDS 
Market Trading Mechanism 
Hypothesis 
Exchange and/or electronic 
trading 
Stock 
Notes: This table shows five price discovery hypotheses related to credit risk discovery. The conditions 
for leading the discovery of credit risk news are illustrated in the second column. Based on the inferences 
of these hypotheses, the expected dominant markets are presented in the third column. These hypotheses 
are not mutually exclusive and the dominant role of one market may result from the multiple influences 
of these hypotheses. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of Price Discovery Techniques 
Group 1 Lead – Lag Relation based on VAR Model, using returns 
Group 2 Volatility Spillover based on VAR-GARCH Model, using volatilities 
Group 3 Price Discovery Contribution Measures based on VECM Model, using prices 
  Provide 
unique 
result 
Depend on 
one-to-one 
cointegraiton 
relation 
Prefer high 
frequency 
data 
Consider 
nonlinearity in 
adjustments to 
the long-run 
efficient price 
It is 
dynamic  
Permit long 
memory in 
equilibrium 
innovations 
Consider the 
panel nature 
of the data 
Panel A: Price Discovery Contribution Measures Constructed in Reduced-form VECM Framework 
 Hasbrouck’s (1995) Information 
Share No Yes Yes No No No No 
 Lien and Shrestha’s (2009) Modified 
Information Share Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 Lien and Shrestha’s (2014) 
Generalised Information Share Yes No Yes No No No No 
 Grammig and Peter’s (2013) New 
Information Share Yes Yes No No No No No 
 Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) 
Component Share Yes Yes No No No No No 
 Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo’s 
(2010) Component Share Yes No No No No No No 
Panel B: Price Discovery Contribution Measures Constructed in Structural VECM framework 
 Yan and Zivot’s (2010) New 
Information Share Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Panel C: Price Discovery Contribution Measures Constructed in Threshold VECM framework 
 Chen, Choi, and Hong’s (2013) 
Modified Component Share Yes Yes No  Yes No No No 
Panel D: Price Discovery Contribution Measures Constructed in VECM-GARCH framework 
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Avino, Lazar, Varotto (2015)’s 
Dynamic Information Share No Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Panel E: Price Discovery Contribution Measures Constructed in Fractional VECM framework 
Dolatabadi, Nielsen, and Xu’s (2015) 
Modified Component Share Yes No  No   No No Yes No 
Panel F: Price Discovery Contribution Measures Constructed in Panel VECM framework 
Narayan, Sharma, and Thuraisamy’s 
(2014) Panel Information Share/ 
Panel Component Share No/Yes Yes Yes/ No No No No Yes 
Notes: This table provides a summary of the extant price discovery methodologies. According to So and Tse (2004), price discovery methodologies can be classified into three 
groups. Group 1 is lead-lag relation based on VAR framework. Group 2 is volatility spillover based on VAR-GARCH Model. Group 3 is price discovery contribution measures 
based on VECM model. Panel A - F of Group 3 present the major price discovery contribution measures based on different VECM frameworks, as well as their characteristics. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of Empirical Findings of Credit Risk Discovery Determinants 
Determinants  Previous Studies Major Findings 
Market Liquidity  Forte and Lovreta (2015) For one market, higher market liquidity 
is accompanied with higher credit risk 
informational efficiency. 
Credit Condition Acharya and Johnson 
(2007); Forte and Lovreta 
(2015); Norden and 
Weber (2009) 
Forte and Lovreta (2015) and Norden 
and Weber (2009) find that the worse 
credit condition of a firm is, the higher 
credit risk discovery contribution of 
stock market has. Acharya and Johnson 
(2007) suggest the opposite. 
Number of 
Informed Insiders 
Acharya and Johnson 
(2007) 
The larger number of informed insiders 
is, the higher credit risk discovery 
contribution the CDS market has. 
Hedging Demand Marsh and Wagner (2015) The higher hedging demand is, the 
longer lag CDS has to capture news. 
Adverse Credit 
Shocks  
Forte and Lovreta (2015); 
Norden and Weber (2004) 
CDS market tends to incorporate 
adverse credit shocks first, compared 
with other credit-sensitive markets.  
Credit Downgrades  Forte and Lovreta (2015); 
Wang and Bhar (2014); 
Norden (2017) 
CDS market is more sensitive to credit 
downgrades events and impounds such 
information firstly.  
Financial Crisis  Xiang, Chng, and Fang 
(2013); Avino, Lazar, and 
Varotto (2013); Narayan, 
Sharma, and Thuraisamy 
(2014); Forte and Lovreta 
(2015) 
Extreme market conditions do affect 
different markets’ information 
processing abilities. Certain market 
even can obtain price discovery 
leadership in the crisis times.  
Earnings 
Announcements 
Kryzanowski, Perrakis, 
and Zhong (2016); 
Hilscher, Pollet, and 
Wilson (2015) 
CDS market’s price discovery increases 
around earnings announcements, 
especially negative earnings surprises. 
Transaction Costs Hilscher, Pollet, and 
Wilson (2015) 
High transaction costs slow down CDS 
in incorporating news. 
Macroeconomic 
Announcements 
Marsh and Wagner 
(2015); Kryzanowski, 
Perrakis, and Zhong 
(2016) 
Marsh and Wagner (2015) find equity 
leads CDS when macro uncertainty is 
higher, while Kryzanowski et al. (2016) 
show that CDS market presents greater 
relative price discovery when either 
positive or negative macro news is 
announced. 
Notes: This table summarises the previous empirical findings of the factors affecting credit risk discovery 
between CDS and stock markets.  
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Table 2.4: Data Sources 
Category  Data  Source  
CDS market CDS quotes (<30/09/2010) 
CDS quotes (≥30/09/2010) 
CMA from Datastream 
Markit from TickHistory 
Stock market Stock prices  
Market capitalization 
Liabilities 
Minority interests 
Preferred shares 
Bloomberg 
Risk-free rate 5-year swap rate Datastream 
Firm characteristics Credit rating 
Industry classification 
Compustat 
Determinants BFCIUS 
GSFCI 
3M CP and 3M T-bill 
CCP Clearing dates 
Bloomberg 
Bloomberg 
FRB reports 
ICE Clear Credit 
Notes: This table summarizes the data required for the empirical analysis. CDS quotes are collected from 
two data sources as none of them covers the whole sample period. 
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics of CS and ICS – By Years 
 LCS LICS 
 Mean  Std. Min. Max. Mean  Std. Min. Max. 
2006 50.04 83.97 0.20 976.41 112.23 154.54 0.32 1,240.10 
2007 59.56 111.60 1.70 1,853.60 104.57 175.59 0.12 1,176.29 
2008 169.10 323.15 13.00 10,210.71 187.64 273.37 0.27 2,907.39 
2009 191.04 474.20 14.14 14,475.64 438.26 375.64 3.62 2,665.26 
2010 123.67 116.28 21.26 780.94 150.54 186.05 0.58 1,176.62 
2011 145.39 147.51 20.45 1,128.45 120.80 161.16 0.30 1,085.66 
2012 162.03 223.63 15.20 2,427.62 149.17 192.75 0.15 1,372.41 
2013 126.45 198.55 11.50 2,279.32 100.35 161.76 0.06 1,331.56 
All 128.09 251.13 0.20 14,475.64 172.23 248.09 0.06 2,907.39 
 CS ICS 
 Mean  Std. Min. Max. Mean  Std. Min. Max. 
2006 50.72 84.77 2.50 987.50 63.30 119.91 0.37 1,232.66 
2007 60.54 114.34 2.90 1,958.60 72.12 150.77 0.09 1,164.68 
2008 171.40 338.09 15.50 11,095.00 198.07 280.98 0.28 2,946.19 
2009 192.29 478.50 15.61 14,624.75 460.33 385.46 3.56 2,701.16 
2010 123.77 116.95 20.50 793.07 158.55 188.68 0.59 1,181.32 
2011 141.74 145.57 19.50 1,112.69 126.80 161.17 0.31 1,085.01 
2012 157.10 215.96 11.50 2,259.00 155.51 193.68 1.10 1,373.11 
2013 122.37 191.64 9.36 2,182.90 103.45 163.20 0.38 1,332.48 
All 127.24 253.28 2.50 14,624.75 168.69 253.47 0.09 2,946.19 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of CS and ICS along the sample period. All the credit spreads 
are expressed in basis points.  
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Table 2.6: Summary Statistics of CS and ICS – By Credit Ratings 
 LCS LICS 
 Mean  Std. Min. Max. Mean  Std. Min. Max. 
AAA 26.17 18.03 0.20 117.39 17.80 27.32 0.32 152.88 
AA 43.25 31.82 2.00 225.12 37.35 41.07 1.09 285.45 
A 50.10 30.82 4.78 350.00 81.99 119.11 0.06 1,006.36 
BBB 129.84 294.61 4.97 14,475.64 168.25 222.14 0.43 2,907.39 
BB 252.68 181.89 25.00 1,697.53 310.11 320.53 0.29 1,590.63 
B 520.96 589.18 24.80 12,033.19 691.81 334.93 39.48 2,093.80 
CCC 452.14 517.47 35.70 2,427.62 313.29 219.43 37.98 899.65 
 CS ICS 
 Mean  Std. Min. Max. Mean  Std. Min. Max. 
AAA 25.81 18.10 2.50 115.00 22.71 27.15 0.68 152.51 
AA 39.18 26.24 3.00 180.00 38.73 43.64 1.42 299.38 
A 49.46 30.71 5.50 360.00 80.05 122.15 0.09 1,014.04 
BBB 129.41 299.72 7.40 14,624.75 161.75 230.11 0.47 2,946.19 
BB 252.91 183.79 26.50 1,717.03 333.26 349.85 7.58 1,958.61 
B 517.54 576.74 26.50 11,877.19 658.68 322.05 37.42 1,373.11 
CCC 434.96 492.23 34.20 2,259.00 339.11 238.00 24.95 926.29 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of CS and ICS across credit ratings. All the credit spreads 
are expressed in basis points. 
Table 2.7: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit-Root Test 
 LCS LICS LCS-LICS 
Levels 100 (88%) 111 (98%) 107 (95%) 
First Differences 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
 CS ICS CS-ICS 
Levels 103 (91%) 112 (99%) 106 (94%) 
First Differences 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Notes: This table summarises the results of the ADF unit-root tests on CS, ICS, and their difference, CS-
ICS. Unit root test on CS-ICS is to test one-to-one cointegration of the pair. If the difference is non-
stationary, one-to-one cointegration relationship is rejected. The figures are the number of non-stationary 
time series with their percentage values in parentheses. The significance level is 5%. 
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Table 2.8: Johansen Cointegration Test 
 LCS-LICS CS-ICS 
Cointegration 68 (60%) 80 (71%) 
No cointegration 45 (40%) 33 (29%) 
Notes: This table summarises the results of the Johansen cointegration tests on LCS-LICS pairs and CS-
ICS pairs. The figures in the first row are the number of firms for which cointegration is detected with 
their percentage values in parentheses. The significance level is 10%. 
Table 2.9: The First Clearing Dates of Clearable Reference Entities 
Ticker Clearing Date Ticker Clearing Date Ticker Clearing Date 
AA 23-Apr-2010 DOW 23-Apr-2010 LUV 02-Apr-2010 
APA 26-Oct-2012 DRI 02-Apr-2010 MCK 03-Sep-2010 
APC 12-Mar-2010 DVN 12-Mar-2010 MDC 01-Apr-2011 
T 05-Feb-2010 F 02-Oct-2013 MO 12-Mar-2010 
AVP 03-Oct-2013 FE 15-Jan-2010 MWV 04-Oct-2013 
BAX 14-May-2010 GIS 13-Aug-2010 NSC 19-Feb-2010 
BMY 14-May-2010 GPS 30-Sep-2013 NUE 05-Nov-2012 
CAT 19-Feb-2010 HAL 12-Mar-2010 NWL 12-Mar-2010 
CI 14-May-2010 HD 02-Apr-2010 OMC 03-Sep-2010 
COP 13-Aug-2010 HON 19-Feb-2010 PBI 21-Jun-2011 
CSX 19-Feb-2010 HPQ 23-Apr-2010 PFE 04-May-2011 
CTL 05-Feb-2010 IBM 23-Apr-2010 PG 09-Nov-2012 
DD 23-Apr-2010 JCI 13-Aug-2010 R 06-May-2011 
DE 19-Feb-2010 LMT 19-Feb-2010 RAI 01-Apr-2011 
DIS 02-Apr-2010 LOW 03-Sep-2010 SHW 19-Feb-2010 
SRE 15-Jan-2010 TSN 15-Jun-2011 WHR 12-Mar-2010 
SWY 02-Apr-2010 TXT 09-Nov-2012 WMB 07-Nov-2012 
TGT 02-Apr-2010 UNP 19-Feb-2010 YUM 01-Apr-2011 
TJX 03-Sep-2010 VFC 09-Nov-2012   
Notes: This table reports the first clearing dates of clearable CDS contracts and the tickers of the 
corresponding reference entities. The sample consists of 113 firms, and there are 56 firms’ CDS contracts 
become clearable during the sample period 2006–2013. 
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Table 2.10: Credit Risk Discovery Contribution of CDS Market (LCS) 
 GIS IS GG 
 GIS >0.5 % IS >0.5 % GG >0.5 % 
2006.2 0.53 63 56 0.50 61 54 0.50 59 52 
2007.1 0.51 60 53 0.47 53 47 0.47 52 46 
2007.2 0.48 53 47 0.38 36 32 0.36 29 26 
2008.1 0.40 30 27 0.27 7 6 0.22 6 5 
2008.2 0.39 28 25 0.37 19 17 0.33 17 15 
2009.1 0.55 67 59 0.40 29 26 0.38 32 28 
2009.2 0.49 48 42 0.42 35 31 0.40 34 30 
2010.1 0.60 83 73 0.52 65 58 0.50 54 48 
2010.2 0.50 60 53 0.40 37 33 0.30 19 17 
2011.1 0.37 31 27 0.30 20 18 0.26 22 19 
2011.2 0.42 40 35 0.36 23 20 0.28 16 14 
2012.1 0.38 34 30 0.29 14 12 0.22 14 12 
2012.2 0.38 29 26 0.31 22 19 0.25 19 17 
2013.1 0.45 48 42 0.31 19 17 0.26 19 17 
2013.2 0.34 24 21 0.25 8 7 0.16 7 6 
All 0.45 35 31 0.37 9 8 0.33 8 7 
Notes: This table reports the credit risk discovery contribution of CDS market measured by GIS, IS, and 
GG, using LCS and LICS. The first column represents semi-annual sub-periods. For each measure, the 
first column is the average measure, the second column is the number of firms for which the measure 
exceeds 0.5, and the last column is the number of firms converted into percentage. 
 54 
 
Table 2.11: Credit Risk Discovery Contribution of CDS Market (CS) 
 GIS IS GG 
 GIS >0.5 % IS >0.5 % GG >0.5 % 
2006.2 0.49 54 48 0.39 37 33 0.38 36 32 
2007.1 0.45 51 45 0.33 24 21 0.30 25 22 
2007.2 0.45 46 41 0.34 21 19 0.30 18 16 
2008.1 0.39 29 26 0.27 5 4 0.22 4 4 
2008.2 0.38 30 27 0.36 14 12 0.32 12 11 
2009.1 0.54 68 60 0.42 32 28 0.40 39 35 
2009.2 0.49 52 46 0.42 36 32 0.40 34 30 
2010.1 0.61 84 74 0.53 67 59 0.51 65 58 
2010.2 0.52 60 53 0.42 40 35 0.32 21 19 
2011.1 0.36 25 22 0.31 16 14 0.27 21 19 
2011.2 0.44 46 41 0.39 34 30 0.33 24 21 
2012.1 0.40 36 32 0.32 20 18 0.24 14 12 
2012.2 0.38 29 26 0.33 22 19 0.27 22 19 
2013.1 0.47 51 45 0.33 22 19 0.27 19 17 
2013.2 0.35 25 22 0.26 10 9 0.17 8 7 
All 0.45 34 30 0.36 8 7 0.32 6 5 
Notes: This table reports the credit risk discovery contribution of CDS market measured by GIS, IS, and 
GG, using CS and ICS. The first column represents semi-annual sub-periods. For each measure, the first 
column is the average measure, the second column is the number of firms for which the measure exceeds 
0.5, and the last column is the number of firms converted into percentage. 
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Table 2.12: Credit Risk Discovery Contribution of Investment-Grade CDS versus 
Speculative-Grade CDS (LCS) 
 Investment-Grade Speculative-Grade 
 GIS >0.5 % Firms GIS >0.5 % Firms 
2006.2 0.54 53 56 94 0.50 10 53 19 
2007.1 0.52 53 56 94 0.42 7 37 19 
2007.2 0.48 44 47 94 0.49 9 47 19 
2008.1 0.39 23 24 94 0.44 7 37 19 
2008.2 0.39 26 28 94 0.35 2 11 19 
2009.1 0.55 55 59 94 0.53 12 63 19 
2009.2 0.50 40 43 94 0.44 8 42 19 
2010.1 0.62 71 76 94 0.54 12 63 19 
2010.2 0.50 50 53 94 0.50 10 53 19 
2011.1 0.38 28 30 94 0.29 3 16 19 
2011.2 0.42 33 35 94 0.41 7 37 19 
2012.1 0.40 32 34 94 0.26 2 11 19 
2012.2 0.38 25 27 94 0.35 4 21 19 
2013.1 0.47 43 46 94 0.39 5 26 19 
2013.2 0.33 19 20 94 0.39 5 26 19 
All 0.46 32 34 94 0.42 3 16 19 
Notes: This table compares the GIS measure of investment-grade CDS with that of speculative-grade 
CDS. The first column represents semi-annual sub-periods. For each measure, the first column is the 
average measure, the second column is the number of firms for which the measure exceeds 0.5, the third 
column is the number of firms converted into percentage, and the last column is the number of firms in 
each group. All calculations are based on the permanent price components, i.e., LCS and LICS. 
Table 2.13: Credit Risk Discovery Contribution of CCP-Clearable CDS versus Non-
Clearable CDS (LCS) 
 CCP-Clearable Non-Clearable 
 GIS >0.5 % Firms GIS >0.5 % Firms 
2010.1 0.59 23 72 32 0.61 60 74 81 
2010.2 0.49 19 49 39 0.51 41 55 74 
2011.1 0.40 16 35 46 0.34 15 22 67 
2011.2 0.46 24 52 46 0.40 16 24 67 
2012.1 0.42 17 37 46 0.35 17 25 67 
2012.2 0.36 9 17 52 0.39 20 33 61 
2013.1 0.47 26 50 52 0.44 22 36 61 
2013.2 0.31 9 16 56 0.37 15 26 57 
Notes: This table compares the GIS measure of CCP-clearable CDS with that of non-clearable CDS. The 
first column represents semi-annual sub-periods. For each measure, the first column is the average 
measure, the second column is the number of firms for which the measure exceeds 0.5, the third column 
is the number of firms converted into percentage, and the last column is the number of firms in each 
group. All calculations are based on the permanent price components, i.e., LCS and LICS. 
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Table 2.14: Determinants of Credit Risk Discovery (LCS) 
 GIS IS GG 
BFCIUS -1.21*** 
(0.00) 
 -1.64*** 
(0.00) 
 -1.54*** 
(0.00) 
 
GSFCI  4.07*** 
(0.00) 
 4.27*** 
(0.00)  
4.78*** 
(0.00) 
FC -4.23*** 
(0.00) 
-2.51** 
(0.01) 
-5.31*** 
(0.00) 
-2.55** 
(0.01) 
-5.10*** 
(0.00) 
-2.79** 
(0.02) 
CCP -7.98*** 
(0.00) 
-5.52** 
(0.01) 
-11.21*** 
(0.00) 
-8.67*** 
(0.00) 
-15.50*** 
(0.00) 
-12.62*** 
(0.00) 
RML 3.84** 
(0.02) 
2.96* 
(0.08) 
7.82*** 
(0.00) 
6.65*** 
(0.00) 
10.58*** 
(0.00) 
9.47*** 
(0.00) 
CCON -0.00 
(0.60) 
-0.01 
(0.30) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
ADS3 -23.92*** 
(0.00) 
-24.39*** 
(0.00) 
-29.82*** 
(0.00) 
-29.13*** 
(0.00) 
-33.70*** 
(0.00) 
-33.91*** 
(0.00) 
CRDOWN 1.43 
(0.52) 
1.02 
(0.65) 
2.79 
(0.18) 
2.37 
(0.25) 
3.71 
(0.11) 
3.22 
(0.16) 
Constant 48.62*** 
(0.00) 
49.14*** 
(0.00) 
42.67*** 
(0.00) 
43.05*** 
(0.00) 
39.69*** 
(0.00) 
40.25*** 
(0.00) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed No No No No No No 
R-squared 1% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5% 
Notes: This table reports the results of the panel regression (2.12).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐷𝑆3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
The dependent variable is either GIS, IS or GG of LCS. The independent variables are Bloomberg 
financial condition index (BFCIUS), Goldman Sachs Financial Condition Index (GSFCI), funding cost 
(FC), and CCP dummy (CCP), relative market liquidity between stock and CDS markets (RML), credit 
condition of reference entity (CCON), relative frequency of adverse shocks (ADS3), and credit rating 
downgrades events (CRDOWN). Figures in parentheses are p-values. ***, **, and * indicate statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.15: Determinants of Credit Risk Discovery (CS) 
 GIS IS GG 
BFCIUS -1.64*** 
(0.00) 
 -3.07*** 
(0.00) 
 -3.49*** 
(0.00) 
 
GSFCI  4.24*** 
(0.00) 
 5.13*** 
(0.00) 
 6.23*** 
(0.00) 
FC -6.36*** 
(0.00) 
-3.59*** 
(0.00) 
-9.67*** 
(0.00) 
-3.46*** 
(0.00) 
-10.97*** 
(0.00) 
-4.06*** 
(0.00) 
CCP -5.21*** 
(0.00) 
-2.69 
(0.14) 
-6.62*** 
(0.00) 
-3.72** 
(0.03) 
-9.38*** 
(0.00) 
-5.82*** 
(0.00) 
RML 2.23* 
(0.06) 
1.07 
(0.39) 
2.67** 
(0.03) 
0.52 
(0.69) 
5.17*** 
(0.00) 
2.73 
(0.12) 
CCON -0.00 
(0.71) 
-0.00 
(0.35) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
ADS3 -20.91*** 
(0.00) 
-20.20*** 
(0.00) 
-27.04*** 
(0.00) 
-22.56*** 
(0.00) 
-28.63*** 
(0.00) 
-24.00*** 
(0.00) 
CRDOWN 0.18 
(0.93) 
-0.24 
(0.91) 
2.62 
(0.16) 
2.17 
(0.25) 
3.49 
(0.10) 
2.93 
(0.17) 
Constant 48.07*** 
(0.00) 
48.45*** 
(0.00) 
41.30*** 
(0.00) 
41.29*** 
(0.00) 
38.08*** 
(0.00) 
38.18*** 
(0.00) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed No No No No No No 
R-squared 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 
Notes: This table reports the results of the panel regression (2.12).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐷𝑆3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
The dependent variable is either GIS, IS or GG of CS. The independent variables are Bloomberg financial 
condition index (BFCIUS), Goldman Sachs Financial Condition Index (GSFCI), funding cost (FC), and 
CCP dummy (CCP), relative market liquidity between stock and CDS markets (RML), credit condition 
of reference entity (CCON), relative frequency of adverse shocks (ADS3), and credit rating downgrades 
events (CRDOWN). Figures in parentheses are p-values. ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
 
Table 2.16: Determinants of Credit Risk Discovery – Sub-sample Analysis (LCS) 
 GIS IS GG 
BFCIUS -1.57*** 
(0.00) 
 -1.35** 
(0.01) 
 -1.22** 
(0.02) 
 
GSFCI  4.62*** 
(0.00) 
 3.56*** 
(0.00) 
 4.21*** 
(0.00) 
FC -5.44*** 
(0.00) 
-3.02** 
(0.01) 
-3.57** 
(0.04) 
-1.35 
(0.21) 
-2.39 
(0.22) 
-0.70 
(0.59) 
CCP -10.16*** 
(0.00) 
-7.47*** 
(0.00) 
-9.68*** 
(0.00) 
-7.61*** 
(0.00) 
-15.28*** 
(0.00) 
-12.81*** 
(0.00) 
RML 5.77** 
(0.01) 
4.58** 
(0.03) 
9.75*** 
(0.00) 
8.72*** 
(0.00) 
14.86*** 
(0.00) 
13.94*** 
(0.00) 
CCON -0.00 
(0.75) 
-0.00 
(0.67) 
-0.00 
(0.13) 
-0.01* 
(0.06) 
-0.00 
(0.24) 
-0.01* 
(0.09) 
ADS3 -31.22*** 
(0.00) 
-31.06*** 
(0.00) 
-40.05*** 
(0.00) 
-39.36*** 
(0.00) 
-49.90*** 
(0.00) 
-50.60*** 
(0.00) 
CRDOWN 3.72 
(0.34) 
2.75 
(0.48) 
3.53 
(0.18) 
2.80 
(0.29) 
4.22 
(0.16) 
3.30 
(0.28) 
Constant 47.13*** 
(0.00) 
47.74*** 
(0.00) 
37.07*** 
(0.00) 
37.49*** 
(0.00) 
31.01*** 
(0.00) 
31.65*** 
(0.00) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed No No No No No No 
R-squared 1% 3% 3% 4% 4% 6% 
Notes: This table reports the results of the panel regression (2.12).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐷𝑆3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
When LCS are used, 68 pairs of LCS-LICS are statistically cointegrated. The dependent variable is either 
GIS, IS or GG of LCS. The independent variables are Bloomberg financial condition index (BFCIUS), 
Goldman Sachs Financial Condition Index (GSFCI), funding cost (FC), and CCP dummy (CCP), relative 
market liquidity between stock and CDS markets (RML), credit condition of reference entity (CCON), 
relative frequency of adverse shocks (ADS3), and credit rating downgrades events (CRDOWN). Figures 
in parentheses are p-values. ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.17: Determinants of Credit Risk Discovery – Sub-sample Analysis (CS) 
 GIS IS GG 
BFCIUS -1.73*** 
(0.00) 
 -2.94*** 
(0.00) 
 -3.40*** 
(0.00) 
 
GSFCI  4.40*** 
(0.00) 
 4.83*** 
(0.00) 
 5.97*** 
(0.00) 
FC -7.05*** 
(0.00) 
-4.20*** 
(0.00) 
-9.64*** 
(0.00) 
-3.81*** 
(0.00) 
-11.06*** 
(0.00) 
-4.45*** 
(0.00) 
CCP -5.86** 
(0.01) 
-3.33 
(0.12) 
-7.23*** 
(0.00) 
-4.57** 
(0.02) 
-10.55*** 
(0.00) 
-7.24*** 
(0.00) 
RML 2.90** 
(0.03) 
1.31 
(0.38) 
2.96* 
(0.06) 
0.57 
(0.72) 
5.87*** 
(0.00) 
3.05 
(0.15) 
CCON -0.00 
(0.79) 
-0.01 
(0.43) 
-0.02** 
(0.04) 
-0.02** 
(0.02) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
ADS3 -23.13*** 
(0.00) 
-21.88*** 
(0.00) 
-28.56*** 
(0.00) 
-23.53*** 
(0.00) 
-31.70*** 
(0.00) 
-26.30*** 
(0.00) 
CRDOWN 4.96* 
(0.07) 
4.49 
(0.12) 
4.80* 
(0.07) 
4.27 
(0.10) 
5.34* 
(0.09) 
4.69 
(0.13) 
Constant 49.04*** 
(0.00) 
49.79*** 
(0.00) 
40.73*** 
(0.00) 
40.92*** 
(0.00) 
38.03*** 
(0.00) 
38.41*** 
(0.00) 
Firm-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time-fixed No No No No No No 
R-squared 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 
Notes: This table reports the results of the panel regression (2.12).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐴𝐷𝑆3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
When CDS are used, 80 pairs of CS-ICS are statistically cointegrated. The dependent variable is either 
GIS, IS or GG of LCS. The independent variables are Bloomberg financial condition index (BFCIUS), 
Goldman Sachs Financial Condition Index (GSFCI), funding cost (FC), and CCP dummy (CCP), relative 
market liquidity between stock and CDS markets (RML), credit condition of reference entity (CCON), 
relative frequency of adverse shocks (ADS3), and credit rating downgrades events (CRDOWN). Figures 
in parentheses are p-values. ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Sample Firms 
Panel A: Distribution of Firms across Credit Ratings 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Firms across Industry Sectors 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates credit ratings and industry sectors of the 113 firms in the sample. Credit 
ratings are based on the S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Ratings as of 31/12/2013 and industry 
classifications are based on the Global Industry Classification Standard. Panel A is based on credit ratings 
and Panel B is based on industry sectors. 
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Figure 2.2: Cross-Sectional Means of CDS (LCS) and ICS (LICS) 
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Means of LCS and LICS 
 
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Means of CS and ICS 
 
Notes: Panel A of this figure plots the cross-sectional means of LCS and LICS and Panel B plots the 
cross-sectional means of CS and ICS. The sample period is from January 2006 to December 2013. All 
the credit spreads are expressed in basis points. 
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Figure 2.3: The U.S. Financial Condition Index  
 
Notes: This figure plots the U.S. Bloomberg Financial Condition Index and the U.S. Goldman Sachs Financial 
Condition Index from 01/01/2006 to 31/12/2013. The lower (higher) BFCIUS (GSFCI) indicates the higher systemic 
risk in the U.S. financial market.  
Figure 2.4: The Overall Funding Cost in the U.S. 
 
Notes: This figure plots the interest rates of 3-month financial commercial paper, the interest rates of 3-
month T-bill, and the differences between two rates which is the proxy of the overall funding cost in the 
U.S. market. The sample period is 01/01/2006-31/12/2013. All the rates are expressed in percentage (%). 
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Figure 2.5: Credit Risk Discovery Contribution of the CDS Market 
Panel A: Credit Risk Discovery Contribution of LCS 
 
Panel B: Credit Risk Discovery Contribution of CS 
 
Notes: This figure plots the cross-sectional means of credit risk discovery contribution of the CDS market 
measured by GIS, IS, and GG from mid-2006 to 2013. The upper graph is based on the permanent price 
components (LCS and LICS) and the lower graph is based on the original prices (CS and ICS). 
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Figure 2.6: Impact of Transitory Components on Credit Risk Discovery Leadership 
Panel A: Lien and Shrestha’s (2014) Generalized Information Share (GIS) 
 
Panel B: Hasbrouck’s (1995) Information Share (IS) 
 
Panel C: Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) Component Share (GG) 
 
Notes: This chart shows the number of firms for which the credit risk discovery leadership is reversed 
after eliminating transitory components. ‘CDS to Stock’ refers to the firms for which the leadership has 
moved from CDS to stock and ‘Stock to CDS’ refers to the opposite case. 
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Figure 2.7: Credit Risk Discovery Contribution of Investment-Grade CDS versus 
Speculative-Grade CDS 
 
Notes: This figure plots the cross-sectional means of GIS for investment-grade CDS and GIS for 
speculative-grade CDS. All calculations are based on the permanent price components, i.e., LCS and 
LICS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66 
 
Appendix 2A: The CreditGrades Model and the Calculation of ICS 
According to Finger et al. (2002), CreditGrades model introduces randomness to default 
barrier although the distribution of default barrier is time-invariant. Also, in comparison 
with other structural credit risk models, CreditGrades model is more practical and easier 
for implementation as it links most of the model parameters, e.g., asset value and asset 
volatility, to market observables (Xiang et al., 2013). To extract implied credit spreads 
from equity market, survival probability is calculated first and then survival probability 
is converted to stock implied credit spreads. The first step is to obtain survival 
probability. Asset value 𝑉𝑡 (on a per share basis) follows a Geometric Brownian Motion:  
𝑑𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑡
= 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡 + 𝜇𝐷𝑑𝑡                                                                         (A.1) 
where 𝑊𝑡 is a standard Brownian motion and has the distribution 𝑊𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝑡). 𝜎 is the 
asset volatility. 𝜇𝐷 is the expected asset mean and is assumed to be zero. Default barrier 
is defined as the amount of the firm’s assets remaining when default occurs, which 
equals the recovery value that the debt holders receive, 𝐿 ∙ 𝐷, where 𝐿 is the average 
recovery on the debts and 𝐷 is the firm’s debt-per-share. Assume the recovery rate 𝐿 to 
follow a lognormal distribution with mean ?̅? and percentage standard deviation 𝜆.  
?̅? = 𝐸𝐿, 𝜆2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿), 𝐿𝐷 = ?̅?𝐷𝑒𝜆𝑍−𝜆
2/2                                             (A.2) 
where 𝑍~𝑁(0,1) and 𝑍 is independent of the Brownian motion 𝑊𝑡. 𝑍 is unknown until 
the time of default. For an initial asset value 𝑉0, default occurs once:  
𝑉0𝑒
𝜎𝑊𝑡−𝜎
2𝑡/2 ≤ ?̅?𝐷𝑒𝜆𝑍−𝜆
2/2                                                           (A.3) 
The survival probability of the company at time 𝑡 is given by the probability that the 
asset value does not touch the default barrier before time 𝑡. Denote a process 𝑋𝑡, 
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𝑋𝑡 = 𝜎𝑊𝑡 −
𝜎2𝑡
2
− 𝜆𝑍 −
𝜆2
2
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑡 > 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
?̅?𝐷
𝑉0
) − 𝜆2,  when 𝑡 ≥ 0 , 𝑋𝑡  is normally 
distributed: 𝑋𝑡~𝑁(−
𝜎2𝑡
2
−
𝜆2
2
, 𝜎2𝑡 + 𝜎2𝜆2). 
A closed-form formula for the survival probability up to time 𝑡, 
𝑃(𝑡) = 𝛷 (−
𝐴𝑡
2
+
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑑)
𝐴𝑡
) − 𝑑 ∙ 𝛷(−
𝐴𝑡
2
−
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑑)
𝐴𝑡
)                                     (A.4)  
where 𝛷(∙) is the cumulative distribution function, 𝑑 =
𝑉0
?̅?𝐷
𝑒𝜆
2
 and 𝐴𝑡
2 = 𝜎2𝑡 + 𝜆2.  
Then, the survival probability is converted to a credit spread. To price a CDS contract, 
let 𝑓(𝑡) be the density function of default time, 𝑓(𝑡) = −
𝑑𝑃(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
. Thus, the cumulative 
default probability up to time 𝑡  is 1 − 𝑃(0) + ∫ d𝑠𝑓(𝑠)
𝑡
0
. For a CDS contract with 
maturity 𝑡  and a continuous spread ICS, the present value of expected loss 
compensations for the CDS is:  
(1 − 𝑅) [1 − 𝑃(0) + ∫ 𝑓(𝑠) ∙ 𝑒−𝑟𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠]                                         (A.5)  
where 𝑟 is the risk free interest rate and 𝑅 is the recovery rate on the specific underlying 
debt. 𝑅 is different from ?̅? because 𝑅 is the expected recovery rate on a specific class 
of the firm’s debt, while ?̅? is the expected recovery rate averaged over all debt classes. 
The asset-specific recovery rate 𝑅 for an unsecured debt is usually lower than ?̅? since 
the secured debt would have a higher recovery rate.  
The present value of expected CDS spread payments because of a default event is: 
𝐼𝐶𝑆 ∫ 𝑃(𝑠)
𝑡
0
∙ 𝑒−𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑠                                                                  (A.6) 
The price of CDS is the difference between discounted spread and loss compensation: 
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𝐶𝐷𝑆 = (1 − 𝑅) [1 − 𝑃(0) + ∫ 𝑓(𝑠) ∙ 𝑒−𝑟𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠] − 𝐼𝐶𝑆 ∫ 𝑃(𝑠)
𝑡
0
∙ 𝑒−𝑟𝑠𝑑𝑠      (A.7) 
To ensure at time 0, the value of CDS contract is zero. We have the following equation: 
(1 − 𝑅)(1 − 𝑃(0)) − (
𝐼𝐶𝑆
𝑟
) (𝑃(0) − 𝑃(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡) = −(1 − 𝑅 +
𝐼𝐶𝑆
𝑟
) 𝑒𝑟𝜉[𝐺(𝑡 + 𝜉) − 𝐺(𝜉)]   
with 𝜉 =
𝜆2
𝜎2
, 𝐺(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑧+
1
2 𝛷 (−
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑑)
𝜎√t
− 𝑧𝜎√𝑡) + 𝑑
−𝑧+
1
2 𝛷 (−
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑑)
𝜎√𝑡
+ 𝑧𝜎√𝑡) , and 
𝑧 = √
1
4
+
2𝑟
𝜎2
. Therefore, the closed-form solution for 𝐼𝐶𝑆 can be obtained:  
𝐼𝐶𝑆 = 𝑟(1 − 𝑅) [
1−𝑃(0)+𝐻(𝑡)
𝑃(0)−𝑃(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡−𝐻(𝑡)
] , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐻(𝑡) = 𝑒𝑟𝜉(𝐺(𝑡 + 𝜉) − 𝐺(𝜉))               (A.8) 
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Appendix 2B: Unite-Root Test Results  
Table 2B.1: Unit-Root Test Results of LCS (CS) and LICS (ICS) 
Panel A: Unit-Root test results of LCS and LICS 
Ticker LCS  LICS One-to-one relation of LCS and LICS 
MMM -1.898 -1.37 -2.348 
ABT -1.772 -3.167* -3.594** 
AA -2.044 -1.245 -1.67 
MO -1.788 -1.153 -2.007 
ABC -1.337 -1.159 -1.564 
APC -2.505 -1.437 -1.451 
APA -3.101** -1.591 -1.564 
T -2.451 -1.073 -2.056 
AVP -1.314 -2.304 -2.354 
BAX -2.349 -2.498 -2.679 
BZH -2.794 -2.018 -3.151* 
BMY -2.529 -1.151 -1.589 
CA -3.352** -1.083 -2.157 
CAT -2.653 -1.348 -1.246 
CNP -1.675 -1.122 -1.24 
CTL -1.912 -2.165   -1.83 
CHK -2.409 -1.458 -1.878 
CI -2.728 -1.281 -1.192 
CLX -1.841 -0.928 -1.662 
CMC -1.861 -1.288 -1.113 
CNF -2.411 -1.295 -1.576 
COP -2.324 -1.731 -1.572 
ED -2.122 -1.254 -1.595 
COST -2.224 -1.269 -1.773 
CSX -2.148 -1.037 -1.538 
CVS -2.77 -1.504 -1.684   
DHR -1.818 -1.443 -1.983 
DRI -2.226 -1.29 -1.059 
DE -2.531 -1.078 -0.928   
DVN -2.572 -1.329 -1.243 
D -3.248** -1.349   -2.055 
DOV -1.901 -1.228 -1.391 
DOW -2.444 -0.975 -1.761 
DHI -2.468 -0.914 -1.139 
DD -2.562 -1.234 -1.241 
LLY -1.696 -1.481 -1.604 
EEP -1.962 -1.219 -1.752 
ETR -1.753 -1.358 -2.083 
EPD -2.022 -1.09 -1.802 
XOM -2.068 -1.701 -2.138 
FE -2.14 -1.288 -1.597 
F -2.681 -0.984 -3.358* 
GCI -2.113 -1.036 -2.65 
GPS -1.817 -1.517 -1.531   
GD -2.597 -1.641 -2.193   
GIS -2.658 -1.210 -2.293 
HAL -2.707 -1.375   -1.364 
HAS -1.879 -1.519 -1.778 
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HMA -1.893 -1.524 -1.833 
HES -2.129 -1.588 -1.558 
HPQ -1.441 -1.082 -1.471 
HD -2.016 -1.044 -1.537 
HON -2.368 -1.296 -1.293 
IBM -2.897** -1.284 -2.614 
JCP -0.979 -0.327 -1.613 
JNJ -1.905 -1.633 -2.314 
JCI -2.568 -1.362 -1.894 
KBH -2.42 -1.716 -1.487 
K -1.933 -1.927 -1.837 
KMB -1.812 -1.171 -1.713 
LMT -2.321 -1.228 -1.466 
LOW -2.308 -1.403 -1.577 
MAR -2.007 -0.962 -1.861 
MAS -2.133 -1.112 -1.633   
MCK -3.157** -3.417* -3.374* 
MDC -2.567 -1.326 -1.262 
MWV -2.226 -1.166 -1.238 
MDT -1.973 -1.879 -2.311 
MUR -2.31 -1.546 -1.629 
NWL -1.891 -0.849 -1.034 
NEM -1.636 -1.457 -1.723 
NSC -3.336** -1.24 -1.656 
NUE -2.425 -1.188 -1.035 
OXY -2.406 -1.603 -1.438 
OLN -3.682*** -1.177 -1.534   
OMC -2.841 -1.446 -3.433* 
OKE -2.592 -1.429 -1.302 
PKG -2.864** -1.091 -1.32 
PFE -1.926 -1.36 -2.588 
PBI -1.428 -1.557 -1.59 
PG -1.792 -1.282 -1.956 
PHM -2.381 -0.822 -0.889   
RSH -0.488 -0.454 -1.025 
RTN -2.561 -1.49 -2.117 
RSG -1.694 -1.815 -2.184 
RAI -2.111 -0.863 -2.435 
R -2.065 -1.166 -1.226 
RYL -2.22 -1.732 -1.472 
SWY -1.455 -1.65 -1.855 
SRE -2.913** -1.404 -1.797 
SHW -3.277** -1.113 -2.078 
LUV -2.494 -0.897 -2.231 
SPF -2.283 -1.133 -3.318* 
SVU -1.835 -2.859 -2.627 
TGT -2.285 -1.27 -1.036 
TSO -2.106 -0.914 -1.486 
TXN -2.828 -1.352 -2.292 
TXT -2.511 -1.041 -2.023 
NYT -1.981 -1.08 -1.932 
TWX -2.619 -1.243 -1.508   
TJX -2.213 -1.324 -1.469 
TSN -2.602 -0.949 -1.261 
UNP -2.956** -0.961 -1.077 
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X -1.835 -1.374 -1.549 
UTX -2.316 -1.487 -1.932 
VLO -2.03 -1.356 -1.21 
VZ -3.112** -1.271 -2.275 
VFC -2.733 -1.24 -1.626 
WMT -1.913 -1.731 -2.241 
DIS -2.687 -1.152 -1.352 
WHR -2.26 -1.145 -1.125 
WMB -3.789*** -1.591 -1.205   
YUM -2.341 -0.920 -1.231 
Panel B: Unit-Root test results of CS and ICS 
Ticker CS ICS One-to-one relation of CS and ICS 
MMM -1.885 -1.212 -2.188 
ABT -1.783 -2.943** -3.771*** 
AA -2.125 -1.611 -1.703 
MO -1.763 -0.957 -1.538 
ABC -1.347 -1.179 -0.810 
APC -2.544 -1.631 -1.665 
APA -3.142** -1.603 -1.576 
T -2.473 -1.161 -2.028 
AVP -1.303 -2.221 -2.342 
BAX -2.323 -2.076 -2.085 
BZH -2.735 -2.036 -3.091** 
BMY -2.5 -1.055 -1.706 
CA -3.307** -1.13 -2.032 
CAT -2.703 -1.171 -1.029 
CNP -1.653 -1.478 -1.712 
CTL -1.964 -1.952 -2.003 
CHK -2.421 -1.462 -1.835 
CI -2.8 -1.265 -1.248 
CLX -1.87 -0.900 -1.817 
CMC -1.848 -1.209 -1.067 
CNF -2.434 -1.252 -1.571 
COP -2.309 -1.588 -1.517 
ED -2.09 -1.2 -1.719 
COST -2.216 -1.277 -1.848 
CSX -2.108 -1.021 -1.471 
CVS -2.809 -1.455 -1.692 
DHR -1.818 -1.458 -2.041 
DRI -2.24 -1.239 -0.995 
DE -2.571 -1.157 -1.006 
DVN -2.629 -1.357 -1.302 
D -3.207** -1.33 -2.042 
DOV -1.882 -1.178 -1.366 
DOW -2.497 -0.950 -1.626 
DHI -2.442 -0.901 -0.932 
DD -2.592 -1.229 -1.197 
LLY -1.711 -1.499 -1.618 
EEP -1.953 -1.269 -1.943 
ETR -1.728 -1.388 -2.123 
EPD -2.035 -1.137 -1.972 
XOM -2.062 -1.7 -2.195 
FE -2.179 -1.324 -1.563 
F -2.622 -0.948 -3.313** 
GCI -2.1 -1.038 -2.688 
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GPS -1.81 -1.468 -1.529 
GD -2.633 -1.578 -2.171 
GIS -2.592 -1.199 -2.434 
HAL -2.718 -1.436 -1.422 
HAS -1.899 -1.474 -1.793 
HMA -1.891 -1.681 -2.122 
HES -2.126 -1.485 -1.301 
HPQ -1.464 -1.082 -1.434 
HD -1.997 -1.058 -1.554 
HON -2.356 -1.322 -1.351 
IBM -2.859 -1.269 -2.786 
JCP -1.089 -0.457 -1.691 
JNJ -1.859 -1.621 -2.573 
JCI -2.603 -1.138 -3.203** 
KBH -2.442 -2.036 -1.907 
K -1.979 -1.718 -2.165 
KMB -1.808 -1.168 -1.764 
LMT -2.373 -1.189 -1.428 
LOW -2.293 -1.382 -1.548 
MAR -1.993 -1.09 -1.848 
MAS -2.122 -1.041 -1.576 
MCK -3.086** -1.298 -1.406 
MDC -2.625 -1.2 -1.121 
MWV -2.246 -1.123 -1.126 
MDT -1.954 -1.808 -2.262 
MUR -2.295 -1.479 -1.54 
NWL -1.926 -0.852 -1.033 
NEM -1.675 -1.24 -1.588 
NSC -3.224** -1.18 -1.588 
NUE -2.462 -1.249 -1.1 
OXY -2.457 -1.643 -1.49 
OLN -3.747*** -1.142 -1.323 
OMC -2.821 -1.409 -3.366** 
OKE -2.637 -1.583 -1.414 
PKG -2.869** -1.097 -1.137 
PFE -1.938 -1.353 -2.25 
PBI -1.445 -1.504 -1.611 
PG -1.748 -1.268 -2.143 
PHM -2.385 -0.917 -0.904 
RSH -0.412 -0.494 -0.99 
RTN -2.576 -1.432 -2.107 
RSG -1.747 -1.691 -2.083 
RAI -2.1 -0.906 -2.857 
R -2.075 -1.157 -1.176 
RYL -2.207 -1.479 -1.408 
SWY -1.471 -1.274 -1.606 
SRE -2.853 -1.368 -1.775 
SHW -3.273** -1.073 -2.035 
LUV -2.483 -1.108 -2.15 
SPF -2.296 -1.208 -3.442*** 
SVU -1.83 -2.317 -2.865** 
TGT -2.265 -1.319 -1.065 
TSO -2.087 -0.975 -1.338 
TXN -2.837 -1.368 -2.225 
TXT -2.448 -1.021 -1.786 
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NYT -1.991 -0.935 -1.847 
TWX -2.578 -1.225 -1.473 
TJX -2.206 -1.107 -1.615 
TSN -2.538 -1.085 -1.579 
UNP -2.845 -0.948 -1.061 
X -1.882 -1.395 -1.618 
UTX -2.347 -1.483 -1.915 
VLO -2.02 -1.405 -1.26 
VZ -3.094** -1.265 -2.294 
VFC -2.726 -1.218 -1.551 
WMT -1.898 -1.694 -2.403 
DIS -2.647 -1.185 -1.371 
WHR -2.304 -1.128 -1.123 
WMB -3.747*** -1.778 -1.287 
YUM -2.307 -0.924 -1.25 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the ADF Unit-Root Tests on LCS (CS) and LICS (ICS). The stock 
ticker of each reference entity in our sample is in the first column. The critical value is -2.863 at 5% and 
-3.437 at 1% level of significance, respectively. ** and *** indicate the test statistic to be significant at 
5% and 1%, respectively. For the test of one-to-one cointegration, as Lien and Shrestha (2014) do, the 
difference between LCS (CS) and LICS (ICS) is calculated. If the difference is non-stationary, then the 
one-to-one cointegrating relationship can be rejected. The results show that even after eliminating 
transitory effects from credit spreads, the one-to-one cointegrating assumption cannot obtain in most 
cases. 
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Table 2B.2: Unit-Root Test Results of the First-Differences of LCS (CS) and LICS 
(ICS) 
Panel A: Unit-Root test results of the first-differences of LCS and LICS 
Ticker LCS  LICS One-to-one relation of LCS and LICS 
MMM -11.04*** -9.787*** -9.836*** 
ABT -12.93*** -13.25*** -13.25*** 
AA -12.41*** -7.237*** -11.94*** 
MO -9.007*** -10.07*** -8.928*** 
ABC -10.63*** -8.204*** -10.51*** 
APC -9.694*** -8.414*** -9.347*** 
APA -12.98*** -9.485*** -10.43*** 
T -13.24*** -8.252*** -12.1*** 
AVP -12.5*** -12.08*** -12.34*** 
BAX -13.25*** -13.09*** -13.5*** 
BZH -14.39*** -10.19*** -14.33*** 
BMY -12.28*** -12.3*** -12.2*** 
CA -11.16*** -10.02*** -11.18*** 
CAT -12.23*** -9.939*** -12.7*** 
CNP -9.938*** -9.319*** -9.958*** 
CTL -14.4*** -11.73*** -12.83*** 
CHK -13.15*** -7.823*** -11.88*** 
CI -11.95*** -6.956*** -8.158*** 
CLX -12.11*** -11.77*** -12.09*** 
CMC -11.43*** -8.37*** -10.14*** 
CNF -12.56*** -10.25*** -11.79*** 
COP -13.92*** -7.666*** -9.3*** 
ED -10.83*** -10.48*** -11.6*** 
COST -11.79*** -10.75*** -12*** 
CSX -13.45*** -11.17*** -9.963*** 
CVS -11.83*** -12.88*** -13.01*** 
DHR -11.84*** -10.47*** -12.01*** 
DRI -13.97*** -10.33*** -13.67*** 
DE -12.14*** -6.895*** -7.948*** 
DVN -13.07*** -10.75*** -11.29*** 
D -13.25*** -9.25*** -12.58*** 
DOV -11.57*** -9.254*** -8.843*** 
DOW -11.17*** -9.815*** -11.01*** 
DHI -13.05*** -8.893*** -11.57*** 
DD -12.86*** -9.13*** -11.36*** 
LLY -12.5*** -10.43*** -10.91*** 
EEP -9.194*** -9.94*** -10.48*** 
ETR -12.06*** -9.05*** -12.25*** 
EPD -10.62*** -9.438*** -10.73*** 
XOM -11.48*** -9.465*** -11.25*** 
FE -13.04*** -9.104*** -10.6*** 
F -12.28*** -9.644*** -12.32*** 
GCI -12.08*** -11.25*** -12.36*** 
GPS -13.83*** -12.48*** -14.24*** 
GD -11.36*** -9.612*** -8.817*** 
GIS -12.7*** -12.84*** -12.94*** 
HAL -11.32*** -10.05*** -9.793*** 
HAS -13.35*** -11.83*** -13.25*** 
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HMA -11.25*** -10.52*** -11.56*** 
HES -12.23*** -8.689*** -11.13*** 
HPQ -12.96*** -11.14*** -13.97*** 
HD -12.03*** -10.36*** -11.43*** 
HON -12.4*** -9.254*** -10.96*** 
IBM -12.83*** -10.69*** -13.84*** 
JCP -13.34*** -12.09*** -13.55*** 
JNJ -10.65*** -11.3*** -11.02*** 
JCI -11.47*** -10.2*** -11.1*** 
KBH -12.74*** -11.79*** -12.59*** 
K -13.36*** -10.97*** -13.18*** 
KMB -12.16*** -10.86*** -12.43*** 
LMT -11.77*** -11.48*** -10.71*** 
LOW -12.96*** -9.609*** -11.29*** 
MAR -11.2*** -9.756*** -11.4*** 
MAS -12.37*** -9.854*** -11.63*** 
MCK -13.22*** -9.963*** -10.36*** 
MDC -11.91*** -11.37*** -11.71*** 
MWV -13.22*** -10.36*** -9.345*** 
MDT -10.86*** -13.09*** -11.57*** 
MUR -10.69*** -8.959*** -10.58*** 
NWL -12.8*** -10.7*** -11.06*** 
NEM -12.39*** -10.24*** -12.75*** 
NSC -13.19*** -11.83*** -11.99*** 
NUE -12*** -8.548*** -9.58*** 
OXY -12.8*** -8.38*** -9.566*** 
OLN -12.36*** -11.95*** -12.14*** 
OMC -11*** -11.27*** -12.5*** 
OKE -11.6*** -7.461*** -8.531*** 
PKG -12.1*** -10.82*** -10.94*** 
PFE -10.72*** -12.47*** -10.45*** 
PBI -12.02*** -12.47*** -12.49*** 
PG -10.5*** -9.527*** -10.86*** 
PHM -12.54*** -10.71*** -11.77*** 
RSH -12.59*** -12.24*** -12.9*** 
RTN -12.78*** -11.15*** -11.77*** 
RSG -12.45*** -15.83*** -14.89*** 
RAI -10.64*** -12.39*** -11.28*** 
R -12.94*** -9.921*** -11.89*** 
RYL -13.66*** -10.56*** -13.43*** 
SWY -13.1*** -12.5*** -13.08*** 
SRE -13.61*** -8.695*** -11.36*** 
SHW -12.71*** -12.65*** -12.67*** 
LUV -12.22*** -11.34*** -11.47*** 
SPF -14.47*** -11.04*** -13.96*** 
SVU -13.65*** -11.97*** -12.52*** 
TGT -12.17*** -7.025*** -11.59*** 
TSO -12.82*** -8.517*** -11.45*** 
TXN -12.92*** -13.18*** -12.79*** 
TXT -10.87*** -8.515*** -10.03*** 
NYT -12.85*** -11.1*** -12.82*** 
TWX -13.16*** -10.21*** -10.28*** 
TJX -12.81*** -10.96*** -11.94*** 
TSN -11.62*** -9.282*** -11.33*** 
UNP -13.96*** -10.54*** -10.16*** 
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X -12.93*** -7.049*** -12.27*** 
UTX -11.03*** -8.367*** -10.25*** 
VLO -13.61*** -8.697*** -10.99*** 
VZ -13.12*** -8.71*** -10.54*** 
VFC -12.82*** -10.3*** -12.08*** 
WMT -11.7*** -10.14*** -11.46*** 
DIS -12.25*** -8.833*** -10.65*** 
WHR -11.23*** -8.801*** -10.32*** 
WMB -12.06*** -7.582*** -8.804*** 
YUM -13.1*** -10.32*** -12.68** 
Panel B: Panel B: Unit-Root test results of the first-differences of CS and ICS 
Ticker CS ICS One-to-one relation of CS and ICS 
MMM -11.03*** -9.882*** -9.641*** 
ABT -12.75*** -13.35*** -13.4*** 
AA -12.64*** -6.239*** -11.63*** 
MO -9.024*** -10.44*** -9.655*** 
ABC -10.46*** -8.779*** -9.943*** 
APC -9.623*** -8.542*** -9.571*** 
APA -12.92*** -8.444*** -8.27*** 
T -13.28*** -9.658*** -12.29*** 
AVP -12.35*** -11.77*** -11.88*** 
BAX -13.27*** -13.1*** -13.84*** 
BZH -14.24*** -11.61*** -14.43*** 
BMY -12.38*** -13.59*** -12.86*** 
CA -11.2*** -10.89*** -11.37*** 
CAT -12.39*** -8.168*** -10.88*** 
CNP -9.932*** -8.459*** -9.402*** 
CTL -14.34*** -12.45*** -13.18*** 
CHK -13.11*** -7.951*** -13.04*** 
CI -11.97*** -7.88*** -7.815*** 
CLX -12.1*** -12.33*** -12.51*** 
CMC -11.44*** -8.22*** -10.62*** 
CNF -12.7*** -10.85*** -12.4*** 
COP -14.06*** -7.366*** -7.358*** 
ED -10.9*** -11.24*** -11.75*** 
COST -11.84*** -11.36*** -12*** 
CSX -13.48*** -10.73*** -9.915*** 
CVS -11.84*** -12.4*** -12.8*** 
DHR -11.88*** -11.11*** -11.85*** 
DRI -13.99*** -10.98*** -13.71*** 
DE -12.3*** -6.496*** -7.77*** 
DVN -13.21*** -9.489*** -9.099*** 
D -13.25*** -10.29*** -13.11*** 
DOV -11.61*** -9.999*** -9.558*** 
DOW -10.9*** -10.08*** -10.98*** 
DHI -12.85*** -7.326*** -10.41*** 
DD -12.88*** -9.449*** -12.21*** 
LLY -12.39*** -10.53*** -11.01*** 
EEP -9.167*** -10.02*** -10.6*** 
ETR -12.08*** -9.874*** -11.77*** 
EPD -10.83*** -10.89*** -11.18*** 
XOM -11.43*** -10.07*** -11.89*** 
FE -12.99*** -10.98*** -11.77*** 
F -13.1*** -12.69*** -13.16*** 
GCI -12.13*** -10.55*** -11.98*** 
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GPS -13.7*** -12.4*** -13.83*** 
GD -11.46*** -10.2*** -9.479*** 
GIS -12.72*** -12.75*** -13.08*** 
HAL -11.18*** -9.594*** -9.271*** 
HAS -13.32*** -12.46*** -13.04*** 
HMA -11.13*** -12.15*** -12.17*** 
HES -12.18*** -8.045*** -9.217*** 
HPQ -13.01*** -10.75*** -13.44*** 
HD -12.17*** -11.01*** -11.82*** 
HON -12.44*** -9.011*** -9.924*** 
IBM -12.75*** -10.77*** -13.67*** 
JCP -13.17*** -12.31*** -13.13*** 
JNJ -10.75*** -11.26*** -11.56*** 
JCI -11.43*** -9.762*** -11.83*** 
KBH -12.72*** -12.27*** -12.85*** 
K -13.35*** -11*** -13.26*** 
KMB -12.21*** -10.35*** -12.47*** 
LMT -11.71*** -11.72*** -11.27*** 
LOW -12.98*** -10.38*** -11.93*** 
MAR -11.21*** -10.46*** -11.42*** 
MAS -12.41*** -10.28*** -12.48*** 
MCK -13.08*** -11.52*** -11.43*** 
MDC -11.91*** -9.228*** -10.13*** 
MWV -13.42*** -10.17*** -10.24*** 
MDT -11.1*** -12.87*** -11.87*** 
MUR -10.72*** -9.007*** -10.5*** 
NWL -12.75*** -11.23*** -11.67*** 
NEM -12.41*** -9.457*** -12.16*** 
NSC -13.31*** -11.38*** -11.12*** 
NUE -11.82*** -8.54*** -9.016*** 
OXY -13.12*** -8.217*** -8.714*** 
OLN -12.33*** -11.09*** -11.38*** 
OMC -10.99*** -11.16*** -12.52*** 
OKE -11.62*** -7.678*** -8.127*** 
PKG -12.04*** -10.38*** -10.69*** 
PFE -10.85*** -12.61*** -11.11*** 
PBI -11.97*** -12.53*** -12.4*** 
PG -10.56*** -9.278*** -10.86*** 
PHM -12.53*** -8.789*** -10.92*** 
RSH -12.37*** -11.76*** -12.76*** 
RTN -12.71*** -11.42*** -11.71*** 
RSG -12.22*** -16.62*** -15.46*** 
RAI -10.62*** -13.13*** -11.77*** 
R -13.04*** -9.739*** -11.08*** 
RYL -13.68*** -10.92*** -13.72*** 
SWY -13.08*** -12.89*** -13.78*** 
SRE -13.64*** -8.595*** -9.944*** 
SHW -12.79*** -13.2*** -12.76*** 
LUV -12.24*** -11.66*** -11.9*** 
SPF -14.36*** -11.83*** -14.39*** 
SVU -13.57*** -13.9*** -14.23*** 
TGT -12.26*** -7.383*** -11.23*** 
TSO -12.82*** -9.006*** -11.87*** 
TXN -12.79*** -13.07*** -12.68*** 
TXT -11.72*** -8.588*** -10.92*** 
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NYT -12.63*** -11.16*** -12.89*** 
TWX -12.74*** -11.7*** -11.85*** 
TJX -12.8*** -10.2*** -12.2*** 
TSN -11.63*** -8.179*** -10.77*** 
UNP -13.9*** -9.591*** -9.185*** 
X -12.87*** -6.879*** -13.06*** 
UTX -10.99*** -9.959*** -11.11*** 
VLO -13.74*** -7.579*** -8.997*** 
VZ -13.11*** -11.42*** -11.77*** 
VFC -12.79*** -11.34*** -12.04*** 
WMT -11.64*** -11.46*** -11.63*** 
DIS -12.17*** -8.773*** -10.22*** 
WHR -11.11*** -9.544*** -10.27*** 
WMB -12.13*** -6.368*** -7.61*** 
YUM -13.16*** -10.52*** -12.18*** 
Notes: This table reports the results of the ADF Unit-Root Tests on the first-difference of LCS (CS) and 
the first-difference of LICS (ICS). The stock ticker of each reference entity in our sample is in the first 
column. The critical value is -2.863 at 5% and -3.437 at 1% level of significance, respectively. ** and 
*** indicate the test statistic to be significant at 5% and 1%, respectively. For the test of one-to-one 
cointegration, as Lien and Shrestha (2014) do, the difference between LCS (CS) and LICS (ICS) is 
calculated. If the difference is non-stationary, then the one-to-one cointegrating relationship can be 
rejected. The results show that the first difference of the difference between LCS (CS) and LICS (ICS) 
is stationary in almost all the cases. 
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Chapter 3: ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Financial Institutions: Evidence from 
the Transmission of Credit Risk across the G-SIFIs 
3.1 Introduction  
The collapses of major financial companies and the subsequent meltdowns of financial 
markets around the world in late 2008 have highlighted the need to address the systemic 
risk posed by large international financial institutions that are considered to be ‘too-
interconnected-to-fail’. To directly address the risks inherent in these large, complex, 
interconnected firms, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has formally identified and 
released two lists of financial institutions that are deemed to be systemically important 
to the global economy (G-SIFIs) in the sense that failure of one of them could pose 
negative externalities to the whole financial system and trigger a global financial crisis, 
that is, global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and global systemically important 
insurers (G-SIIs). New regulatory standards and extra loss absorbency requirements 
have since been imposed on these G-SIFIs to ensure that they are not only less likely to 
fail, but also can do so without adverse consequences.12 
Since the publication of these long-awaited lists of G-SIFIs, measuring and monitoring 
the systemic risk and financial connectedness of these special groups of financial firms 
have remained a top priority in academic research and policymaking agendas. There is 
general agreement that, whilst the dependencies and interconnections among the large 
financial firms may not always be detrimental, it is important to assess and monitor the 
risks posed to the broader financial system by individual financial institutions and to 
                                                          
12 See, for instance, the FSB’s (2011) Policy Measures to Address Systematically Important Financial 
Institutions, which defines SIFIs, at both the global level (G-SIFIs) and the domestic level (D-SIFIs), as 
‘financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic 
interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economy 
activity’. 
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understand when the interconnectedness is so extreme that it can severely disrupt the 
international financial system. Billio et al. (2012) define systemic risk as the risk that 
during the periods of financial distress, illiquidity, insolvency, and capital losses of one 
financial institution would quickly propagate to the other closely connected financial 
firms through business activities. They argue that an effective systemic risk measure 
should capture the degree of interconnectivity of financial stakeholders and of the 
default probability, along with other factors, such as size, substitutability, complexity, 
and global (cross-jurisdictional) activity. Zhang et al. (2015) also agree that the degree 
of interconnection is an important possible driver of systemic risk since it can magnify 
externalities of financial distress via contagion.  
The growing literature on systemic risk in the G-SIFIs has focused primarily on a range 
of methodological issues relating to a) the measurement and identification of potential 
G-SIFIs (e.g., Yang and Zhou, 2013; Banulescu and Dumitrescu, 2015), b) testing stock 
market reactions to the publication of the lists of G-SIFIs (e.g., Abreu and Gulamhussen, 
2013; Bongini et al., 2015), and c) detecting stock return and volatility transmissions 
across the G-SIFIs (e.g., Elyasiani et al., 2015). Relatively little is known about credit 
default risk transmission across the systemically important banks and insurers. This is 
somewhat surprising given the growing concern that ‘their distress or failure would 
cause significant dislocation in the global financial system and adverse economic 
consequences across a range of countries (FSB, 2010)’. Although structural credit risk 
models suggest that firms’ default likelihood can be derived from the stock market data 
and the empirical results of Chapter 2 support the general dominating role of the stock 
market in credit risk discovery for non-financial firms, a strand of literature argues that 
CDS spread could be a better and direct default risk proxy for financial institution. For 
instance, Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) claim that CDS spread provides a simple and 
 81 
 
straightforward indicator of market judgement of a financial institution’s default risk, 
especially during the crisis times. Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) suggest that as 
CDS spread contains direct information on probability of default, it is better than stock 
price in investigating financial firms’ systemic risk. Acharya et al. (2017) provide two 
reasons why CDS spread might be better than stock data in studying systemic risk posed 
by financial institutions. On the one hand, CDS spread estimates the losses of the market 
value of a financial institution’s assets, not just its equity. On the other hand, as financial 
firm’s debt may be implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by government creditworthiness, 
CDS spread is better in terms of reflecting the underlying value of financial firm’s debt. 
Thus, this chapter is motivated to employ the default risk information provided by CDS 
spread to examine default risk connectedness across large financial institutions. 
Using the information content in bank and insurer CDS spreads, Billio et al. (2013) and 
Yang and Zhou (2013) present the first attempt in examining credit risk connectedness 
among financial firms during the global financial crisis. However, these studies have 
several shortcomings rendering the validity of empirical results. For instance, Billio et 
al. (2013) focus only on the pairwise connectivity of credit risk of sovereigns, banks, 
and insurance firms. Yang and Zhou (2013) do not measure the dynamics of credit risk 
transmission across financial institutions. This chapter employs Diebold and Yilmaz’s 
(2015a) VECM-based connectedness measures. Complementing the existing systemic 
risk measures, their approach offers a wider range of directed and weighted systemic 
risk indicators, from firm-level pairwise directional connectedness measures to system-
wide aggregate connectedness measures. Compared with Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2014) 
VAR-based connectedness measures, VECM model allows for possible cointegration 
relations. Given the level of interbank lending activities among global banks and that 
of similar investment holdings of international financial institutions, it is not surprising 
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that their default risk, as measured by CDS spreads, may share long-term cointegrating 
relationships. While several studies have examined factors affecting financial firms’ 
systemic risk and/or risk spillovers, they either apply systemic risk measures calculated 
by using stock data or omit several possible drivers. Thus, this chapter suggests several 
possible driving forces of negative credit risk externalities of individual G-SIFIs, such 
as interbank loans and unconventional banking activity, regulatory capital ratios, and 
additional loss absorbency bucket allocations of G-SIBs (published by the FSB). In sum, 
the objectives of this chapter are to investigate the transmission mechanism of default 
risk among G-SIFIs (identifying which bank or insurer is the major transmitter of credit 
risk shock) and to examine the factors underlying each G-SIFI’s systemic importance. 
The following research questions are addressed. 
a) How do credit risk shocks transmit across the identified G-SIFIs? In particular, 
which bank or insurer transfers the most credit risk shocks to the rest of the G-SIFIs? 
b) What factors explain the systemic importance of individual G-SIFIs in the credit 
risk transmission mechanism? 
The major findings can be summarised as follows. Over the entire sample period of the 
years 2006–2014, the total credit risk connectedness among G-SIFIs is generally high. 
It increases substantially from less than 75% in mid-2006 to 95% in mid-2008, and it 
has remained above 90% since then. The periods of unusually high credit risk spillovers, 
as quantified by a ‘scored’ credit risk connectedness measure, occurred during the 
periods of widely publicised financial episodes. Compared with the G-SIFIs from the 
EU and those from Asia, the U.S.-based G-SIFIs are generally major credit risk senders. 
In comparison with insurance firms, banks are more systemically important in the credit 
risk transmission. Finally, a bank is more likely to be net credit risk transmitter when it 
has more interbank loans, more non-interest income (especially trading book income), 
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and lower Tier 1 leverage ratio, and when it is distributed to a higher additional loss 
absorbency bucket. An insurer plays a more crucial role in sending credit risk shocks if 
it has more non-traditional non-insurance business, larger size, and more global sales.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in a number of aspects. First, this study 
extends the existing understanding of credit risk spillovers across financial institutions 
by focusing on a special group of financial firms, that is, the G-SIFIs. Second, different 
from Diebold and Yilmaz (2015a), this chapter documents that the empirical findings 
obtained from VECM model and VAR model share qualitatively similar patterns. Third, 
this chapter proposes a new ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking to identify the major 
credit risk providers and receivers in this special group of financial firms. This ranking 
is complementary to the existing official list published by the FSB in capturing the 
multiple facets of systemic risk. Unlike the official list which is based on balance-sheet 
data, our ranking is derived directly from CDS market data and should reflect, at least 
in part, market participants’ expectations of each G-SIFI’s systemic importance in 
credit risk spillovers. Regulators may combine these two lists to construct a ‘composite’ 
systemic risk ranking that considers various sources of information, including market 
and accounting data. Finally, this chapter offers further evidence of the drivers of credit 
risk spillovers of G-SIFIs, which helps regulators design more effective policies.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews relevant literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2015a) VECM-
based connectedness measures and presents the framework we use to construct the ‘too-
interconnected-to-fail’ ranking and to examine the drivers of G-SIFI’s role in global 
credit risk transmission. Section 3.4 presents the data and the preliminary analysis. The 
main empirical findings are reported in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 is conclusion.   
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3.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Market-Based Systemic Risk Measures 
To support regulators and supervisors in measuring systemic risk, extensive research 
has put forward numerous metrics which rely only on public financial information and 
reflect market expectations.13 Table 3.1 provides a brief summary of the major market-
based systemic risk measures.14 Some of these metrics concentrate on the contribution 
of one firm’s default to the system-wide distress, e.g., Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2016) 
Conditional VaR (CoVaR). Several indicators focus on the degree of vulnerability of a 
financial company in the case of a systemic event, e.g., Acharya et al.’s (2017) marginal 
expected shortfall (MES) and Brownlees and Engle’s (2017) SRISK. Some others focus 
on the interconnections across financial institutions in the system, e.g., Billio et al.’s 
(2012) connectedness measures. 
Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2014) measures concentrate on the connectivity among financial 
firms. They argue that their framework unifies several systemic risk metrics. The ‘From’ 
statistic measures individual firms’ exposures to systemic shocks, which is analogous 
to MES; the ‘To’ statistic quantifies individual firms’ contributions to systemic events, 
which is analogous to ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅; the ‘Total’ statistic aggregates firm-specific systemic 
risk across all the institutions in the financial system, which is analogous to aggregated 
SRISK. Several extensions of Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2014) connectedness measures 
                                                          
13 BCBS (2013) acknowledges that “No approach will perfectly measure global systemic importance 
across all banks.” The usefulness and potential model risks of market-based systemic risk measures are 
criticised by Zhang et al. (2015) and Danielsson et al. (2016a), respectively. Nonetheless, compared with 
the indicator-based systemic risk measures currently used by supervisory authorities, the market-based 
indicators can provide timely assessments of financial firms’ systemic risk and convey, at least in part, 
market participants’ expectations. Thus, although the market-based metrics have several flaws, it is still 
important for regulators to appropriately adopt them as ‘cross-check’ tools (Weistroffer et al., 2011). 
14 More comprehensive surveys of the main systemic risk measures can be found in Bisias et al. (2012), 
Nucera et al. (2016), Giglio et al. (2016), and Benoit et al. (2016). 
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have been proposed in the recent literature. For example, Alter and Beyer (2014) use 
generalised impulse response functions in VAR model with exogenous factors to devise 
a contagion index that can quantify ‘excess spillovers’ among the examined variables. 
To incorporate any long-term equilibrium relationships shared by dependent variables, 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2015a) construct connectedness measures based on VECM model. 
In VAR and VECM models, Barunik and Krehlik (2015) use spectral representation of 
variance decomposition of forecast errors to gauge frequency-dependent connectedness, 
which considers shocks at different frequencies with different strength. Based on the 
BEKK-GARCH model, Fengler and Herwartz (2015) propose a time-varying variance 
spillover index that exploits the information content of variance-covariance dynamics.  
3.2.2 Connectedness of Financial Institutions    
Table 3.2 briefly summarises the existing empirical evidence about interconnectedness 
among financial firms. As shown, Billio et al. (2012) document that in the past decade, 
stock return connectedness across hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insurers has 
increased to a higher level via a complex and dynamic network of causal relationships. 
Elyasiani et al. (2015) find that the U.S. financial institutions are major stock return and 
volatility transmitters to their peers in other countries, such as Japanese financial firms. 
Regarding the relationships between banks and insurers, Harrington (2009) claims that 
compared with banks, insurance companies seem to be less risky because they have no 
deposit runs and have more capital holdings. Billio et al. (2012) and Chen et al. (2014) 
present that although bidirectional spillovers across banking and insurance sectors can 
be observed, banks play as the primary shock providers. 
Most of the existing literature uses stock market data, with only a few exceptions, such 
as Billio et al. (2013) and Yang and Zhou (2013) who employ information from CDS 
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market. However, it has been suggested that CDS spread is a better and straightforward 
default risk proxy for financial institution. For example, Chiaramonte and Casu (2013), 
Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013), and Acharya et al. (2017) agree that because CDS 
spread contains direct information on market expectation of default probability of one 
financial firm, it is better than stock price in examining financial firms’ systemic risk. 
While Billio et al. (2013) and Yang and Zhou (2013) use CDS data, their studies have 
shortcomings. The PCA-based connectedness measures employed by Billio et al. (2013) 
indicate only the pairwise linear dependency, depend on arbitrary significance levels, 
and fail to track the size of non-zero coefficients (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2014). Yang 
and Zhou (2013) provide only a static view about credit risk linkages across financial 
institutions. We complement these previous studies by using CDS data and Diebold and 
Yilmaz’s (2015a) connectedness metrics which yield multilevel, directional, dynamic, 
and daily credit risk interdependence across financial firms. 
3.2.3 Determinants of Connectedness of Financial Institutions  
In the growing literature, the role of leverage, size, corporate governance, deposit 
insurance policy, competition, and domestic regulatory environment in affecting banks’ 
systemic risk or risk spillovers has been widely studied. Allen et al. (2012a) and Yang 
and Zhou (2013) find that financial institutions which rely intensively on short-term 
financing generate more systemic risk. Yang and Zhou (2013) discover that size has 
negative but insignificant impact on one financial firm’ spillover score (SS)15, while 
Bostandzic et al. (2014) and Laeven et al. (2016) present that size is one of the primary 
                                                          
15 Based on the identified contemporaneous causal linkages among financial firms, Yang and Zhou (2013) 
assign a spillover score (SS) to each firm. SS can measure the extent of risk spillover from one firm to 
the rest of firms in the financial system. SS=3 indicates a strong risk sender and a weak risk receiver; 
SS=2 indicates a strong risk transmitter and a strong risk receiver; SS=1 indicates a weak risk sender and 
a strong risk receiver; SS=0 indicates a weak risk provider and a weak risk receiver. Elyasiani et al. (2015) 
also use SS, but they use stock data rather than CDS data.  
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determinants of banks’ systemic risk. Iqbal et al. (2015) suggest that better corporate 
governance amplifies rather than alleviates financial firms’ systemic relevance, while 
Yang and Zhou (2013) cannot find a significant impact of corporate governance on one 
financial firm’s SS. Anginer et al. (2014a) show that although explicit deposit insurance 
and full deposit insurance coverage reduce banks’ exposures to systemic risk during the 
crisis times, their overall effects over the full sample period are detrimental. Bostandzic 
et al. (2014) report that the explicit deposit insurance policy which requires banks to 
contribute more financial resources increases both exposures and contributions of banks 
to systemic risk. In addition, Anginer et al. (2014b) document that greater competition 
benefits the stability of the banking system. They also find that the countries with strong 
regulation, less government ownership of banks, and less competition restrictions have 
lower systemic risk in their banking system. 
Different from the above mentioned literature, this chapter examines the impact of four 
bank-specific characteristics, i.e., interbank loans, unconventional bank activity, capital 
adequacy, and extra loss absorbency requirement, on G-SIBs’ credit risk transmissions. 
Systemic risk can be defined as the risk that the distress of one financial firm propagates 
to other financial institutions through their business links (Furfine, 2003). The financial 
linkages between banks consist of, but are not limited to, interbank loans, payment 
systems, and derivatives positions (Krause and Giansante, 2012). Intuitively, as argued 
by Rochet and Tirole (1996), while interbank lending may incentivise peer monitoring, 
it may increase systemic risk since it results in a higher interconnection between banks. 
Thus, a G-SIB with a higher interbank exposure is expected to be more systemically 
important because it is more likely to transfer credit risk shocks to other G-SIBs through 
its interbank business activities. Proposing and applying the participation approach (PA) 
and generalised contribution approach (GCA) based on Shapley values, Drehmann and 
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Tarashev (2011, 2013) present that banks with greater interbank borrowing/lending are 
more systemically relevant. Hence, we develop the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1(a): The more interbank loans a G-SIB has, the greater role it would play 
in credit risk transmission.  
Motivated by deregulation initiatives and better performance, banks prefer to engage in 
risky non-banking activities (DeYoung and Torna, 2013). While untraditional banking 
business may provide banks diversification opportunities (Saunders and Walter, 1994), 
the risk embedded in those unconventional banking activities may be more appropriate 
for other financial intermediaries such as hedge funds (Billio et al., 2012). Hence, the 
inference to be drawn is that a bank heavily depending on non-interest income would 
be more risky and systemically relevant. In line with the empirical findings of DeYoung 
and Roland (2001) and Stiroh (2004, 2006), DeJonghe (2010) presents that non-interest 
income, e.g., commission and fee income, trading income, and other operating income, 
increases European banks’ tail betas. In terms of the U.S. commercial banks, DeYoung 
and Torna (2013) find that asset-based non-banking activities, e.g., investment banking, 
venture capital, and asset securitization, are positively related to the distressed bank’s 
default probability. In contrast to Bostandzic et al. (2014), Brunnermeier et al. (2012) 
find that banks with more non-interest income have higher systemic risk contributions 
measured by ∆CoVaR and systemic expected shortfall (SES). Accordingly, we develop 
the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1(b): The more non-interest income a G-SIB has, the greater role it would 
play in credit risk transmission. 
Since 1988, the capital adequacy of financial firms has always been the key interest of 
regulators and supervisors. However, the defaults of large financial institutions during 
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the recent financial crisis undoubtedly questioned the effectiveness of the existing 
capital regulation framework (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). In July 2010, the Basel 
Committee proposed a Tier 1 leverage ratio requirement which is based on gross non-
risk-adjusted assets. This capital surcharge aims to supplement Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
requirements that are based on risk-weighted assets and address the criticism associated 
with arbitrary risk exposure computations under the Basel rules (Fender and Lewrick, 
2015). Intuitively, since better-capitalised banks have more capital to withstand adverse 
shocks and absorb unexpected losses (e.g., VanHoose, 2007), they would be less likely 
to default and contribute more systemic risk. Bostandzic et al. (2014) show that banks 
with more Tier 1 capital have less exposures and contributions to systemic risk, which 
is supported by the findings of Laeven et al. (2016). Although it is unknown whether 
Tier 1 leverage ratio and leverage ratio (divide the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital by 
total assets) could influence banks’ systemic importance, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) 
discover that large banks’ stock returns are more sensitive to Tier 1 leverage ratio and 
leverage ratio than to Tier 1 capital ratio. Using four proxies of capital adequacy, that 
is, Tier 1 capital ratio, capital adequacy ratio, Tier 1 leverage ratio, and leverage ratio, 
this chapter tests the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1(c): The lower capital adequacy a G-SIB has, the greater role it would 
play in credit risk transmission. 
Since November 2012, based on the assessment scores obtained by using the BCBS 
methodology, the FSB has allocated the yearly designated G-SIBs to five buckets. Each 
bucket represents a Tier 1 common equity capital ratio (CET1) level that G-SIBs must 
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hold in addition to the Basel III minimum CET1 requirement.16 The higher bucket a G-
SIB is assigned, the more systemically relevant it is. The requirements are phased in 
from January 2016, with full implementation by January 2019 (FSB, 2013).17 Being 
identified as a G-SIB is more likely to be negative news because of extra regulatory 
costs and supervisory scrutiny (Bongini et al., 2015; Danielsson et al., 2016b). Higher 
regulatory burden may even incentivise the G-SIBs to get involved in riskier financial 
innovations or investments to circumvent the stringent regulations and to survive in the 
fierce competition with their non-systemically important rivals, which may in turn 
threaten the global financial stability (Slovik, 2012).  
Hypothesis 1(d): The higher additional loss absorbency bucket a G-SIB is distributed, 
the greater role it would play in credit risk transmission. 
Regarding insurers, Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014) study the impact of size, leverage, 
and other factors identified by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS) (2013) on the systemic risk exposures and contributions of the U.S. insurers 
from 2007 to 2008. Bierth et al. (2015) extend Weiß and Mühlnickel’s (2014) work by 
using an international sample and a longer sample period. Both studies employ MES, 
∆CoVaR, and SRISK to measure systemic risk. Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014) find that 
insurers which have higher exposures to systemic risk are larger, relying more heavily 
on non-core insurance business, and more successful in investment activities. However, 
insurers’ contributions to systemic risk are driven only by firm size. Bierth et al. (2015) 
                                                          
16 Bucket 1: extra 1% CET1; bucket 2: extra 1.5% CET1; bucket 3: extra 2% CET1; bucket 4: extra 2.5% 
CET1; bucket 5: extra 3.5% CET1. Bucket 5 is used as an incentive to curb banks to become more 
systemically important. If Bucket 5 is populated, the sixth bucket will be added for the same purpose. 
17 According to the FSB (2013), the extra CET1 requirements for the G-SIBs designated in the annual 
update each November will apply to them as from January fourteen months later. It means that, for 
example, the G-SIBs identified in November 2014 need to hold the required additional CET1 from 
January 2016 onwards. The G-SIBs identified in November 2015 need to hold the required extra CET1 
from January 2017 onwards.  
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document that insurance firms’ systemic risk is affected by various factors including 
interconnectedness, size, and leverage, while the magnitudes and significances of the 
effects of driving forces vary with different systemic risk measures, insurance lines (life 
or non-life insurers), and geographic regions. 
Based on the findings of the above mentioned studies, this chapter focuses on two main 
drivers: non-traditional and non-insurance (NTNI) activity and size. Engaging in more 
NTNI activities, e.g., CDS underwriting activities, has been considered as one of the 
primary reasons causing the distress of AIG (Cummins and Weiss, 2014). Thus, G-SIIs 
with more NTNI business are expected to generate more systemic risk. This conjecture 
is empirically supported by the findings of Bierth et al. (2015). In terms of firm size, 
insurance businesses are based on the law of large numbers, that is, as the number of 
risks in a portfolio increases, the risk of the portfolio declines (Weiß and Mühlnickel, 
2014). However, Acharya et al. (2009) argue that larger insurers, such as AIG, are more 
likely to be ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’, so they become more systemically important. 
Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014) and Irresberger et al. (2016) empirically confirm that size 
is positively related to insurers’ systemic risk. Thus, we test the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2(a): The more NTNI business a G-SII has, the greater role it would play 
in credit risk transmission. 
Hypothesis 2(b): The larger size a G-SII has, the more systemically important it would 
be in credit risk transmission. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 VECM-based Connectedness Measures  
Consider the following model for CDS spreads of G-SIFIs, 
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∆𝑋𝑡 = −𝛱𝑋𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛤𝑖𝛥𝑋𝑡−𝑖 +𝑈𝑡
𝑘−1
𝑖=1 , 𝑈𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝛴)               (3.1) 
where ∆𝑋𝑡 is a 𝑁 × 1 vector of first log-difference of CDS spreads. Lag 𝑘 is selected 
based on Schwarz Information Criterion (SBC). 𝛤𝑖 are 𝑁 × 𝑁 coefficient matrices, for 
𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑘 − 1. 𝛴 is assumed to be constant for all 𝑡.18 Suppose there is a 𝑁 × 𝑟 
matrix 𝛽  so that the 𝑟 × 1  vector 𝑧𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑋𝑡  is stationary, where 1 ≤ 𝑟 < 𝑁 . The 
cointegration relations can be expressed as: 𝛱 = 𝛼𝛽′, where 𝛼 is a 𝑁 × 𝑟 matrix, with 
rank (𝛱) = 𝑟 . Since ∆𝑋𝑡  are stationary, ∆𝑋𝑡  can be rewritten as the vector moving 
average representation: 
∆𝑋𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑈𝑡−𝑖
∞
𝑖=0                                              (3.2) 
where 𝐴𝑖  are 𝑁 × 𝑁  coefficient matrices, for 𝑖 = 0,1, 2, …  To identify shocks, the 
generalised variance decomposition (GVD) proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran 
and Shin (1998) (KPPS) is employed. GVD is ordering invariant and considers shocks 
by using historically observed distribution of the errors. Denote the KPPS 𝐻-step-ahead 
GVD as 𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔 (𝐻), for 𝐻 = 1,2, …, such that:  
𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔 (𝐻) =
𝜎𝑗𝑗
−1  ∑ (𝑒𝑖
′𝐴ℎ𝛴𝑒𝑗)
2𝐻−1
ℎ=0
∑ (𝑒𝑖
′𝐴ℎ𝛴𝐴ℎ
′ 𝑒𝑗)
𝐻−1
ℎ=0
                                                                   (3.3)   
where 𝜎𝑗𝑗 is the standard deviation of the error term for the 𝑗𝑡ℎ equation, and 𝑒𝑖 is a 
vector with one at the 𝑖𝑡ℎ element and zeros otherwise. The sum of the elements in each 
                                                          
18 It can be noted that the variance-covariance matrix of 𝑈𝑡 , 𝛴, could also be time-varying, that is, VECM-
GARCH model. However, given the complexity and computation burden in the estimation of VECM-
GARCH model, the empirical applications of the modified connectedness measures may be significantly 
limited (See, e.g., Fengler and Herwartz, 2015). As the purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
transmission of credit default risk of a relatively large system of G-SIFIs across the U.S., the EU, and 
Asia, 𝛴 is assumed to be constant.  
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row of the variance decomposition table is not necessarily equal to 1: ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔 (𝐻)𝑁𝑗=1 ≠
1. Thus, normalise each entry of the variance decomposition matrix by the row sum as: 
?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔 (𝐻) =
𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)
∑ 𝜃
𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑗=1
                                                                                   (3.4) 
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔 (𝐻)𝑁𝑗=1 = 1 and ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔 (𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑗=1 = 𝑁. Total connectedness measure is defined as: 
𝐶𝑔(𝐻) =
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗
∑ ?̃?
𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑗=1
 × 100 =
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗
𝑁
 × 100                          (3.5) 
To identify the origin of connectedness, directional connectedness measure is defined. 
Directional connectedness obtained by market 𝑖 from all other markets 𝑗 and directional 
connectedness transmitted by market 𝑖 to all other markets 𝑗 are: 
𝐶𝑖.
𝑔(𝐻) =
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗
∑ ?̃?
𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑗=1
 × 100 =
∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗
𝑁
 × 100                             (3.6) 
𝐶.𝑖
𝑔(H) =
∑ ?̃?𝑗𝑖
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗
∑ ?̃?
𝑗𝑖
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑗=1
 × 100 =
∑ ?̃?𝑗𝑖
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗
𝑁
 × 100                             (3.7) 
Net connectedness measure and net pairwise connectedness measure are computed as: 
𝐶𝑖
𝑔(𝐻) = 𝐶.𝑖
𝑔(𝐻) − 𝐶𝑖.
𝑔(𝐻)                                                                                     (3.8)       
𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑔(𝐻) = (
?̃?𝑗𝑖
𝑔
 (𝐻)
∑ ?̃?
𝑖𝑘
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑖,𝑘=1
−
?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)
∑ ?̃?
𝑗𝑘
𝑔
 (𝐻)𝑁𝑗,𝑘=1
) × 100 = (
?̃?𝑗𝑖
𝑔
 (𝐻)−?̃?𝑖𝑗
𝑔
 (𝐻)
𝑁
) × 100        (3.9) 
As a benchmark, we also use VAR-based connectedness metrics in empirical analyses.   
3.3.2 Ranking of ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Financial Firms 
Using rolling-window estimation method, this chapter calculates a variety of dynamic 
credit risk connectedness measures for G-SIFIs. Then, we compute the yearly average 
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net directional credit risk connectedness of individual G-SIFIs and rank the values from 
the lowest to the highest. Next, we assign a score, ranging from 1 to 𝑁, to each G-SIFI. 
𝑁 is the total number of G-SIFIs in the sample. The higher (lower) the score, the more 
(less) important the role of G-SIFI is in the global credit risk transmission. This ranking 
is updated yearly and is referred to as ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking.19 It is noted 
that, unlike the FSB list which is based on balance-sheet data, this ‘too-interconnected-
to-fail’ ranking is derived directly from CDS market data and can reveal investors’ 
expectations about individual G-SIFI’s systemic importance in credit risk transmission.  
3.3.3 Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking 
This study also examines the determinants of the strength of credit risk spillovers across 
G-SIFIs. In particular, the following regression (similar to that of Yang and Zhou, 2013; 
Elyasiani et al., 2015) is used to examine the driving forces of credit risk transmission:20  
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (3.10) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ financial institution at year 𝑡. 𝛾 and 𝜉 are the 
vectors of coefficients. To alleviate the concern that dependent variable and explanatory 
variables could be determined simultaneously (Bierth et al., 2015), all the independent 
variables are lagged by one period. Given that banks and insurers have distinct business 
models, it is appropriate to adopt a diverse set of explanatory and control variables for 
G-SIBs and G-SIIs estimations so that the drivers of the strength of credit risk spillovers 
                                                          
19 Indeed, one can construct such a ranking using data at various frequencies, ranging from daily to yearly. 
We choose to derive a yearly ranking because this can facilitate the ensuing analysis on the determinants 
of credit risk spillovers. The data of several main drivers are firm-specific accounting data and are 
available only at the yearly frequency. 
20 To address the concern that our dependent variable is non-continuous, we consider several alternative 
estimation frameworks to check the sensitivity of results. Both the ordinal probit and logit models are 
used to investigate this issue and the results reported in Table 3.17 confirm that the main empirical 
findings remain qualitatively the same as those shown in Table 3.12 and 3.13. 
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among banks and insurers can be tested separately. For G-SIBs, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of 
the proxies of interbank loans, non-interest income, regulatory capital ratio, and extra 
loss absorbency requirement. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of control variables, which contains the 
proxies of international business, corporate governance, leverage, size, credit risk, 
management effectiveness, deposit insurance policy, GDP growth rate, and financial 
condition index of the region in which a G-SIB is located. For G-SIIs, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector 
of the proxies of non-traditional non-insurance (NTNI) activity and size. Again, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 
is a vector of control variables, which includes the proxies of international business, G-
SII designation, corporate governance, insurance portfolio quality, leverage, investment 
activity, operating efficiency, management effectiveness, GDP growth rate, and 
financial condition index of the region in which a G-SII is located. 
3.4 Data  
3.4.1 Data Sources 
Since 2010, the FSB has released 5 lists of G-SIBs and 3 lists of G-SIIs. All G-SIFIs 
that have been included in these lists are considered in this chapter. The sample period 
is from 02/01/2006 to 31/12/2014. Daily data of 5-year single-name CDS contracts 
written on senior unsecured debt are obtained from DataStream. The restructuring type 
depends, however, on regional preference (as specified by Thomson Reuters). For the 
Asian CDS, it is CR (fully restructured); for the European CDS, it is MM (Modified 
Modified restructuring); and for the U.S. CDS, it is XR (no restructuring). In the final 
sample, there are a total of 32 G-SIFIs, consisting of 23 G-SIBs and 9 G-SIIs. Following 
Yang and Zhou (2013), two-day rolling averages of CDS spreads are used to smooth 
out sharp daily movements and irregular trading (Eichengreen et al., 2012) and to 
control for the asynchronous trading issue (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). The definitions 
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and data sources for the key variables used in the analysis of determinants of credit risk 
spillovers are reported in Table 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. All the yearly accounting data 
are measured in U.S. dollars to mitigate any possible bias stemming from currency risk 
(e.g., Bierth et al., 2015).   
3.4.2 Preliminary Data Analysis  
Summary statistics on CDS spreads of 32 G-SIFIs are reported in Table 3.5. The table 
shows that average spreads during the sample period vary substantially across G-SIFIs, 
from 51.384 basis points (bps) for Mitsubishi UFJ FG to 307.357 bps for AIG. The 
standard deviations of CDS spreads are generally close to the means and become larger 
in the case of three G-SIIs: Prudential, Prudential Financial, and AIG. The large range 
in CDS spreads of several financial firms reveals considerable variations in their default 
risk over the sample period, e.g., Prudential Financial (10.2 to 1,314.1 bps), AIG (8 to 
4,639.0 bps), and Morgan Stanley (17.25 to 1,197.01 bps). Their default risk became 
extremely high during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. The test statistics of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root test and Johansen cointegration test are 
presented in Table 3.6 and 3.7, respectively. All the CDS spreads are non-stationary at 
log-levels and stationary at first log-differences.21 Based on the results of trace test, we 
find five long-run equilibrium relations among CDS spreads of 32 G-SIFIs.  
Table 3.8 reports summary statistics of the determinants of the ‘too-interconnected-to-
fail’ ranking of G-SIFIs, and we briefly discuss the statistics data for the drivers of main 
interest. Panel A of the table reveals that the mean of the log of interbank loans of the 
                                                          
21 Pedrosa and Roll (1998) find that credit spreads are 𝐼 (1) process. They suggest that the unit-root 
behaviour of credit spreads is driven by risk-free interest rate and investors’ view of volatility and asset 
values. Since CDS spread is a subset of credit spread, it is reasonable to expect that CDS spread is non-
stationary. The non-stationary nature of CDS spread has been confirmed by previous studies related to 
the determinants of CDS spread, e.g., Davies (2008) and Galil et al. (2014). 
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G-SIBs is 7.69. On average, the non-banking income accounts for 64% of the total 
interest income, and a larger part of it is generated by other non-banking business rather 
than trading activities. In terms of the four proxies of capital adequacy, the average Tier 
1 capital ratio (capital adequacy ratio) is 10.96 (14.19) per cent, as compared to 4.25 
(5.82) per cent for Tier 1 leverage ratio (leverage ratio). The large ranges in the four 
capital adequacy proxies suggest considerable variations in regulatory capital held by 
the G-SIBs over the sample period. For example, Tier 1 capital ratio ranges from 6.44 
to 21.40 per cent. Panel B of the table shows that for the G-SIIs, the ratio of the total 
liability to total insurance reserves, a proxy for non-core activities (NTNI) of insurers, 
ranges from 1.07 to 3.06, with a mean ratio of 1.79. It implies that on average the 
amount of non-policyholder liabilities accounts for roughly 80% of that of insurance 
liabilities. Other income, another proxy for NTNI, has a mean of 163,000 US$ with a 
large standard deviation of 21.23. As expected, in contrast to the G-SIBs, the G-SIIs 
have smaller firm sizes (e.g., Geneva Association, 2010). As shown in Table 3.9, the 
absolute values of pairwise correlations between derivers are generally smaller than 0.5, 
implying no multicollinearity in the regression analyses. 
3.5 Empirical Results  
3.5.1 Static Credit Risk Connectedness  
Static credit risk connectedness tables are presented in Table 3.10. After accounting for 
the long-run cointegration relations shared by CDS spreads of G-SIFIs, the total credit 
risk connectedness generated by using the VECM model (88.2%) is slightly higher than 
that obtained by using the VAR model (86.3%).22 According to the pairwise directional 
connectedness measures, G-SIIs (the first 9 firms) and G-SIBs (from the 10th to the 
                                                          
22 Since the empirical results yielded by VECM and VAR models are qualitatively similar, all the 
discussions in Section 3.5 are based on the results generated by VECM model. 
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32nd firm) do not operate independently and are linked closely with each other probably 
due to derivatives positions and similar investment holdings. This result is in line with 
the finding of Chen et al. (2014). In particular, the G-SIFIs from the U.S. and the EU 
have higher pairwise directional credit risk dependency with each other and contribute 
more total directional credit risk connectedness to the other G-SIFIs. However, the G-
SIBs from Japan and China appear to be rather isolated from all their peers. One 
possible reason is that these Asian banks are relatively highly regulated by domestic 
regulators; therefore, they have weaker interactions with other international banks. 
Elyasiani et al. (2015) draw similar conclusions when they investigate stock return and 
volatility spillovers across multinational financial institutions.  
3.5.2 Dynamic Credit Risk Connectedness 
3.5.2.1 Total Credit Risk Connectedness of G-SIFIs 
Dynamic credit risk connectedness is obtained by using 5-day forecast horizon and 100-
day rolling window.23 The total credit risk connectedness of G-SIFIs is plotted in Figure 
3.1. Several important observations can be drawn. First, after mid-2006, system-wide 
credit risk connectedness of G-SIFIs increases dramatically from 75% to 95% and then 
fluctuates around 92% until the end of 2014. This finding is somewhat different from 
that of Diebold and Yilmaz (2015b), who show that after September 2012, the total 
stock price volatility connectedness among the 28 financial institutions in the EU and 
the U.S. drops to roughly 75% and does not reach 80% again until 2014. These different 
results may be attributed to two possible reasons. One is that the 28 financial firms 
analysed in Diebold and Yilmaz (2015b) are not all G-SIFIs and, thus, they do not fully 
represent the globally important banks and insurers. Besides, their stock price volatility 
                                                          
23 We check the sensitivity of the results to different forecast horizons and rolling widow sizes in Section 
3.5.5. 
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connectedness indicator alone may fall short in capturing the multiple facets of risk 
transmission among these large, complex, internationally active financial institutions.  
The existing studies suggest that the dependency among financial institutions may not 
always be detrimental, e.g., Rochet and Tirole (1996).24 However, it is important and 
informative to further investigate the period in which the interconnectedness is so 
‘extreme’ that can severely disrupt the international financial system (Yellen, 2013). In 
particular, we follow Chau and Deesomsak (2014) to construct various categories of 
credit risk connectedness (CRC) severity in order to monitor the severity of CRC among 
G-SIFIs. First, a measure of how many standard deviations the current CRC is away 
from its time-varying mean, the scored CRC (𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶), is calculated by subtracting a time-
varying mean and then dividing it by a time-varying standard deviation. As Chau and 
Deesomsak (2014) do, we calculate the time-varying mean by using the moving average 
of 50 days’ values of the total credit risk connectedness and compute the time-varying 
standard deviation by taking the square root of a 50-day moving average of the squared 
deviations from the time-varying mean.25 The second step is to classify the severity of 
CRC based on the values of 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶. Specifically, we assign 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 larger than 2 standard 
deviations (SD) above the mean to the ‘severe CRC’ category (regime A), 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 falling 
between 0.75 and 2 SD to the ‘moderate CRC’ category (regime B), 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 falling within 
+/-0.75 SD of the mean to the ‘normal CRC’ category (regime C), and 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 below -
0.75 SD of the mean to the ‘below-normal CRC’ category (regime D). Such a rating 
system is important as it could provide policymakers with a useful tool to monitor the 
                                                          
24 Rochet and Tirole (1996) suggest that the existence of interbank exposures can encourage banks to 
monitor each other, which benefits the banking industry.  
25 We also use 60 and 100 days’ values of the total credit risk connectedness to calculate the time-varying 
mean. The results related to 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶  remain qualitatively the same.  
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emerging vulnerabilities that caused by abnormal rises in credit risk spillovers across 
G-SIFIs, so that they can take timely actions to stabilise the global financial system.26 
Figure 3.2 presents the movements of 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶  and the corresponding four regimes. As 
indicated in the figure, the majority of 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 locate in regime C and regime D, with a 
few exceptions in regime B or even regime A. To investigate whether the peaks of 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 
(larger than 2) can provide an ‘early warning’ indicator for emerging financial crises, a 
chronology of severe financial events is constructed in Figure 3.3 and these catastrophes 
are marked with shaded areas. The chronology of critical financial events is constructed 
by referencing the ‘Full Timeline’ of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Louzis and 
Vouldis (2013), as well as the relevant financial news. The figure indicates that 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 
has a high correlation to the occurrence of major financial episodes and many well-
known financial crises occurred approximately at the peaks of 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶. For instance, the 
peaks of 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶  are coincide with the liquidity stress and bank-run of Northern Rock 
(08/2007–09/2007), the collapse of Lehman Brothers (09/2008–10/2008), and the onset 
of the European sovereign debt crisis in the early 2010.  
3.5.2.2 Total Directional Credit Risk Connectedness of G-SIFIs  
As suggested by Alter and Beyer (2014) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2015b), the total 
credit risk connectedness of G-SIFIs can be divided into various components based on 
regions or institutional characteristics. Total connectedness of 𝑁 firms is not a simple 
sum of all its components, but it is a weighted average of all the components. The 
                                                          
26 It is noted that this classification approach is not without its shortcomings. For instance, there is no 
consensus on how many standard deviations the index has to exceed its mean in order to be classified as 
‘severe’. Nonetheless, the choices of thresholds are comparable to those commonly used in the literature 
(see, e.g., Chau and Deesomsak, 2014).  
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calculation approach of cross-region/group and within-region/group connectedness is 
described in Appendix 3A.  
3.5.2.2.1 Cross-Region and Within-Region Connectedness 
The sample firms are from three main regions: the EU (20 firms), the United States (9 
firms) and Asia (3 firms). In Figure 3.4, Panel A presents credit risk connectedness 
originating from each region and Panel B demonstrates credit risk connectedness across 
any two regions. As indicated in Panel A, credit risk connectedness of the U.S. G-SIFIs 
fluctuates around 40% and reaches its peaks during three occasions. The first peak 
coincides the 2007–2008 global financial crisis period. The second spike occurs in mid-
2011 when the U.S. federal government credit rating was downgraded from AAA to 
AA+. The final peak occurs in the second half 2014 when the 3rd quantitative easing 
was terminated and when six major banks (including HSBC, RBS, UBS, JP Morgan, 
Citi, and Bank of America) were heavily penalised by the U.K. and the U.S. regulators 
over attempted manipulation of foreign exchange rates. 
Credit risk connectedness of the G-SIFIs in the EU fluctuates around 65%. Compared 
with those in the U.S., the EU G-SIFIs have a higher level of within-region linkages 
because there are more European banks on the list of G-SIFIs. Likewise, the within-
region connectedness in the EU experienced several peaks in the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis. Moreover, in October 2010, the EU credit risk transmission reached to its highest 
level (88%). After that, accompanied by a series of rescue policies implemented by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) to curb the European sovereign debt crisis, the credit 
risk connectedness gradually declined to 47% in July 2012. However, the credit risk 
connectedness increased back to nearly 80% in 2013 and again in 2014.  
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With regards to the G-SIFIs in Asia, within-region credit risk connectedness of G-SIFIs 
is only 5% on average. One reason is that although there are around eight G-SIFIs from 
the Asia region on the FSB’s official lists, only three of them can meet our data selection 
requirements. Another possible interpretation is that because of heavy regulation and 
government control, China’s current economy may not be fully exposed to the risks 
posed by the global systemically important financial institutions. Therefore, the default 
probability of Bank of China may not be closely linked with that of the two Japanese 
G-SIBs. In addition, the credit risk connectedness of the Asian G-SIBs substantially 
increased when there was an earthquake in Japan in March 2011.  
Regarding the cross-region transmission between the U.S. G-SIFIs and the EU G-SIFIs, 
on average, credit risk connectedness from the EU to the U.S. is around 13% and that 
from the U.S. to the EU is about 16% (Figure 3.4, Panel B). In general, the U.S. G-
SIFIs are net credit risk senders. However, from late 2009 to mid-2011, credit risk 
spillovers from the EU to the U.S. was equal to or even higher than that from the U.S. 
to the EU. This seems to suggest that, during the European sovereign debt crisis, the 
EU G-SIFIs became net credit risk transmitters to the U.S. G-SIFIs. After that, the U.S. 
G-SIFIs played a key role in the global credit risk transmission once again. Our findings 
are slightly different from those of Diebold and Yilmaz (2015b), who study the cross-
region stock volatility spillovers between the U.S. and the EU financial firms. They find 
that although the U.S. financial institutions played more important roles in transmitting 
stock volatility during the subprime crisis, the EU financial institutions continued to be 
the major risk providers from 2010 to 2014. Between the U.S. and Asia, while there are 
several unexpected outliers in the ‘from’ and ‘to’ directional connectedness series, the 
averages of the two series are less than 20%. As expected, the G-SIFIs in Asia are net 
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credit risk receivers. Similar patterns can be seen from the cross-region connectedness 
between the EU G-SIFIs and the Asian G-SIFIs.  
3.5.2.2.2 Cross-Group and Within-Group Connectedness 
Figure 3.5 plots directional credit risk connectedness of G-SIFIs within and across two 
groups of global systemically important financial institutions, that is, G-SIBs (23 firms) 
and G-SIIs (9 firms). Panel A presents credit risk connectedness originating from each 
group and Panel B demonstrates credit risk connectedness between two groups. As 
shown in Panel A, credit risk connectedness within G-SIIs fluctuates around 26%, while 
that within G-SIBs moves around 66%. G-SIBs have a relatively higher within-group 
connectedness because they are closely linked by common credit exposure, interbank 
lending, and derivatives trading, while G-SIIs tend to operate more independently. The 
figure in Panel B indicates that credit risk transmission from G-SIBs to G-SIIs and that 
from G-SIIs to G-SIBs fluctuate around 18% and 16%, respectively. Although there is 
bilateral credit risk transmission between two groups, G-SIBs are generally net credit 
risk providers in the whole sample period, with an exception of only a few sub-intervals, 
such as the AIG bailout period in 2008. These results are generally consistent with those 
of Billio et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2014). 
3.5.3 Ranking of ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ G-SIFIs 
Employing the dynamic net directional credit risk spillovers of individual G-SIFIs, this 
chapter derives a yearly ranking of ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ G-SIFIs. It is important 
to provide this ranking because Chan-Lau (2010) suggests that regulators can penalise 
the G-SIFIs based on their degree of interconnectedness rather than their risk-weighted 
assets. Chan-Lau (2010) argues that such capital charges may effectively internalise the 
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negative externalities related to highly interconnected institutions and encourage them 
to strengthen solvency and diversify counterparties in financial activities.  
Table 3.11 provides a comparison of our ranking with the official list issued by the FSB 
in 2013 and in 2014.27 The table shows that our G-SIBs’ rankings are dissimilar to their 
official rankings. There are several differences between the ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ 
ranking and the official list. First, the FSB’s list contains only G-SIBs but our ranking 
includes both G-SIBs and G-SIIs. Hence, it may not be feasible to use the FSB list to 
empirically examine the interactions between G-SIBs and G-SIIs. Second, the newly 
proposed ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking is derived directly from CDS market data, 
while the official list is based on accounting data submitted by banks. Thus, our ranking 
is considered to be better reflecting market expectation of credit risk transmission across 
the G-SIFIs. 28  Moreover, by identifying the key players in the global default risk 
transmission, the ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking complements the FSB list which 
focuses largely on G-SIBs’ general business risk, as measured by size, substitutability, 
complexity, interconnectedness, and cross-jurisdictional activity.  
While the ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking is not designed to replace the FSB list, 
regulators can combine it with the official list to construct a ‘composite’ ranking that 
considers various sources of information about G-SIBs (including both balance-sheet 
information and market data) in order to capture the multiple facets of systemic risk. 
To achieve this, this chapter suggests the following three steps. First, for each G-SIB, 
                                                          
27 To make the comparison, the G-SIIs on our ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking are excluded. The 
purpose of making this comparison is to complement the current understanding of systemic importance 
of individual G-SIBs from the perspective of their roles in default risk transmission rather than to prove 
that our ranking can substitute the official list. However, it would be interesting to complete the empirical 
analysis by examining the determinants of the ranking suggested by the official list in our future research. 
28 Although the V-Lab of the New York University also provides a ranking of global large financial 
institutions based on SRISK, the calculation of SRISK relies on both balance-sheet data and a long-run 
marginal expected shortfall (LRMES) estimator. Thus, similar to the FSB’s list, the ranking of V-Lab is 
not entirely based on market data. 
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we add the yearly average net directional credit risk connectedness values to the yearly 
interconnectedness scores. Then, we use the new scores of interconnectedness and the 
scores of size, substitutability/financial institution infrastructure, cross-jurisdictional 
activity, and complexity to calculate an equally weighted average scores of individual 
G-SIBs. Finally, based on the equally weighted average scores, a yearly ‘composite’ 
ranking of G-SIBs can be obtained. The ‘composite’ ranking of G-SIBs in 2013 and 
2014 are presented in Table 3.11.29 Although the G-SIB rankings on the ‘composite’ 
ranking are still rather distinct from that on the official list, the extra loss absorbency 
bucket allocation of each G-SIB remains largely unchanged. The major advantage of 
this ‘composite’ ranking is that it considers not only market participants’ judgement 
associated with systemic credit risk importance of G-SIBs, but also the business activity 
interconnections among those large banks.  
3.5.4 Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking  
As suggested by the unreported results of preliminary F-test, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test, and Hausman test, the regressions for G-SIBs are estimated by 
using the random-effects GLS method.30 To adjust for heteroskedasticity, we employ 
robust standard errors. Estimation results are reported in Table 3.12. As indicated in 
this table, banks with a higher level of interbank loans tend to play more important roles 
in the global credit risk spillovers. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1(a) and 
Chan-Lau’s (2010) argument that the interconnectivity across financial institutions can 
be largely attributable to their extensive interbank business. Financial distress of one 
financial firm which has more interbank exposure can materially increase the likelihood 
                                                          
29 The scores of G-SIBs in 2013 and 2014 are available at the website of the Office of Financial Research 
(financialresearch.gov/gsib-scores-chart/files/OFRbr-2016-04-13-gsib-data.xlsx).  
30 According to Park (2011), F-test is used to choose between pooled OLS model and fixed-effects model, 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test is used to choose between pooled OLS model and random-
effects model, and Hausman test is employed to choose between fixed and random effects models.  
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of distress of other financial institutions via the interbank lending network. Also, banks 
with more non-interest income are associated with higher systemic credit risk and are 
more likely to transmit credit risk shocks to their peers, which supports Hypothesis 1(b). 
Similar findings are also documented by Brunnermeier et al. (2012), who suggest that 
banks’ non-interest income can significantly and positively affect their systemic risk 
measured by MES and ∆CoVaR.  
Moreover, Hypothesis 1(c) is not fully supported by the results of the impact of capital 
adequacy. Tier 1 leverage ratio and leverage ratio are negatively related to G-SIB’s 
systemic credit risk importance, while Tier 1 capital ratio and capital adequacy ratio are 
insignificant and positive with regard to G-SIB’s credit risk connectedness. The only 
difference between Tier 1 leverage ratio (leverage ratio) and Tier 1 capital ratio (capital 
adequacy ratio) is the denominator in their calculations. Leverage ratios are based on 
gross assets, while capital ratios are based on risk-weighted assets. The effectiveness of 
the risk-weighted scheme has been widely questioned by researchers. For example, 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) argue that the Basel II relies heavily on external credit 
rating agencies, whose objectivity is criticised, to determine risk weights and approves 
large banks to use their own capital calculation models, which are not transparent and 
inconsistent across banks. Also, as pointed out by the BCBS (2009), the risk adjustment 
under the Basel rules is subject to manipulation and some large banks can show strong 
capitalisation but actually possess insufficient tangible common equity which is the 
core component of regulatory capital absorbing unexpected losses. To complement the 
current capital requirements, the Basel III proposes a Tier 1 leverage ratio requirement. 
As discussed by Fender and Lewrick (2015), the leverage ratio shows greater robustness 
against risks and uncertainties than the risk-adjusted framework and its calculation is 
simple. The findings of this chapter provide support to the effectiveness of leverage 
 107 
 
ratios, especially Tier 1 leverage ratio, and suggest that they may effectively curb G-
SIBs to transmit credit risk shocks to their peers.  
Additionally, in line with Hypothesis 1(d), the positive coefficients of additional loss 
absorbency bucket suggest that a higher extra loss absorbency bucket allocated to a G-
SIB is more likely to be perceived as bad news by investors and is accompanied by an 
increase in the ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking of the G-SIB. This result signals the 
suspicion about whether the stricter capital regulation initiative can effectively motivate 
banks to reduce excessive risk-taking and eliminate public expectations of bank bailouts. 
The similar doubt is raised by Bongini et al. (2017), who use an event study to test stock 
price reactions and default risk evolutions of large insurers to the release of information 
regarding G-SIIs. Bańbuła and Iwanicz-Drozdowska (2016) show that the releases of 
the lists of G-SIBs substantially and significantly reduce the systemic importance of G-
SIBs. However, unlike this chapter, they use stock data and systemic importance index 
obtained from multivariate extreme value theory. Also, they do not consider the effect 
of extra loss absorbency bucket allocations on G-SIBs’ systemic relevance.  
Again, as informed by the unreported results of preliminary F-test and Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, the regressions for G-SIIs are estimated by using pooled 
OLS method and heteroskedasticity is controlled for. The estimation results shown in 
Table 3.13 support Hypothesis 2(a) and 2(b). Specifically, the G-SII having more other 
income has a higher ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking. The larger G-SIIs, measured 
by total assets, tend to be more systemic important, supporting the argument of Acharya 
et al. (2009). These results are in line with those of Weiß and Mühlnickel (2014), Bierth 
et al. (2015), and Irresberger et al. (2016). Another finding is that G-SIIs relying heavily 
on international sales are more important in credit risk transmission. However, Weiß 
and Mühlnickel (2014) and Bierth et al. (2015) do not find significant impact of global 
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activities on insurers’ systemic risk. One possible reason is that they use the systemic 
risk measures which focus on either exposure or contribution to systemic risk, while we 
use the measures which concentrate on linkages among financial institutions.   
3.5.5 Additional Analysis and Robustness Test 
In this section, some additional analyses are conducted and the robustness of the results 
are examined by implementing different econometric specifications, estimation method, 
rolling window, and forecasting horizon. First, this study follows Brunnermeier et al. 
(2012) to divide non-interest income into trading account income and other non-interest 
income, e.g., investment banking/venture capital income. The results reported in Table 
3.14 and 3.15 suggest that trading income is positively related to G-SIB’s systemic risk 
importance, while the effect of other non-interest income is largely insignificant. Such 
findings are fairly in line with the results of Brunnermeier et al. (2012), who find that 
compared with investment banking/venture income, trading income contributes slightly 
more to banks’ systemic risk. Then, to check the robustness of rolling window size and 
prediction horizon, a 150-day rolling window and 10-day forecast horizon are used, 
respectively. The main empirical findings on dynamics and determinants of credit risk 
connectedness of G-SIFIs remain qualitatively unchanged.  
We use GMM method to re-estimate main regressions to mitigate possible endogeneity 
concern. The results in Table 3.16 confirm that the general conclusions remain valid. 
Finally, it is noted that the dependent variable of our main regressions is the ranking of 
each G-SIFI that is discrete and ordinal in nature. Hence, we use random-effects ordinal 
logit and probit models to alleviate the concern that the non-continuous and ordinal 
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nature of the dependent variable may cause significant bias in the regression results.31 
However, as reported by Table 3.17, the sign and statistical significance of the ordinal 
logit and probit coefficients generally agree with the results of linear panel regressions 
reported in Section 3.5.4.  
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates credit risk transmission across the G-SIFIs from 2006 to 2014. 
Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2015a) VECM-based connectedness measures are used to allow 
for the existence of long-run equilibrium relations shared by credit risk of G-SIFIs. We 
put forward a new yearly ranking of ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ G-SIFIs to identify the 
credit risk transmitters and the credit shock receivers in the global financial system. 
Finally, the factors affecting G-SIFI’s systemic credit risk importance are examined.  
This study finds that the empirical results generated by using VECM and VAR models 
are not dissimilar to each other. The total credit risk connectedness (CRC) among G-
SIFIs increases considerably during the 2007–2008 financial crisis and then continues 
to fluctuate around 90% until 2014. To assess the extent to which the intensified credit 
risk transmission of G-SIFIs would threaten the global financial stability, a scored CRC 
(𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶) is computed to monitor how many standard deviations the current CRC is away 
from its time-varying mean. The peaks of 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 allow one to derive a timely indicator 
for financial crises and reliably locate and date significant financial episodes that are of 
serious concerns to market regulators and financial experts. Moreover, as shown in the 
cross-region/group and within-region/group analysis, the G-SIFIs from the U.S. are the 
major global credit risk transmitters to their peers in the EU and Asia. Although there 
                                                          
31 According to Torres-Reyna (2012), although ordinal logit and ordinal probit regressions share the same 
model specifications, they use different functions to define the predictors of dependent variables. Logit 
models use the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution, while probit models use the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Thus, we use both models. 
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is bilateral credit risk transmission between G-SIBs and G-SIIs, the G-SIBs are the net 
credit risk senders (except for the AIG distress period).  
Central bankers and regulators can combine the proposed ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ 
ranking with the official list published by the FSB to construct a ‘composite’ ranking 
which considers both the accounting information and the CDS market data. Interbank 
lending, non-conventional banking activity (especially trading business), and extra loss 
absorbency requirement bucket are all found to be positively associated with G-SIB’s 
credit risk transmission. Unlike Tier 1 capital ratio and capital adequacy ratio, Tier 1 
leverage ratio and leverage ratio are negatively related to G-SIB’s credit risk spillovers, 
lending support to the recently proposed Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratio requirement. 
The G-SII with more non-traditional non-insurance business, larger size, and more 
global sales tends to play a more significant role in sending credit risk shocks.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of Market-Based Systemic Risk Measures 
Measures Studies Descriptions Advantages Disadvantages  
Contribution to 
the variance of 
the systemic 
Expected 
shortfall 
(EXSHORT) 
Lehar (2005) EXSHORT defines one firm’s 
systemic risk as its share of the total 
volatility of the expected shortfall 
for the system which equals the 
total present value of the amount of 
debt that cannot be covered by the 
assets of the distressed firms under 
a hypothetical regulator’s 
supervision. 
It uses public information of financial 
markets, e.g., stock price and 
balance-sheet information. When 
define the likelihood of systemic 
crisis, it considers the size of the 
distressed firm and the number of 
banks which default simultaneously. 
It may not consider off-balance sheet 
information which is important for financial 
institutions; it may not account for one firm’s 
failure in the circumstance that the system is 
already in distress (Brownlees and Engle, 2017). 
Marginal 
Expected 
Shortfall (MES)  
Acharya, Pedersen, 
Philippon, and 
Richardson (2017) 
MES tracks the sensitivity of a 
firm’s return to a market-wide 
extreme event and measures a 
firm’s systemic risk exposure by 
conditioning firm’s distress on 
market’s distress.  
It is a simple market-based measure 
of a firm’s fragility and uses only 
stock prices. Also, it is a weighted 
and directional measure (Diebold and 
Yilmaz, 2014). 
MES cannot assess the likelihood of firm distress 
which is determined by not only MES but also 
the amount of the capital held by firms to buffer 
the loss caused by adverse market movements 
(Diebold and Yilmaz, 2014). It does not consider 
firm-specific attributes, e.g., size and leverage 
(Banulescu and Dumitrescu, 2015).  
SRISK  Acharya, Engle, 
and Richardson 
(2012); Brownlees 
and Engle (2017)  
SRISK is defined as the expected 
capital shortfall of a financial firm 
conditional on the distress of 
market.  
It considers dependence among firms, 
size, and leverage (Acharya et al., 
2017). It uses public information of 
financial markets, e.g., stock price 
and balance-sheet information. 
Its calculations rely on the variables sampled at 
different frequencies (Banulescu and 
Dumitrescu, 2015). Also, it may not consider 
off-balance sheet information which is important 
for financial institutions (Brownlees and Engle, 
2017). 
Component 
Expected 
Shortfall (CES) 
Banulescu and 
Dumitrescu (2015) 
CES is the product of MES and the 
relative market capitalisation of a 
financial institution. It measures the 
absolute sensitivity of a firm to 
systemic risk.  
It accounts for the size of a firm; it 
uses only daily financial market data; 
unlike MES, the ES of the financial 
system at time 𝑡 equals the sum of 
CES for all the firms in the system 
(Banulescu and Dumitrescu, 2015). 
Its calculations may be affected by the choice of 
weighting scheme. Also, like MES, it cannot 
assess the likelihood of firm distress which is 
determined by not only MES but also the amount 
of the capital held by firms to absorb the loss 
caused by market downturns.  
 
 
 112 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Market-Based Systemic Risk Measures (Continued) 
Measures Studies Descriptions Advantages Disadvantages  
Conditional Value-
at-Risk (CoVaR) 
and ∆CoVaR 
Adrian and 
Brunnermeier 
(2016) 
CoVaR measures the value-at-risk of the financial 
system conditional on the distress of a financial firm. 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗|𝑖measures the difference between firm-𝑗 
VaR when firm-𝑖 is ‘heavily’ stressed and firm-𝑗 
VaR when firm-𝑖 is in “normal” times. ∆CoVaR 
indicates a firm’s contribution to systemic risk. 
CoVaR and its variations are useful 
measures of tail-event linkages 
between financial institutions (Adrian 
and Brunnermeier, 2011). Also, 
∆CoVaR is weighted and directional 
systemic risk measures (Diebold and 
Yilmaz, 2014).  
They do not consider firm-
specific attributes, e.g., size 
and leverage (Acharya et al., 
2017). 
Distressed 
insurance premium 
(DIP) 
Huang, Zhou, and 
Zhu (2009, 2012); 
Black, Correa, 
Huang, and Zhou 
(2016) 
DIP is the hypothetical insurance premium required 
to cover distressed losses in the financial system and 
is a function of probability of default (PoD) of 
individual firm and asset correlations among firms. 
The systemic importance of each firm is its marginal 
contribution to the DIP.  
It is applicable to any firms with 
publicly tradable equity and CDS 
contracts; the probability of default is 
risk-neutral and forward looking; it 
does not depend on any accounting 
information (Huang et al., 2009). 
CDS data may not be 
available for a long time 
period and a large sample of 
firms (Zhang et al., 2015). 
CATFIN Allen, Bali, and 
Tang (2012b) 
It is a measure of aggregate systemic risk. It is 
calculated as the average of three VaR measures at 
the 99% confidence level. The three VaR measures 
are estimated by Generalised Pareto distribution, 
Skewed Generalised Error distribution, and a 
nonparametric method. 
It can forecast macroeconomic 
downturns six months into the future; 
it can be combined with VaR and ES 
methods (Allen et al., 2012b).  
The predictive advantage of 
this measure only exists 
within banking sectors, but 
not within nonfinancial firms 
or simulated “fake banks” 
(Allen et al., 2012b). 
Shapley values Drehmann and 
Tarashev (2011) 
Two Top-down measures are designed based on 
Shapley values: Participation approach (PA) and 
Contribution approach (CA). One Bottom-up 
measure: Bottom-up approach (BA). 
Shapley values consider both the firm 
systemic risk contribution and firm 
systemic risk exposure.  
Due to high dimensionality 
issue, the applications of 
Shapley values are limited to 
small samples of firms 
(Zhang et al., 2015). 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Market-Based Systemic Risk Measures (Continued) 
Measures Studies Descriptions Advantages Disadvantages  
Conditional Co-
Risk 
Chan-Lau, Espinosa, 
Giesecke, and Solé 
(2009) 
It measures the proportional 
rise in a firm’s credit risk 
induced, directly and 
indirectly, by its links to 
another firm in the system. 
It examines the direct and indirect credit risk 
co-dependence across firms for different 
quantiles; it is more informative than 
unconditional risk measures; the quantile 
regression considers nonlinearity in co-
movements of firms (Chan-Lau et al., 2009). 
Its usefulness depends on whether market is 
efficient (Chan-Lau et al., 2009).  
Realized 
systemic risk 
beta 
Hautsch, 
Schaumburg, and 
Schienle (2014) 
It is defined as the total 
time-varying marginal effect 
of a firm’s VaR on the 
system’s VaR. 
It considers network spillover effects across 
firms’ tail risk exposures; it depends on only 
public accessible data (Hautsch et al., 2014). 
Since it is essentially a VaR-type measure, it 
suffers from the same critiques as VaR does, 
e.g., it is not a coherent risk measure since it 
violates the sub-additivity property. 
Connectedness 
Measures 
Billio, Getmansky, 
Lo, and Pelizzon 
(2012) 
 
PCA is used to estimate the 
number and importance of 
common factors driving 
asset returns of financial 
institutions. Pairwise 
Granger-causality is used to 
identify network of 
statistically significant 
Granger-causal relations. 
These measures rely on fewer assumptions 
than variance-decomposition and impulse 
response analyses; they are directional 
(Diebold and Yilmaz, 2014). They provide 
direct estimates of the statistical connectivity 
of a network of financial firms’ returns by 
linear Granger causality and volatility by 
nonlinear Granger causality (Billio et al., 
2012). 
They are exclusively pairwise and 
unweighted, testing zero vs. nonzero 
coefficients, with arbitrary significance 
levels, and without tracking the magnitude of 
non-zero coefficients (Diebold and Yilmaz, 
2014). Also, it may be difficult to clearly 
interpret Granger causality test results unless 
all the shocks are simultaneously considered 
(Acharya et al., 2017).  
Network-based 
Connectedness 
Measures 
Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2014) 
Forecast error variance 
decompositions are used to 
define different levels of 
connectedness, from 
pairwise to system-wide. 
They are weighted directed measures; they are 
more general than correlation-based measures 
which are only pairwise (Diebold and Yilmaz, 
2014). They only depend on the information 
of asset prices or volatility.  
These measures cannot identify risk 
exchange centres as Yang and Zhou (2013) 
do. Also, to identify uncorrelated structural 
shocks from correlated reduced-form shocks, 
assumptions must be made before conducting 
variance decomposition and impulse response 
analysis (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2014).  
Notes: This table summarises the major market-based systemic risk measures. Each measure may have several extensions, but they are not included in this table. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Empirical Evidence of Connectedness of Financial Firms 
Studies Markets Methodologies Major Findings 
Billio, Getmansky, 
Lo, and Pelizzon 
(2012) 
Monthly Stock Data; 25 hedge 
funds, banks, broker/dealers, 
and insurance companies around 
the world  
Connectedness measures 
developed based on PCA, 
linear Granger causality and 
Nonlinear Granger causality. 
Since all four sectors have become highly interrelated through a complex and 
time-varying network over the recent decade, the level of systemic risk in the 
finance and insurance industries is increased. Their connectedness measures can 
date and quantify financial crisis times, and can be considered as predictors of 
financial market conditions. Also, compared with other financial firms, banks 
are primary senders of shocks via lending and trading activities. 
Yang and Zhou 
(2013) 
Daily CDS Data; 43 largest 
financial institutions across the 
world 
Cluster analysis, principal 
component analysis (PCA), 
the direct acyclic graph 
(DAG) and structural VAR 
analysis  
Financial institutions are classified into three groups, credit risk senders, credit 
risk exchange centres and credit risk receivers. The former two groups of 
financial institutions can be considered as G-SIFIs, while the last group cannot 
be G-SIFIs. Short-term debt ratios are significant determinants of different roles 
of financial firms in credit risk transfer. However, corporate governance 
indexes, size, liquidity, and write-downs cannot explain the different risk 
transfer roles played by these financial institutions. 
Drehmann and 
Tarashev (2013)  
Balance-sheet Data; One 
banking system with nine 
hypothetical banks and another 
with 20 real-world banks 
Shapley values: 
Participation approach (PA) 
and generalised contribution 
approach (GCA).  
They find that interconnectedness is a key driver of systemic risk. However, 
since PA and GCA reflect the impact of interbank borrower and lender on 
system-wide risk differently, they can generate different results about which 
banks are systemically important.  
Billio, Getmansky, 
Gray, Lo, Merton, 
and Pelizzon (2013) 
Monthly CDS data; 17 
Sovereigns, 63 banks, and 39 
insurance companies around 
world 
Connectedness measures 
developed based on PCA, 
linear Granger causality and 
Nonlinear Granger causality. 
The system of banks, insurance companies, and sovereigns is highly connected. 
Sovereign risk seems to become relevant before the 2010-2012 European 
Sovereign crisis. Also, the proposed connectedness measures can be early 
warning signals and indicate the complexity of the financial system. 
Chen, Cummins, 
Viswanathan, and 
Weiss (2014) 
Daily CDS data and intraday 
stock data; 11 insurance firms 
and 22 banking firms around 
world 
Huang, Zhou, and Zhu’s 
(2009, 2012) DIP and Linear 
and non-linear Granger-
causality tests. 
Bidirectional Granger causality are found between banks and insurers. 
However, after controlling for conditional heteroskedasticity, banks exert 
stronger and longer duration impact on insurers than vice versa.  
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Table 3.2: Summary of Empirical Evidence of Connectedness of Financial Firms (Continued) 
Studies Markets Methodologies Major Findings 
Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2014) 
Intraday Stock Data; 13 US 
financial institutions  
Diebold and Yilmaz’s 
(2014) network-based 
connectedness measures.  
Financial institutions’ To-degree connectedness and From-degree 
connectedness can track their systemic importance during different time 
periods. Total-degree connectedness shows two big cycles which indicate dot-
com bubble and 2007-2008 financial crises. Also, the total-degree measure can 
reflect the effects of critical events on the U.S. financial system, such as the 
Lehman Bankruptcy.  
Hautsch, 
Schaumburg, and 
Schienle (2014) 
Daily Stock Data; Publicly traded 
US depositories (21), broker 
dealers (7), insurers (20), and 
other firms (11) 
Hautsch et al.’s (2014) 
realized systemic risk beta  
A high degree of tail risk interconnectedness of the U.S. financial system is 
found. Direct credit and liquidity exposure are potential channels of risk 
spillovers. Firms can be classified into major risk producers, transmitters, or 
recipients within the system. Large depositories are the most systemically 
important.  
Bierth, Irresberger, 
and Weiß (2015) 
Daily Stock Data; 253 insurers in 
the world, including 112 life 
insurers and 141 non-life insurers 
Billio et al.’s (2012) 
connectedness measures  
Systemic risk in the global insurance sector is smaller than that in the global 
banking sector. However, both the exposure and contribution of insurers to the 
fragility of the whole financial system have raised since the recent financial 
crisis. Compared with other insurers, the nine G-SIIs have significantly larger 
size and are more interconnected. Also, interconnectedness, size, loss rations, 
funding fragility, and leverage can determine an insurer’s systemic risk.  
Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2015b) 
Daily Stock Data; 28 financial 
institutions in the US and the EU 
Diebold and Yilmaz’s 
(2014) network-based 
connectedness measures 
During the 2007-2008 financial crisis, stock volatility spillovers from the U.S. 
to the EU. After that, bidirectional spillovers are documented in late 2008. After 
June 2011, the EU financial institutions become the net risk transmitters 
because of the European sovereign debt crisis.  
Elyasiani, 
Kalotychou, 
Staikouras, and 
Zhao (2015) 
Daily Stock Data; Banks and 
insurers (life and non-life) from 
the US, the EU and Japan  
VAR-BEKK model which 
can detect return and 
volatility transmission 
simultaneously 
From 2003 to 2009, they document substantial return and volatility 
transmissions within and across banking and insurance industries. The U.S. 
financial firms play important roles in spreading risk to their peers in other 
countries. Size and leverage are major factors to determine return contagion 
among the major banking firms.  
Notes: This table summarises the previous empirical evidence of connectedness of financial firms. 
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Table 3.3: Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking (G-SIBs) 
Variables  Proxies Data Source 
Interbank activity  Log of inter-bank loans (US$) DataStream 
No-deposit business  Ratio of non-interest income to total interest income; ratio of trading 
income to total interest income; ratio of other non-interest income to 
total interest income 
DataStream 
Capital adequacy  Tier 1 leverage ratio (ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets) (%); Tier 
1 capital ratio (ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets) 
(%); leverage ratio (ratio of the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital to 
total assets) (%); capital adequacy ratio (ratio of the sum of Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital to total risk-weighted assets) (%) 
DataStream  
Extra loss absorbency requirement 
bucket  
It is a variable ranging from 0 to 5. The higher value means the 
higher extra loss absorbency requirement bucket 
Official lists published by the 
FSB 
Global activity Ratio of foreign sales to total sales (%) DataStream 
Corporate Governance Log of board size DataStream 
Leverage  Ratio of total debt to total asset (%) DataStream 
Size  Log of total assets (US$) DataStream 
Credit risk Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (%) DataStream 
Management effectiveness  Return on Equity (%) DataStream 
Deposit Insurance Policy Coverage limit GDP per capita (%) Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2014) 
Country characteristic GDP growth rate (%) The World Bank Database 
Financial condition in one region Bloomberg Financial Condition Index  Bloomberg 
Notes: This table reports the drivers, their proxies, and data sources of the ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ rankings of G-SIFIs (G-SIBs). 
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Table 3.4: Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking (G-SIIs) 
Variables  Proxies Data Source 
Global activity  Ratio of foreign sales to total sales (%) DataStream 
Non-policyholder liabilities Ratio of total liability to total insurance reserves DataStream 
Size  Log of total assets (US$); log of market capitalisation (US$) DataStream 
Other income  Other pre-tax income and expenses besides operating income, non-
operating interest income, interest expense on debt, interest capitalized, 
pre-tax extraordinary charge, pre-tax extraordinary credit and 
increase/decrease in reserves (US$) 
DataStream 
G-SII Designation It is a dummy variable which equals 1 after one insurer identified as a 
G-SII and 0 otherwise.  
Official lists published by 
the FSB  
Corporate Governance Log of board size DataStream 
Quality of insurance portfolio Loss ratio (claim and loss expense plus long term insurance reserves 
divided by premiums earned) (%) 
DataStream 
Leverage  Ratio of total debt to total asset (%) DataStream 
Investment success Ratio of investment income to net revenue (%) DataStream 
Operating efficiency  Ratio of operating expenses to total assets DataStream 
Management effectiveness  Return on Equity (%) DataStream 
Financial condition in one region Bloomberg Financial Condition Index  Bloomberg 
Country characteristic  GDP growth rate (%) The World Bank Database  
Notes: This table reports the drivers, their proxies, and data sources of the ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ rankings of G-SIFIs (G-SIIs). 
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of CDS Spreads 
 
Mean Std. Min. Max. 
G-SIBs     
HSBC  70.343 41.048 4.950 181.895 
Barclays  104.538 65.104 5.400 282.520 
BNP Paribas 91.284 71.141 5.000 354.375 
Deutsche Bank 90.632 52.053 8.850 299.725 
Credit Suisse 86.827 50.849 9.400 259.250 
Royal Bank of Scotland 137.864 93.967 3.500 396.935 
Crédit Agricole 112.178 83.139 5.500 394.560 
ING Bank 95.043 64.052 4.050 268.280 
Santander 136.267 102.825 7.150 433.395 
Société Générale 117.455 91.966 5.800 430.687 
UBS 94.538 65.362 4.000 356.667 
Commerzbank  110.561 76.095 7.450 350.975 
Dexia 284.124 236.111 6.500 954.162 
Lloyds Banking Group 123.851 92.752 3.750 381.575 
JP Morgan Chase  78.373 40.621 11.000 227.280 
Citigroup 140.578 111.055 6.900 645.000 
Bank of America 125.443 93.629 7.900 480.710 
Goldman Sachs 134.232 89.238 18.250 590.410 
Morgan Stanley  171.297 137.741 17.250 1,197.010 
Wells Fargo  76.882 48.644 6.000 297.750 
Mitsubishi UFJ FG 51.384 35.382 7.800 204.230 
Sumitomo Mitsui FG 64.603 42.551 5.450 200.905 
Bank of China 128.163 81.861 14.350 450.000 
G-SIIs     
Allianz 66.815 37.464 5.550 185.000 
Assicurazioni Generali 129.983 106.163 5.500 438.045 
Aviva 111.200 72.822 5.550 498.333 
Axa  120.263 86.064 8.500 383.470 
Prudential  121.233 123.261 7.250 922.500 
MetLife  175.022 164.734 10.200 940.582 
Prudential Financial 178.330 196.188 10.200 1,314.100 
AIG 307.357 474.851 8.000 4,639.046 
Aegon 148.961 101.466 8.350 557.500 
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of CDS Spreads in the sample. The sample period is 
from 02/01/2006 to 31/12/2014. The credit spreads are expressed in basis points. 
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Table 3.6: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit-Root Test  
Name of Firms  CDS 
spreads  
CDS 
returns 
Name of Firms  CDS 
spreads  
CDS  
returns 
Aegon -1.785 -11.540*** Goldman Sachs -2.162 -13.749*** 
AIG -1.517 -13.036*** HSBC  -1.836 -12.870*** 
Allianz -1.632 -14.298*** ING Bank -1.856 -12.302*** 
Assicurazioni 
Generali -1.553 -13.232*** 
JP Morgan 
Chase  -1.970 -14.065*** 
Aviva 
-1.685 -12.643*** 
Lloyds Banking 
Group -1.669 -13.148*** 
Axa  -1.658 -12.607*** MetLife  -1.548 -11.533*** 
Bank of America -1.764 -13.523*** Mitsubishi UFJ  -2.484 -11.154*** 
Bank of China -2.127 -12.126*** Morgan Stanley  -2.070 -13.153*** 
Barclays  
-1.959 -13.521*** 
Prudential 
Financial -1.570 -11.868*** 
BNP Paribas -1.791 -13.945*** Prudential  -1.717 -10.779*** 
Citigroup 
-1.799 -13.933*** 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland -1.740 -13.643*** 
Commerzbank  -1.753 -13.586*** Santander -1.966 -14.655*** 
Crédit Agricole 
-1.831 -12.861*** 
Société 
Générale -1.795 -13.020*** 
Credit Suisse 
-1.936 -12.981*** 
Sumitomo 
Mitsui FG -1.976 -14.857*** 
Deutsche Bank -1.865 -14.507*** UBS -1.844 -11.950*** 
Dexia -1.951 -11.632*** Wells Fargo  -1.966 -13.417*** 
Notes: This table reports the t-statistics of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root test on CDS 
spreads and CDS returns. The critical values at significance level 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) are -
3.436, -2.863, and -2.568, respectively.  
Table 3.7: Johansen Cointegration Test 
Rank Eigenvalue Log likelihood for rank Trace test 
0 - 194013.7 2839.94*** 
(0.000) 
1 0.130 194177.3 2526.11*** 
(0.000) 
2 0.118 194324.6 2243.67*** 
(0.000) 
3 0.097 194444.6 2013.46*** 
(0.000) 
4 0.089 194554 1803.6*** 
(0.000) 
5 0.076 194646.9 1625.44** 
(0.010) 
6 0.068 194729 1467.9 
(0.085) 
7 0.062 194803.7 1324.62 
(0.289) 
Notes: This table reports the test results of Johansen cointegration tests. Based on Schwarz Information 
criterion (SBC), the optimal lag is 3. Figures in the parentheses are the p-values. *** and ** denote 
statistically significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. The number of long-run cointegration relations is 
chosen based on significance level 5%. 
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Table 3.8: Summary Statistics of Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ 
Ranking  
 𝑁 Mean Std. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Drivers of ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking of G-SIBs 
Log of inter-bank loans 143 7.69 0.53 5.08 8.66 
Non-interest income/total interest 
income 
172 0.64 0.38 -0.16 2.61 
Trading account income/total interest 
income 
156 0.10 0.15 -0.49 0.78 
Other non-interest income/total 
interest income 
146 0.55 0.34 -0.19 2.48 
Tier1 leverage ratio (%) 182 4.25 1.80 1.41 9.21 
Tier1 capital ratio (%) 181 10.96 2.97 6.44 21.40 
(Tier 1 + Tier 2)/total asset (%) 178 5.82 2.40 1.71 11.69 
Capital adequacy ratio (%) 183 14.19 3.03 8.50 25.20 
Buckets corresponding to the 
additional loss absorbency 
requirements  
207 0.42 0.98 0.00 4.00 
Foreign sales/total sales (%) 195 24.32 18.04 -19.64 82.92 
Log of board size 203 2.54 0.51 0.90 3.26 
Total debt/total asset (%) 207 27.57 13.56 4.53 61.16 
Log of total asset 207 9.16 0.20 8.46 9.68 
Non-performing loans/total loans (%) 160 3.31 9.44 0.16 119.52 
Return on Equity (%) 206 2.95 55.39 -687.29 35.85 
Coverage limit GDP per capita (%) 207 251.59 139.20 0.00 518.00 
GDP growth rate (%) 207 1.62 2.83 -5.64 14.20 
BFCI Index 207 -0.80 1.55 -4.13 1.27 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of Drivers of ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking of G-SIIs 
Total liability/total insurance reserves  81 1.79 0.46 1.07 3.06 
Other income/100,000 81 1.63 21.23 -25.27 179.45 
Log of total asset 81 8.79 0.15 8.51 9.14 
Log of market capitalisation 81 7.52 0.31 6.61 8.27 
Foreign sales/total sales (%) 77 47.49 21.61 -21.78 90.99 
G-SII dummy 81 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Log of board size 81 1.13 0.09 0.90 1.38 
Loss ratio (%) 81 115.38 40.54 -57.61 220.26 
Total debt/total asset (%) 81 6.57 6.18 1.41 42.01 
Investment income/net revenue (%) 81 0.29 0.31 0.03 2.92 
Operating expenses/total assets  81 0.12 0.05 -0.04 0.22 
Return on Equity (%) 79 5.18 34.04 -207.00 32.97 
BFCI Index 81 -0.89 1.61 -4.13 1.11 
GDP growth rate (%) 81 1.06 2.20 -5.62 4.08 
Notes:  This table presents the summary statistics of determinants of ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking 
of G-SIBs in Panel A and those of G-SIIs in Panel B.
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Table 3.9: Pairwise Correlations of Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking  
Panel A: Pairwise Correlations of Determinants of ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking of G-SIBs 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. IBL 1.00 
                 
2. NII -0.13 1.00 
                
3. TAI -0.07 0.53 1.00 
               
4. ONII 0.06 0.60 0.15 1.00 
              
5. T1LR -0.17 0.00 -0.08 0.04 1.00 
             
6. T1CR -0.18 0.05 0.23 0.01 0.14 1.00 
            
7. LR -0.17 0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.95 -0.06 1.00 
           
8. CR -0.29 0.08 0.29 -0.08 0.19 0.92 0.05 1.00 
          
9. ALA 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.18 0.23 0.43 0.11 0.36 1.00 
         
10. FS -0.06 -0.01 0.29 0.03 -0.10 0.24 -0.17 0.27 0.12 1.00 
        
11. BS 0.21 -0.23 -0.15 -0.08 0.01 0.12 -0.06 0.11 0.09 -0.04 1.00 
       
12. L -0.03 -0.47 -0.14 -0.36 -0.18 0.06 -0.19 0.05 -0.16 -0.23 -0.01 1.00 
      
13. A 0.33 0.22 0.04 0.18 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.22 0.27 0.26 -0.47 1.00 
     
14. NP 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.16 0.23 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.01 -0.12 0.05 1.00 
    
15. ROE -0.02 0.23 0.13 -0.02 0.10 -0.23 0.15 -0.16 0.01 0.22 -0.09 -0.13 0.18 0.02 1.00 
   
16. DI 0.03 0.31 0.15 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.40 0.19 0.34 -0.09 0.10 -0.03 0.16 0.11 -0.07 1.00 
  
17. GDP 0.08 -0.19 -0.12 -0.02 0.16 -0.12 0.12 -0.13 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 -0.18 -0.12 0.10 -0.22 1.00 
 
18. BFCI -0.19 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.11 -0.12 0.14 -0.11 0.14 0.03 -0.36 -0.03 -0.24 -0.05 0.17 0.05 0.48 1 
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Table 3.9: Pairwise Correlations of Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking (Continued) 
Panel B: Pairwise Correlations of Determinants of ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking of G-SIIs  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Foreign sales/total sales  1.00 
             
2. Total liability/total insurance reserves  0.10 1.00 
            
3. Log of total asset -0.02 0.10 1.00 
           
4. Log of market capitalisation -0.10 0.09 0.04 1.00 
          
5. G-SII dummy -0.27 -0.15 -0.20 0.46 1.00 
         
6. Other income -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 0.08 0.19 1.00 
        
7. Log of board size -0.12 -0.47 -0.03 0.09 0.37 -0.05 1.00 
       
8. Loss ratio 0.21 0.19 -0.03 -0.42 -0.15 -0.05 -0.28 1.00 
      
9. Total debt/total asset  -0.15 0.30 0.21 0.37 0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.19 1.00 
     
10. Investment income/net revenue  -0.44 -0.13 -0.01 -0.26 -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.31 -0.03 1.00 
    
11. Operating expenses/total assets  0.46 -0.52 -0.05 -0.09 0.07 0.03 0.37 0.14 -0.23 -0.42 1.00 
   
12. Return on Equity -0.09 0.04 -0.01 -0.16 0.57 0.05 0.26 0.18 -0.27 0.01 0.04 1.00 
  
13. BFCI Index -0.09 0.16 0.04 -0.01 0.47 0.28 -0.06 0.33 0.11 -0.17 0.02 0.38 1.00 
 
14. GDP growth rate -0.12 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.29 0.03 -0.13 -0.01 0.10 -0.05 -0.18 0.27 0.56 1 
Notes: This table reports the pairwise correlations between determinants of ‘too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking of G-SIBs in Panel A and those of G-SIIs in Panel B. In panel 
A, the variables are: Log of inter-bank loans (IBL), Non-interest income/total interest income (NII), Trading account income/total interest income (TAI), Other non-interest 
income/total interest income (ONII), Tier1 leverage ratio (Tier1LR), Tier1 capital ratio (Tier1CR), (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/total asset (LR), Capital adequacy ratio (CR), Buckets of 
additional loss absorbency (ALA), Foreign sales/total sales (FS), Log of board size (BS), Total debt/total asset (L), Log of asset (A), Non-performing loans/total loans (NP), 
ROE (ROE), Coverage limit GDP per capita (DI), GDP growth rate (GDP), and BFCI Index (BFCI).  
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Table 3.10: Static Credit Risk Connectedness Table 
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Table 3.10: Static Credit Risk Connectedness Table (Continued) 
 
Notes: This table presents the static credit risk connectedness matrix among G-SIFIs from 2006 to 2014. The upper (lower) panel is based on the results of VECM (VAR) 
model. The 𝑖𝑗th element of the upper left 32 × 32 submatrix indicates pairwise directional connectedness between firm 𝑖 and 𝑗, with 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. The column ‘From others’ depicts 
total directional connectedness of firm from all others, i.e., the sum of entries in the corresponding row. The row ‘Contributions to others’ illustrates total directional 
connectedness of firm to all others, i.e., the sum of entries in the corresponding column. The element in bottom-right corner is ‘Total connectedness’ of all firms, i.e., the 
average of ‘From Others’ connectedness, or equivalently, the average of ‘Contributions to Others’ connectedness. All the numbers in the upper left 32 × 32 submatrix, the 
numbers in the rows ‘Contribution to Others’ and ‘Net’, and those in the column ‘From Others’ are expressed in percentage (%).  
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Table 3.11: A Comparison of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ Ranking, Official G-
SIBs List, and the ‘Composite’ Ranking 
2013 ‘Too-Interconnected-To Fail’ 
Ranking 
2013 Official List of G-SIBs  2013 ‘Composite’ 
Ranking 
HSBC HSBC JP Morgan Chase 
Crédit Agricole JP Morgan Chase HSBC 
Barclays Barclays Citigroup 
BNP Paribas BNP Paribas Deutsche Bank 
Credit Suisse Citigroup  BNP Paribas 
Société Générale Deutsche Bank Barclays 
Deutsche Bank Bank of America Bank of America 
UBS Credit Suisse Credit Suisse 
Morgan Stanley Goldman Sachs Morgan Stanley 
Goldman Sachs Crédit Agricole Goldman Sachs 
Citigroup Mitsubishi Mitsubishi  
Santander Morgan Stanley RBS 
JP Morgan Chase RBS Société Générale 
RBS UBS Crédit Agricole 
Bank of China Bank of China UBS 
Bank of America ING  Santander 
ING  Santander Bank of China 
Wells Fargo Société Générale Wells Fargo 
Sumitomo Mitsui  Sumitomo Mitsui  ING  
Mitsubishi  Wells Fargo Sumitomo Mitsui  
2014 ‘Too-Interconnected-To Fail’ 
Ranking 
2014 Official List of G-SIBs  2014 Composite Ranking 
Morgan Stanley HSBC JP Morgan Chase 
JP Morgan Chase JP Morgan Chase HSBC 
Goldman Sachs Barclays Citigroup 
Citigroup BNP Paribas BNP Paribas 
Wells Fargo Citigroup Deutsche Bank 
Société Générale Deutsche Bank Barclays 
Santander Bank of America Bank of America 
Barclays Credit Suisse Credit Suisse 
BNP Paribas Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs 
RBS Mitsubishi  Mitsubishi  
UBS Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley 
Deutsche Bank RBS RBS 
HSBC Bank of China Société Générale 
Crédit Agricole Crédit Agricole Santander 
Credit Suisse ING  Bank of China 
Bank of America Santander Wells Fargo 
ING  Société Générale UBS 
Bank of China Sumitomo Mitsui  Crédit Agricole 
Mitsubishi  UBS Sumitomo Mitsui  
Sumitomo Mitsui  Wells Fargo ING  
Notes: The first column is the ‘too-interconnected-to fail’ ranking proposed by this chapter. The second 
column is the official list of G-SIBs issued by the FSB. The red group represents that the banks should 
have 2.5% additional loss absorbency. According to the BCBS (2013), the higher loss absorbency 
requirement is associated with Common Equity Tier 1 capital as defined by the Basel III framework. The 
additional loss absorbency requirements for the members in the yellow group, the green group, and the 
blue group are 2.0 %, 1.5%, and 1.0%, respectively. The final column is the composite ‘too-
interconnected-to fail’ ranking generated by combing the ‘too-interconnected-to fail’ ranking of this 
study and the official list provided by the FSB. 
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Table 3.12: Estimation Results of Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ 
Ranking (G-SIBs) 
VECM model     
Log of inter-bank loans 5.659*** 
(0.001) 
6.682*** 
(0.001) 
5.430*** 
(0.003) 
6.549*** 
(0.000) 
Non-interest income/total interest 
income 
4.115* 
(0.065) 
4.600** 
(0.037) 
3.061 
(0.228) 
3.631 
(0.143) 
Tier1 leverage ratio -1.695** 
(0.012) 
 
  
(Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/total assets  -1.002 
(0.123) 
  
Tier1 capital ratio  
 
0.026 
(0.928) 
 
Capital adequacy ratio  
 
 0.107 
(0.738) 
Extra loss absorbency requirements  1.728*** 
(0.005) 
1.486*** 
(0.008) 
1.325** 
(0.045) 
1.166* 
(0.085) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.085* 
(0.087) 
0.093** 
(0.044) 
0.055 
(0.247) 
0.070 
(0.142) 
Log of board size 1.073 
(0.530) 
0.625 
(0.723) 
2.294* 
(0.098) 
0.553 
(0.753) 
Total debt/total asset 0.146 
(0.213) 
0.152 
(0.225) 
0.152 
(0.294) 
0.171 
(0.227) 
Log of assets -8.256* 
(0.085) 
-9.058 
(0.131) 
-4.877 
(0.340) 
-6.090 
(0.266) 
Non-performing loans/total loans 0.023 
(0.959) 
-0.158 
(0.736) 
-0.169 
(0.713) 
-0.036 
(0.933) 
Return on Equity  0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.014** 
(0.011) 
0.008** 
(0.042) 
0.011** 
(0.035) 
Coverage limit GDP per capita -0.003 
(0.795) 
-0.004 
(0.757) 
-0.005 
(0.646) 
-0.004 
(0.757) 
GDP growth rate -0.212 
(0.443) 
-0.251 
(0.409) 
-0.342 
(0.278) 
-0.295 
(0.378) 
BFCI Index -1.035* 
(0.054) 
-1.052* 
(0.076) 
-0.640 
(0.183) 
-0.942* 
(0.071) 
Constant 9.223 
(0.827) 
41.880 
(0.405) 
-26.946 
(0.579) 
9.869 
(0.833) 
R-squared 44.95% 41.69% 33.86% 36.86% 
No. of observations  113 111 111 113 
Notes: This table reports the panel regression results of the equation (3.10) for G-SIBs: 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                    (3.10) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  financial institution at year 𝑡  when the connectedness 
measures based on the VECM model are used. 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of the proxies for interbank loans, non-
interest income, regulatory capital ratio, and additional loss absorbency bucket. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of 
variables, including global activity, corporate governance, leverage, size, credit risk, management 
effectiveness, deposit insurance policy, GDP growth rate, and financial condition indicator in one region 
in which a G-SIB locates. Hausman test suggests that GLS random-effect model is used to estimate the 
panel regression. Robust standard errors are used. The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.12: Estimation Results of Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ 
Ranking (G-SIBs) (Continued) 
VAR model     
Log of inter-bank loans 4.308* 
(0.085) 
5.949** 
(0.026) 
3.810 
(0.160) 
4.939* 
(0.063) 
Non-interest income/total interest 
income 
5.342*** 
(0.009) 
6.441*** 
(0.001) 
4.254* 
(0.087) 
4.534* 
(0.061) 
Tier 1 leverage ratio -1.479** 
(0.024) 
   
(Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/total assets 
 
-1.320** 
(0.030) 
  
Tier 1 capital ratio 
  
0.111 
(0.713) 
 
Capital adequacy ratio 
   
0.198 
(0.538) 
Extra loss absorbency requirements  2.333*** 
(0.003) 
2.158*** 
(0.008) 
1.927** 
(0.029) 
1.780* 
(0.052) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.075** 
(0.043) 
0.104*** 
(0.008) 
0.038 
(0.284) 
0.050 
(0.200) 
Log of board size 0.883 
(0.630) 
0.548 
(0.763) 
1.330 
(0.501) 
0.440 
(0.806) 
Total debt/total asset 0.080 
(0.460) 
0.094 
(0.421) 
0.060 
(0.608) 
0.072 
(0.550) 
Log of assets -6.338 
(0.337) 
-7.760 
(0.298) 
-4.628 
(0.478) 
-5.109 
(0.416) 
Non-performing loans/total loans -0.300 
(0.526) 
-0.448 
(0.289) 
-0.521 
(0.236) 
-0.392 
(0.359) 
Return on Equity 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.015** 
(0.013) 
0.007** 
(0.021) 
0.009** 
(0.022) 
Coverage limit GDP per capita -0.002 
(0.869) 
-0.003 
(0.817) 
-0.004 
(0.724) 
-0.003 
(0.770) 
GDP growth rate -0.285 
(0.220) 
-0.277 
(0.295) 
-0.374 
(0.174) 
-0.351 
(0.208) 
BFCI Index -1.285** 
(0.016) 
-1.381** 
(0.018) 
-1.014* 
(0.084) 
-1.176** 
(0.028) 
Constant 2.276 
(0.967) 
36.723 
(0.532) 
-13.856 
(0.800) 
14.296 
(0.778) 
R-squared 48.96% 49.13% 34.03% 39.05% 
No. of observations  113 111 111 113 
Notes: This table reports the panel regression results of the equation (3.10) for G-SIBs: 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                    (3.10) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  financial institution at year 𝑡  when the connectedness 
measures based on the VAR model are used. 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of the proxies for interbank loans, non-
interest income, regulatory capital ratio, and additional loss absorbency bucket. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of 
variables, including global activity, corporate governance, leverage, size, credit risk, management 
effectiveness, deposit insurance policy, GDP growth rate, and financial condition indicator in one region 
in which a G-SIB locates. Hausman test suggests that GLS random-effect model is used to estimate the 
panel regression. Robust standard errors are used to account for possible heteroskedatic residuals. The p-
values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.13: Estimation Results of Determinants of the ‘Too-Interconnected-To-Fail’ 
Ranking (G-SIIs) 
Notes: This table reports the panel regression results of the equation (3.10) for G-SIIs: 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                    (3.10) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  financial institution at year 𝑡  when the connectedness 
measures based on the VECM or VAR model are used. 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of the proxies for NTNI activity 
and size. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of variables which consist of global activity, G-SII designation, corporate 
governance, insurance portfolio quality, leverage, investment activity, operating efficiency, GDP growth 
rate, management effectiveness, and financial condition indicator in one region in which a G-SII locates. 
As suggested by F-test, pooled OLS method is used. Also, robust standard errors are used. The p-values 
of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 
 VECM 
model 
VECM 
model 
VAR  
model 
VAR  
model 
Total liability/total insurance 
reserves 
1.757 
(0.487) 
3.070 
(0.269) 
5.327** 
(0.029) 
7.208*** 
(0.005) 
Other income 0.126* 
( 0.083) 
0.132 
(0.138) 
0.020 
(0.814) 
0.024 
(0.828) 
Log of total assets 19.285** 
(0.027) 
 
24.527*** 
(0.000) 
 
Log of market capitalisation  
 
5.943 
(0.259) 
 
8.829 
(0.116) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.121** 
(0.021) 
0.110* 
(0.059) 
0.107** 
(0.024) 
0.095* 
(0.073) 
G-SII dummy -2.252 
(0.547) 
-2.247 
(0.524) 
-3.490 
(0.187) 
-3.488 
(0.192) 
Log of board size -14.142 
(0.363) 
-13.742 
(0.421) 
-3.912 
(0.741) 
-3.727 
(0.780) 
Loss ratio -0.001 
( 0.987) 
-0.026 
(0.459) 
0.008 
(0.777) 
-0.021 
(0.511) 
Total debt/total asset 0.082 
(0.559) 
0.091 
(0.524) 
-0.065 
(0.628) 
-0.066 
(0.571) 
Investment income/net revenue  1.295 
(0.749) 
-1.861 
(0.609) 
6.046** 
(0.021) 
2.409 
(0.404) 
Operating expenses/total assets  19.037 
(0.606) 
19.235 
(0.624) 
58.546** 
(0.043) 
59.611** 
(0.045) 
Return on Equity 0.089*** 
(0.000) 
0.054* 
(0.069) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.013 
(0.624) 
BFCI Index 0.387 
(0.671) 
0.228 
(0.834) 
0.737 
(0.421) 
0.432 
(0.670) 
GDP growth rate  -0.941* 
(0.089) 
-0.975 
(0.110) 
-0.522 
(0.297) 
-0.550 
(0.316) 
Constant -149.953* 
(0.068) 
-23.531 
(0.608) 
-219.736*** 
(0.000) 
-69.260 
(0.137) 
R-squared 32.15% 27.00% 39.73% 31.47% 
No. of observations  75 75 75 75 
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Table 3.14: Additional Test I – Impact of Trading Account Income  
VECM model     
Log of inter-bank loans 6.775*** 
(0.000) 
7.547*** 
(0.000) 
7.678*** 
(0.000) 
8.225*** 
(0.000) 
Trading account income/total interest 
income 
11.885** 
(0.025) 
11.889** 
(0.033) 
14.124** 
(0.050) 
11.642 
(0.126) 
Tier 1 leverage ratio -2.904*** 
(0.000) 
   
(Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/total assets  -1.679** 
(0.033) 
  
Tier 1 capital ratio   -0.154 
(0.707) 
 
Capital adequacy ratio    0.280 
(0.472) 
Extra loss absorbency requirements  2.563*** 
(0.000) 
1.971*** 
(0.002) 
1.728*** 
(0.001) 
1.194** 
(0.025) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.116** 
(0.048) 
0.103* 
(0.072) 
0.061 
(0.450) 
0.046 
(0.580) 
Log of board size 0.709 
(0.702) 
-0.085 
(0.966) 
0.299 
(0.863) 
-0.376 
(0.839) 
Total debt/total asset 0.174 
(0.191) 
0.159 
(0.285) 
0.259* 
(0.055) 
0.224 
(0.109) 
Log of assets -10.400 
(0.100) 
-10.654 
(0.210) 
-6.674 
(0.354) 
-6.019 
(0.437) 
Non-performing loans/total loans 0.323 
(0.529) 
0.043 
(0.942) 
0.518 
(0.440) 
0.407 
(0.499) 
Return on Equity 0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.037** 
(0.026) 
0.029* 
(0.051) 
0.033** 
(0.039) 
Coverage limit GDP per capita 0.005 
(0.638) 
0.007 
(0.565) 
0.008 
(0.570) 
0.009 
(0.510) 
GDP growth rate -0.050 
(0.889) 
-0.225 
(0.562) 
-0.300 
(0.475) 
-0.365 
(0.385) 
BFCI Index -1.136* 
(0.053) 
-0.974 
(0.120) 
-1.132** 
(0.030) 
-0.970* 
(0.076) 
Constant 56.349 
(0.317) 
54.448 
(0.454) 
5.218 
(0.934) 
-6.803 
(0.913) 
R-squared 48.65% 44.24% 40.48% 40.81% 
No. of observations  102 100 100 102 
Notes: This table reports the panel regression results of the equation (3.10) for G-SIBs: 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                    (3.10) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  financial institution at year 𝑡  when the connectedness 
measures based on the VECM model are used. 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of the proxies for interbank loans, 
trading account income, regulatory capital ratio, and additional loss absorbency bucket. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector 
of variables, including global activity, corporate governance, leverage, size, credit risk, management 
effectiveness, deposit insurance policy, GDP growth rate, and financial condition indicator in one region 
in which a G-SIB locates. Hausman test suggests that GLS random-effect model is used to estimate the 
panel regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. The p-values of the coefficients are 
in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.15: Additional Test II – Impact of Other Non-Interest Income 
VECM model     
Log of inter-bank loans 6.625*** 
(0.000) 
7.321*** 
(0.004) 
8.218*** 
(0.001) 
8.567*** 
(0.001) 
Other non-interest income/total 
interest income 
4.179 
(0.112) 
4.091 
(0.126) 
4.643 
(0.213) 
4.999 
(0.106) 
Tier 1 leverage ratio -2.966*** 
(0.007) 
   
(Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/total assets  -1.633 
(0.106) 
  
Tier 1 capital ratio   -0.032 
(0.927) 
 
Capital adequacy ratio    0.251 
(0.464) 
Extra loss absorbency requirements  2.245*** 
(0.002) 
1.674** 
(0.021) 
1.560** 
(0.023) 
1.189* 
(0.066) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.200*** 
(0.009) 
0.177** 
(0.025) 
0.110 
(0.295) 
0.095 
(0.377) 
Log of board size 1.872 
(0.299) 
1.585 
(0.453) 
1.916 
(0.126) 
1.139 
(0.574) 
Total debt/total asset 0.146 
(0.299) 
0.109 
(0.523) 
0.171 
(0.293) 
0.149 
(0.370) 
Log of assets -11.891* 
(0.098) 
-11.665 
(0.245) 
-9.452 
(0.325) 
-9.131 
(0.346) 
Non-performing loans/total loans 0.464 
(0.454) 
0.224 
(0.726) 
0.430 
(0.580) 
0.318 
(0.647) 
Return on Equity 0.030* 
(0.071) 
0.032* 
(0.091) 
0.030 
(0.100) 
0.033* 
(0.079) 
Coverage limit GDP per capita -0.005 
(0.590) 
-0.008 
(0.427) 
-0.009 
(0.473) 
-0.007 
(0.594) 
GDP growth rate 0.050 
(0.861) 
0.094 
(0.759) 
0.223 
(0.524) 
0.201 
(0.554) 
BFCI Index -0.994 
(0.140) 
-0.892 
(0.201) 
-1.303** 
(0.043) 
-1.294** 
(0.042) 
Constant 67.926 
(0.242) 
62.154 
(0.440) 
24.948 
(0.757) 
18.107 
(0.819) 
R-squared 47.63% 43.70% 42.35% 42.12% 
No. of observations  88 86 87 88 
Notes: This table reports the panel regression results of the equation (3.10) for G-SIBs: 
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                    (3.10) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  financial institution at year 𝑡  when the connectedness 
measures based on the VECM model are used. 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of the proxies for interbank loans, other 
non-interest income, regulatory capital ratio, and additional loss absorbency bucket. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is a vector of 
variables, including global activity, corporate governance, leverage, size, credit risk, management 
effectiveness, deposit insurance policy, GDP growth rate, and financial condition indicator in one region 
in which a G-SIB locates. Hausman test suggests using GLS random-effect model. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are used. The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.16: Robustness Test I – GMM Estimation Method 
Panel A: GMM regressions of G-SIBs (VECM) 
Log of inter-bank loans 6.479*** 
(0.000) 
7.194*** 
(0.000) 
7.405*** 
(0.000) 
7.493*** 
(0.000) 
Non-interest income/total interest 
income 
6.774*** 
(0.002) 
7.284*** 
(0.001) 
7.947*** 
(0.001) 
7.304*** 
(0.002) 
Tier 1 leverage ratio -2.408*** 
(0.000) 
   
(Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/total assets  -1.471*** 
(0.001) 
  
Tier 1 capital ratio   -0.241 
(0.374) 
 
Capital adequacy ratio    0.012 
(0.966) 
Extra loss absorbency requirements  1.860** 
(0.019) 
1.401* 
(0.069) 
1.299 
(0.121) 
0.968 
(0.250) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.143*** 
(0.000) 
0.139*** 
(0.001) 
0.141*** 
(0.002) 
0.134*** 
(0.005) 
Log of board size 0.869 
(0.508) 
0.320 
(0.814) 
1.262 
(0.425) 
0.481 
(0.740) 
Total debt/total asset 0.276*** 
(0.001) 
0.267*** 
(0.002) 
0.366*** 
(0.000) 
0.336*** 
(0.000) 
Log of assets -6.228 
(0.250) 
-6.690 
(0.253) 
-2.773 
(0.638) 
-2.454 
(0.670) 
Non-performing loans/total loans 0.145 
(0.774) 
-0.139 
(0.781) 
0.172 
(0.734) 
0.115 
(0.816) 
Return on Equity 0.023*** 
(0.003) 
0.025*** 
(0.002) 
0.015** 
(0.025) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
Coverage limit GDP per capita -0.001 
(0.896) 
0.000 
(0.983) 
-0.001 
(0.885) 
0.000 
(0.955) 
GDP growth rate -0.056 
(0.851) 
-0.179 
(0.558) 
-0.270 
(0.408) 
-0.295 
(0.360) 
BFCI Index -1.443** 
(0.024) 
-1.317** 
(0.048) 
-1.394* 
(0.055) 
-1.316* 
(0.057) 
Constant 12.775 
(0.799) 
12.702 
(0.812) 
-35.986 
(0.503) 
-38.655 
(0.454) 
Panel B: GMM regressions of G-SIIs (VECM) 
Total liability/total insurance reserves 1.757 
(0.438) 
3.070 
(0.216) 
Other income 0.126* 
(0.051) 
0.132* 
(0.095) 
Log of total assets 19.285** 
(0.012) 
 
Log of market capitalisation   5.943 
(0.206) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.121*** 
(0.008) 
0.110** 
(0.033) 
G-SII dummy -2.252 
(0.502) 
-2.247 
(0.478) 
Log of board size -14.142 
(0.309) 
-13.742 
(0.369) 
Loss ratio -0.001 
(0.986) 
-0.026 
(0.409) 
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Notes: This table reports the GMM estimation results of the equation (3.10).  
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                    (3.10) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡  is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  financial institution at year 𝑡  when the connectedness 
measures are obtained from VECM model. For G-SIBs, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1  include interbank loans, non-interest 
income, regulatory capital ratio, and additional loss absorbency bucket. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 include global activity, 
corporate governance, leverage, size, credit risk, management effectiveness, deposit insurance policy, 
GDP growth rate, and financial condition indicator in one region in which a G-SIB locates. For G-SIIs, 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1  include NTNI activity and size. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1  include global activity, G-SII designation, corporate 
governance, insurance portfolio quality, leverage, investment activity, operating efficiency, management 
effectiveness, GDP growth rate, and financial condition indicator in one region in which a G-SII locates. 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total debt/total asset 0.082 
(0.514) 
0.091 
(0.478) 
Investment income/net revenue  1.295 
(0.722) 
-1.861 
(0.569) 
Operating expenses/total assets  19.037 
(0.565) 
19.235 
(0.585) 
Return on Equity 0.089*** 
(0.000) 
0.054** 
(0.040) 
BFCI Index 0.387 
(0.636) 
0.228 
(0.816) 
GDP growth rate  -0.941* 
(0.055) 
-0.975* 
(0.072) 
Constant   -149.953** 
(0.040) 
-23.531 
(0.568) 
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Table 3.17: Robustness Test II – Ordered Logit/Probit Model  
VECM model for G-SIBs Ordinal  
Logit  
Ordinal 
Logit  
Ordinal 
Logit  
Ordinal 
Logit  
Log of inter-bank loans 1.937*** 
(0.001) 
2.006*** 
(0.000) 
1.912*** 
(0.000) 
2.190*** 
(0.001) 
Non-interest income/total interest 
income 
0.841 
(0.284) 
0.849 
(0.214) 
1.216* 
(0.066) 
1.148* 
(0.096) 
Tier1 capital ratio -0.054 
(0.512) 
   
Capital adequacy ratio  -0.009 
(0.906) 
  
Tier1 leverage ratio   -0.577*** 
(0.001) 
 
(Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/total assets    -0.261 
(0.234) 
Extra loss absorbency requirements  0.341* 
(0.096) 
0.279 
(0.170) 
0.410** 
(0.037) 
0.343** 
(0.030) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.020* 
(0.093) 
0.020 
(0.101) 
0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.026** 
(0.019) 
Log of board size 0.584 
(0.179) 
0.118 
(0.827) 
0.176 
(0.729) 
0.105 
(0.846) 
Total debt/total asset 0.067* 
(0.075) 
0.057 
(0.117) 
0.059* 
(0.058) 
0.049 
(0.174) 
Log of assets -1.153 
(0.401) 
-1.817 
(0.207) 
-1.994 
(0.110) 
-2.777 
(0.119) 
Non-performing loans/total loans 0.013 
(0.914) 
0.028 
(0.829) 
0.059 
(0.629) 
-0.011 
(0.932) 
Return on Equity 0.001 
(0.163) 
0.002 
(0.155) 
0.003* 
(0.086) 
0.003 
(0.131) 
Coverage limit GDP per capita -0.002 
(0.615) 
-0.001 
(0.653) 
-0.001 
(0.732) 
-0.001 
(0.658) 
GDP growth rate -0.125 
(0.235) 
-0.096 
(0.365) 
-0.068 
(0.482) 
-0.087 
(0.385) 
BFCI Index -0.187 
(0.232) 
-0.268* 
(0.059) 
-0.301* 
(0.071) 
-0.307* 
(0.079) 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of random-effects ordered Logit model for G-SIBs. The 
ordered Logit model is defined as:  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                         
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
{
 
 
1, 𝑖𝑓              𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜅1
2, 𝑖𝑓    𝜅1 < 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜅2
⋮                                    
𝑁, 𝑖𝑓         𝜅𝑁−1 < 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗
   
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗  is an unobserved latent variable linked to the observed ordinal response categories 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 which 
is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ financial institution at year 𝑡 when the connectedness measures are obtained 
from VECM model. 𝜅 represents cutpoints to be estimated (along with the 𝛾0, 𝛾, and 𝜉 coefficients) 
using maximum likelihood estimation, subject to the constraint that 𝜅1 < 𝜅2⋯ < 𝜅𝑁−1. 𝑁 is the largest 
value of 𝑦𝑖,𝑡. In this study, 𝑁 = 32. For G-SIBs, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 include interbank loans, non-interest income, 
regulatory capital ratio, and additional loss absorbency bucket. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 include global activity, corporate 
governance, leverage, size, credit risk, management effectiveness, deposit insurance policy, GDP growth 
rate, and financial condition indicator in one region in which a G-SIB locates. The p-values of the 
coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3.17: Robustness Test II – Ordered Logit/Probit Model (Continued) 
VECM model for G-SIBs Ordinal 
Probit 
Ordinal 
Probit  
Ordinal 
Probit 
Ordinal 
Probit 
Log of inter-bank loans 1.008*** 
(0.002) 
1.123*** 
(0.001) 
1.077*** 
(0.000) 
1.225*** 
(0.001) 
Non-interest income/total interest 
income 
0.420 
(0.341) 
0.456 
(0.241) 
0.724* 
(0.055) 
0.720* 
(0.087) 
Tier1 capital ratio -0.018 
(0.734) 
   
Capital adequacy ratio  0.005 
(0.909) 
  
Tier1 leverage ratio   -0.342*** 
(0.001) 
 
(Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital)/total assets    -0.175 
(0.159) 
Extra loss absorbency requirements  0.221* 
(0.090) 
0.187 
(0.144) 
0.270** 
(0.021) 
0.225** 
(0.023) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.011 
(0.111) 
0.011* 
(0.092) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.007) 
Log of board size 0.225 
(0.377) 
-0.047 
(0.869) 
0.002 
(0.993) 
-0.060 
(0.838) 
Total debt/total asset 0.032 
(0.141) 
0.029 
(0.163) 
0.033** 
(0.042) 
0.028 
(0.152) 
Log of assets -0.763 
(0.366) 
-1.107 
(0.182) 
-1.226* 
(0.084) 
-1.581 
(0.106) 
Non-performing loans/total loans -0.003 
(0.965) 
0.003 
(0.962) 
0.027 
(0.680) 
-0.016 
(0.812) 
Return on Equity 0.001 
(0.100) 
0.001* 
(0.072) 
0.002* 
(0.058) 
0.002 
(0.136) 
Coverage limit GDP per capita 0.000 
(0.876) 
0.000 
(0.910) 
0.000 
(0.997) 
0.000 
(0.935) 
GDP growth rate -0.053 
(0.339) 
-0.042 
(0.445) 
-0.025 
(0.598) 
-0.038 
(0.465) 
BFCI Index -0.148* 
(0.099) 
-0.189** 
(0.021) 
-0.218** 
(0.020) 
-0.214** 
(0.031) 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of random-effects ordered Probit model for G-SIBs. The 
ordered Probit model is defined as:  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
{
 
 
1, 𝑖𝑓              𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜅1
2, 𝑖𝑓    𝜅1 < 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜅2
⋮                                    
𝑁, 𝑖𝑓         𝜅𝑁−1 < 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗
   
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗  is an unobserved latent variable linked to the observed ordinal response categories 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 which 
is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ financial institution at year 𝑡 when the connectedness measures are obtained 
from VECM model. 𝜅 represents cutpoints to be estimated (along with the 𝛾0, 𝛾, and 𝜉 coefficients) 
using maximum likelihood estimation, subject to the constraint that 𝜅1 < 𝜅2⋯ < 𝜅𝑁−1. 𝑁 is the largest 
value of 𝑦𝑖,𝑡. In this study, 𝑁 = 32. For G-SIBs, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 include interbank loans, non-interest income, 
regulatory capital ratio, and additional loss absorbency bucket. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 include global activity, corporate 
governance, leverage, size, credit risk, management effectiveness, deposit insurance policy, GDP growth 
rate, and financial condition indicator in one region in which a G-SIB locates. The p-values of the 
coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3.17: Robustness Test II – Ordered Logit/Probit Model (Continued) 
VECM model for G-SIIs Ordinal 
Probit 
Ordinal 
Logit 
Ordinal 
Probit 
Ordinal 
Logit 
Total liability/total insurance 
reserves 
0.224 
(0.536) 
0.416 
(0.509) 
0.369 
(0.398) 
0.646 
(0.211) 
Other income 0.022** 
(0.033) 
0.042** 
(0.023) 
0.023 
(0.201) 
0.042* 
(0.061) 
Log of total assets 3.022*** 
(0.007) 
5.063** 
(0.015) 
 
 
Log of market capitalisation    0.663 
(0.682) 
1.145 
(0.226) 
Foreign sales/total sales 0.019** 
(0.014) 
0.035** 
(0.015) 
0.016** 
(0.040) 
0.031* 
(0.065) 
G-SII dummy -0.309 
(0.494) 
-0.792 
(0.309) 
-0.267 
(0.666) 
-0.554 
(0.492) 
Log of board size -1.842 
(0.508) 
-2.492 
(0.633) 
-1.320 
(0.842) 
-2.307 
(0.624) 
Loss ratio -0.002 
(0.689) 
-0.003 
(0.629) 
-0.005 
(0.602) 
-0.011 
(0.203) 
Total debt/total asset 0.002 
(0.904) 
-0.002 
(0.935) 
0.003 
(0.821) 
0.003 
(0.908) 
Investment income/net revenue  -0.007 
(0.990) 
-0.125 
(0.910) 
-0.535 
(0.358) 
-1.110 
(0.193) 
Operating expenses/total assets  2.269 
(0.648) 
2.887 
(0.749) 
1.288 
(0.926) 
1.472 
(0.879) 
Return on Equity 0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.172) 
0.015* 
(0.071) 
BFCI Index 0.101 
(0.375) 
0.194 
(0.339) 
0.087 
(0.475) 
0.158 
(0.495) 
GDP growth rate  -0.139* 
(0.076) 
-0.269** 
(0.025) 
-0.141 
(0.104) 
-0.262* 
(0.051) 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of random-effects ordered Logit/Probit model for G-SIIs. 
The ordered Logit/Probit model is defined as:  
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝛾0 + 𝛾𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =
{
 
 
1, 𝑖𝑓              𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜅1
2, 𝑖𝑓    𝜅1 < 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜅2
⋮                                    
𝑁, 𝑖𝑓         𝜅𝑁−1 < 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗
   
where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗  is an unobserved latent variable linked to the observed ordinal response categories 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 which 
is the ranking of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ financial institution at year 𝑡 when the connectedness measures are obtained 
from VECM model. 𝜅 represents cutpoints to be estimated (along with the 𝛾0, 𝛾, and 𝜉 coefficients) 
using maximum likelihood estimation, subject to the constraint that 𝜅1 < 𝜅2⋯ < 𝜅𝑁−1. 𝑁 is the largest 
value of 𝑦𝑖,𝑡. In this study, 𝑁 = 32. For G-SIIs, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 include NTNI activity and size. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 include 
global activity, G-SII designation, corporate governance, insurance portfolio quality, leverage, 
investment activity, operating efficiency, management effectiveness, GDP growth rate, and financial 
condition indicator in one region in which a G-SII locates. The p-values of the coefficients are in the 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Figure 3.1: Total Credit Risk Connectedness of G-SIFIs 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the total credit risk connectedness of G-SIFIs. Black (red) line is total credit 
risk connectedness of G-SIFIs based on VECM (VAR) model. The blue line represents the difference 
between (VECM-VAR) two time series. The values of connectedness are expressed in percentage (%). 
 
Figure 3.2: Scored Credit Risk Connectedness (𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶) and Connectedness Regimes 
 
Notes: This figure presents the scored credit risk connectedness and four connectedness regimes. Black 
line is 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶  based on VECM model and red line is 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶  based on VAR model. 
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Figure 3.3: 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 and Financial Crisis Periods 
 
Notes: This figure indicates the scored credit risk connectedness, 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 , and several critical events during the financial catastrophes. The chronology of severe financial events 
is selected by referencing ‘Full Timeline’ of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Louzis and Vouldis (2013), and financial news. Black line is 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶  based on VECM model 
and red line is 𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶  based on VAR model. 
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Figure 3.4: Total Directional Connectedness: Cross-Region and Within-Region 
Panel A: Credit Risk Connectedness Originating from One Region 
 
Panel B: Credit Risk Connectedness Cross Any Two Regions 
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Notes: This figure depicts the total directional connectedness: cross-region in Panel A and within-region 
in Panel B. The values of connectedness are expressed in percentage (%). 
Figure 3.5: Total Directional Connectedness: Cross-Group and Within-Group 
Panel A: Credit Risk Connectedness Originating from One Group 
 
Panel B: Credit Risk Connectedness Cross Any Two Groups 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the total directional connectedness: cross-group in Panel A and within-group 
in Panel B. The values of connectedness are expressed in percentage (%).
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Appendix 3A: Cross-Region/Group and Within-Region/Group Connectedness 
Suppose there are 𝑁 firms and 𝑀 regions or groups. In the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region/group, there are 
𝑝𝑖 firms. So, ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1 = 𝑁. The total number of pairwise connectedness series is 𝑁
2 −
𝑁 . The number of within-region pairwise connectedness series in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region is 
𝑝𝑖(𝑝𝑖 − 1); therefore, the total number of within-region pairwise connectedness series 
is ∑ 𝑝𝑖(𝑝𝑖 − 1)
𝑀
𝑖=1 . The number of cross-region pairwise connectedness series between 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region and the 𝑗𝑡ℎ region is 2𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Among these 2𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗  series, half of 
them are pairwise connectedness from the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region to the 𝑗𝑡ℎ region and the other 
half of the series are pairwise connectedness from the 𝑗𝑡ℎ region to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region. The 
total number of cross-region pairwise connectedness series is ∑ 2𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗
𝑀
𝑖,𝑗=1,𝑖≠𝑗 = 𝑁
2 −
𝑁 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖(𝑝𝑖 − 1)
𝑀
𝑖=1 . 
Total connectedness of 𝑁 firms is calculated by summing 𝑁2 − 𝑁 series of pairwise 
connectedness and dividing the sum by 𝑁 . Following the same procedure, total 
connectedness within the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region/group is calculated by summing 𝑝𝑖
2 − 𝑝𝑖 series of 
pairwise connectedness and divide the sum by 𝑝𝑖. Total directional connectedness from 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region to the 𝑗𝑡ℎ region is calculated by summing the corresponding 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗 series 
of pairwise connectedness and dividing the sum by (𝑝𝑖 + 𝑝𝑗) . Total directional 
connectedness from the 𝑗𝑡ℎ  region to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  region is calculated by summing the 
corresponding 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗 pairwise connectedness series and dividing the sum by (𝑝𝑖 + 𝑝𝑗). 
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Chapter 4: Impact of Sovereign Credit Rating and Bailout Events on Sovereign 
CDS and Equity Index: Evidence from the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone States 
4.1 Introduction 
Prior to the European sovereign debt crisis, sovereign credit risk of emerging economies 
was the major concern of academics, policymakers, and investors. However, during the 
past decade, sovereign default risk of developed countries has become undoubtedly 
important. Therefore, this chapter is motivated to focus on sovereign default risk of 
major advanced economies, i.e., the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone states. A number 
of researchers have examined the relationship between sovereign CDS and government 
bond, such as IMF (2013) and Fontana and Scheicher (2016). Nevertheless, only a few 
studies investigate the relationship between sovereign CDS and equity index. Sovereign 
CDS and equity markets are both related to one country’s probability of default (Ngene 
et al., 2014). Since sovereign CDS contract provides investors with protection to against 
contingent default of one country, sovereign CDS spread is directly depend on country 
credit risk. Equity market and sovereign default risk are linked through macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Jeanneret, 2017), corporate borrowing costs (Bedendo and Colla, 2015), 
and global investors’ trading decisions (Hooper et al., 2008). This chapter studies the 
relation of these two assets from the perspective of their time-varying contemporaneous 
correlation. Asset correlation is critically important for policymakers to monitor risk 
transmission across markets and for global investors to manage portfolios and control 
risk (e.g., Karolyi and Stulz, 1996; Fleming et al., 1998).  
The impact of sovereign credit risk events on sovereign CDS and equity index has been 
separately examined by previous studies, such as Afonso et al. (2012) and Hooper et al. 
(2008). However, the question of whether the relationship between the two assets in a 
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country is affected by sovereign credit risk news has not been answered. As suggested 
by Andersen et al. (2007), it is also important to approach the central question of price 
discovery by studying the news impact on returns and volatility of different assets as 
well as the linkages across assets. Thus, we aim at extending the current understanding 
of the news impact on sovereign CDS and equity index by examining the news impact 
not only on their returns and volatility, but also on their correlation. The correlation of 
assets may change at the arrival of macro news, which can be attributable to any cross-
asset trading caused by information spillovers, portfolio rebalancing, wealth effects, 
and increased dispersion of investors’ forecasts (Brenner et al., 2009). Accordingly, it 
can be expected that macro events conveying tradable news about one country’s default 
risk are likely to affect the correlation of sovereign CDS and equity index. We consider 
sovereign credit rating events and bailout events of troubled financial firms or distressed 
Eurozone states. To obtain a more general measure of sovereign credit rating events, 
we aggregate three major rating agencies’ rating information, which complements the 
method of Gande and Parsley (2005). Unlike Drago and Gallo (2016) who use dummy 
variable to account for anticipation effects of outlooks/watchlists, we calculate rating 
surprises which quantify the unexpected component of actual rating actions.  
While a stream of literature has studied the spillover effect of sovereign rating events 
across countries and assets, e.g., Ferreira and Gama (2007) and Arezki et al. (2011), 
limited papers have examined the spillover effect of a country’s sovereign rating news 
on the relationship between sovereign CDS and equity index in other economies. Hence, 
this chapter aims to fill in this gap. According to Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), besides 
similar economic fundamentals, transmission channels of a country’s sovereign credit 
rating news include international trade, common creditor, competition in a third market, 
membership in a trade bloc, and regional proximity. Due to the crucial role of Greece 
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in the European sovereign debt crisis, this chapter studies the spillover effect of Greek 
sovereign rating news. Given that the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone states are closely 
linked by global trades and/or geographic proximity, Greek sovereign rating events are 
likely to produce spillover effect.  
In sum, using an asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation model with exogenous 
variables (ADCC-X), we simultaneously study the impact of sovereign credit risk news 
on the returns, volatility, and correlation of sovereign CDS and equity index in major 
advanced economies. This allows us to tackle two research questions.  
a) How do sovereign default risk events affect the returns and volatility of sovereign 
CDS and equity index? 
b) How do sovereign default risk events affect the correlation between sovereign CDS 
and equity index? 
The major findings are briefly summarised as follows. First, domestic rating events and 
rating surprises have more significant impact on sovereign CDS than on equity index. 
Rating events or surprises are accompanied by a lower degree of asset correlation. 
Domestic good and bad rating events present both asymmetric and symmetric impact 
on the returns and volatility of two assets. For the correlation, symmetric impact of two 
rating news is found in Spain, Italy, and Cyprus, whereas asymmetric impact is detected 
in Portugal, Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, and the United States. On the announcement 
days of major bailouts, sovereign CDS spreads widen and equity index prices fall. Asset 
volatility increases, and two assets become more negatively correlated. Compared with 
domestic sovereign rating events, bailout events present more pronounced influence on 
assets. Finally, Greek rating news generates spillover effect and generally has a positive 
impact on the correlation of sovereign CDS and equity index in the sample countries.  
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This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several aspects. First, it adopts a 
more general measure to define sovereign credit rating events, which incorporates the 
information released by the three main rating agencies. It also calculates rating surprises, 
which quantify the size of the unexpected component of actual rating actions. These 
complement the approaches of Gande and Parsley (2005) and Drago and Gallo (2016). 
Second, using the ADCC-X model, this study extends the existing understanding of the 
news impact on sovereign CDS and equity index in terms of the returns, volatility, and 
correlation. Consistent with Andersen et al. (2007) and Brenner et al. (2009), we find 
that the asset correlation can be explained by the releases of sovereign credit rating and 
bailout news. Bailout news has more significant impact. Finally, it adds to the existing 
literature associated with the spillover effect of sovereign rating events, e.g., Ismailescu 
and Kazemi (2010) and Afonso et al. (2012), by showing that in several sample states, 
Greek rating news can affect the returns, volatility, and correlation of the two assets. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related literature 
and develops hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the methods to define rating events, 
rating surprises, and bailout events, and also presents the ADCC-X model. Section 4.4 
reports the data. Section 4.5 presents the empirical results and Section 4.6 concludes.   
4.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Relationship between Sovereign CDS and Equity Index 
The general reason why sovereign CDS and equity markets are interrelated is that they 
are both associated with sovereign default risk (Ngene et al., 2014). On the one hand, 
sovereign CDS contract offers investors an insurance to against contingent sovereign 
default; therefore, sovereign CDS spread is directly determined by country default risk. 
On the other hand, equity market and sovereign default risk are linked by economic 
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fundamentals (Jeanneret, 2017), corporate borrowing costs (Bedendo and Colla, 2015), 
and global investors’ trading decisions (Hooper et al., 2008). To be specific, Jeanneret 
(2017) suggests that sovereign credit risk and equity market jointly react to common 
economic shocks regarding corporate revenues. Also, increased sovereign default risk 
would decrease the market values of government bonds held by financial institutions. 
The losses would reduce these firms’ credit supply for the economy and consequently 
adversely influence the whole equity market. Bedendo and Colla (2015) argue that a 
distressed government may transfer its debt burden to the corporate sector by increasing 
taxation, intervening foreign exchange, or regulating private investment. As a result, 
corporate borrowing costs would increase and, eventually, the national equity market 
is adversely affected. In addition, sovereign default risk is an important input for global 
investors to manage portfolios. Thus, variations of sovereign default risk may induce 
portfolio rebalancing activities and then affect equity market (Hooper et al., 2008). 
The relationship between sovereign CDS and equity index can be inferred by structural 
credit risk pricing theory, price discovery, and arbitrage/hedge activity. First, Merton’s 
(1974) model in which the probability of default of one firm can be calculated by using 
equity market information is also applicable for sovereign debt and equity index. Chan-
Lau and Kim (2004) argue that the only considerable difference between a corporation 
and a sovereign issuer with the equal amount of debt is that default risk is higher for the 
sovereign for every asset value because the sovereign can choose to default even if it is 
technically solvent. This choice is referred to as ‘willingness-to-pay’. They heuristically 
justify that this choice does not affect the possible relation between sovereign debt and 
equity index implied by Merton’s model. Adopting an extended Black-Scholes-Merton 
option pricing model, Oshiro and Saruwatari (2005) present that one country’s default 
probability can be derived from its equity index price. Given that sovereign CDS is 
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written on sovereign debt and provides an insurance to against contingent default on 
the underlying sovereign obligation, its interrelationship with equity index can also be 
implied by Merton’s theory (Chan-Lau and Kim, 2004). 
Also, price discovery relation between the two assets has been empirically studied. Both 
sovereign CDS spreads and equity index prices are related to one country’s default risk. 
However, due to the differences in market structures, investors, and trading constraints, 
these two assets are more likely to react to sovereign credit risk news at different speeds. 
Chan et al. (2009) show that in seven Asian countries, sovereign CDS responds to 
country default risk news more rapidly than equity index, because the sovereign CDS 
market has fewer constraints, more sophisticated investors, and greater informational 
advantage than the undeveloped equity market. However, in eight European countries, 
Coronado et al. (2012) document that stock index leads sovereign CDS from 2007 to 
2009. In thirteen emerging markets, Ngene et al. (2014) find a nonlinear price discovery 
relation of the two assets and identify two regimes. Sovereign CDS leads equity index 
in the lower regime, while their lead-lag relation is ambiguous in the upper regime. 
Moreover, Chan et al. (2009) and Ngene et al. (2014) suggest that the capital structure 
arbitrage elaborated by Yu (2006) is also applicable for sovereign CDS and equity index. 
Capital structure arbitrageurs earn risk-free profits from the discrepancies between the 
observed CDS spread and the theoretical spread extracted from a Merton-type structural 
model (Chan et al., 2009). When the market spread is considerably larger (smaller) than 
the implied spread, arbitrageurs can short (long) default insurance, short (long) equity 
index, or do both. The investment decisions made by arbitrageurs depend on their belief 
about which market would be correct. Ngene et al. (2014) argue that hedging activities 
exist between these two assets. When a country’s default risk increases, equity market 
may be adversely affected. It is ascribed to either the deteriorating economic condition 
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or the higher risk premium required by worldwide investors. The demand for sovereign 
CDS contracts may increase and the protection of sovereign default would become 
more expensive. As a consequence, sovereign CDS spreads would increase. To hedge 
their increased sovereign default risk exposure, the default protection underwriters may 
short equity index, which may impose further downward pressure on equity prices. 
4.2.2 Measuring the Interrelationship across Assets 
Several models are employed by researchers to study the interactions across financial 
assets. For example, VAR and VECM models can identify short-run or/and long-run 
linear relation (e.g., Eun and Shim, 1989; Alter and Schüler, 2012). Copula and extreme 
value theory are used to quantify tail-dependency (e.g., Junker et al., 2006; Ning, 2010). 
Another group of models consists of unconditional and conditional correlation and 
Kendall’s and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.  
To quantify conditional correlation, Bollerslev (1990) develops a GARCH-CCC model, 
which is extended to GARCH-DCC model by Tse and Tsui (2002) and Engle (2002). 
Based on GARCH-DCC model, more advanced methods have been proposed since then. 
For example, Billio and Caporin (2005) introduce a Markov switching DCC (MS-DCC) 
model which allows an unobservable Markov chain to determine the unconditional 
correlation and the DCC parameters. Capplello et al. (2006) devise an asymmetric DCC 
(ADCC) model which considers asymmetric impact of positive and negative shocks in 
both conditional variances and correlations. Also, Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2009) 
propose a double smooth transition conditional correlation (DSTCC) model which 
permits two observable transition variables to control conditional correlation variations. 
Colacito et al. (2011) suggest a class of DCC-mixed-data-sampling (MIDAS) models 
which allow for extracting short- and long-run component specifications from dynamic 
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correlation. As this chapter aims to study the impact of macro news on sovereign CDS 
and equity index, an extension of Capplello et al.’s ADCC model is employed. One of 
the advantages of the ADCC model is that the effects of exogenous variables on returns, 
volatility, and covariance/correlation of assets could be tested directly by adding the 
exogenous variables to conditional mean, variance, and covariance equations. 
4.2.3 News Impact of Macro Events on Financial Markets 
Macro news can be classified as scheduled and unscheduled news, positive and negative 
news, or expected and unexpected news. Table 4.1 presents a brief summary of several 
studies related to news impact on financial markets. As shown, different methodologies 
are used, such as event study, linear regression, VAR model, univariate GARCH model, 
and multivariate GARCH model. Also, a wide variety of assets are studied, e.g., CDS, 
exchange rate, stock, and bond. Among a range of macro events, this study concentrates 
on sovereign credit rating and major bailout events, which are associated with sovereign 
default risk in particular.  
Prior literature separately studies the impact of sovereign rating news on sovereign CDS 
and equity markets. For instance, using event study method, Ismailescu and Kazemi 
(2010) examine the impact of sovereign rating news on sovereign CDS spreads in 22 
emerging markets and find that positive events convey more information than negative 
events. However, in 24 EU developed countries, Afonso et al. (2012) discover that 
sovereign CDS spreads have stronger responses to downgrades and negative outlooks. 
Regarding equity index, Brooks et al. (2004) present that only downgrades significantly 
affect the international equity markets. Their results are robust to different currencies 
used to measure returns, advanced or emerging market status, and the span of rating 
changes. Hooper et al. (2008) conclude that sovereign rating changes have significant 
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impact on stock index returns and volatility, and the impact is amplified for downgrades, 
in emerging countries, and during crisis times.  
Moreover, several papers discuss the impact of bailout events on sovereign CDS market, 
while limited studies examine their effects on equity market. For instance, Acharya et 
al. (2014) theoretically model how banking and sovereign CDS spreads interact in three 
sub-periods, that is, pre-bailout, bailout, and post-bailout. Their two-way feedback loop 
between banking system and public finance suggests that bank bailouts lead to a rise of 
sovereign default risk. Investors may perceive the bailouts as credit risk transfers from 
the private sector to the public sector; thus, they change the expectations of government 
creditworthiness. Due to the government bailouts in the euro area, five heavily indebted 
states obtain an increased access to funding to support their distressed financial systems. 
However, as the guarantors and contributors of the rescue packages, the other Eurozone 
states’ residual fiscal capacity is reduced and financial stability is threatened (Horváth 
and Huizinga, 2015). Using event study method, Horváth and Huizinga (2015) find that 
around the creation day of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), sovereign 
CDS spreads of the European countries reduce with their banking systems’ exposure to 
GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) government debt, but increase with 
their exposure to non-GIIPS government obligations.  
In addition, several studies examine the spillover effect of a country’s sovereign rating 
events on other countries’ sovereign CDS or equity markets. For example, Ferreira and 
Gama (2007) reveal that negative rating events present more significant spillover effect 
across the global stock markets and short geographic distance and emerging market 
status amplify the spillover effect. Arezki et al. (2011) show that after controlling the 
dependency among sovereign CDS, equity index, and equity sub-indices of banking 
and insurance sectors, sovereign rating events exert significant spillover impact across 
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countries and assets in Europe. Blau and Roseman (2014) find that European sovereign 
CDS spreads substantially rise around the U.S. downgrade on 05/08/2011, suggesting 
that the spillover of sovereign rating news exists not only within the proximate countries 
but also across the entire world. Drago and Gallo (2016) uncover that only downgrades 
have spillover effect across the Eurozone sovereign CDS markets, while Ismailescu and 
Kazemi (2010) find that only positive rating changes exert spillover effect on sovereign 
CDS spreads of emerging countries.  
As suggested by Andersen et al. (2007), the intuition of studying news impact on asset 
correlation is to assess whether the correlation simply shows the general interrelation 
among assets or it can be affected by macro event announcements. Brenner et al. (2009) 
summarise the reasons why asset correlation is expected to change when macro news 
is released, which include information spillovers across markets (e.g., Karolyi and Stulz, 
1996), wealth effects of convergence traders (e.g., Kyle and Xiong, 2001), portfolio 
rebalancing of cross-market hedging (e.g., Fleming et al., 1998), and raised degree of 
disagreement among investors (e.g., Kallberg and Pasquariello, 2008). Brenner et al. 
(2009) state that multi-asset trading activities caused by these reasons translate into the 
variation of comovement across assets. Empirically, Karolyi and Stulz (1996) do not 
find that the U.S. macroeconomic news and other macro news releases have impact on 
the U.S. and Japanese stock correlation. Around the arrival of the U.S. economic news, 
Brenner et al. (2009) find either more negative or less positive correlation across the 
U.S. stock, government bond, and corporate bond markets. Chui and Yang (2012) show 
that the extreme correlation of stock–bond futures in the U.S., the U.K., and Germany 
is driven by the U.S. economic news, business cycle, and stock market uncertainties. 
Based on the literature reviewed in Section 4.2.1, generally, higher (lower) sovereign 
default risk is related to higher (lower) sovereign CDS spread and lower (higher) equity 
 151 
 
index price. Therefore, sovereign CDS spread and equity index price are negatively 
correlated (Kapadia and Pu, 2012). According to Chan et al. (2009) and Ngene et al. 
(2014), trades between these two markets may exist for the purposes of arbitrage and 
hedging. When sovereign credit risk news arrives, arbitrageurs and hedgers might be 
more active to rebalance their positions in the two markets to earn profits and/or hedge 
risk (e.g., Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Fleming et al., 1998). Consequently, sovereign CDS 
spread and equity index price are likely to be more negatively correlated due to possibly 
increased cross-asset trading activities (Kapadia and Pu, 2012; Brenner et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are tested.  
Hypothesis 1(a): Sovereign CDS and equity index markets become more correlated at 
the arrivals of domestic sovereign rating events. 
Hypothesis 1(b): Sovereign CDS and equity index markets become more correlated at 
the arrivals of bailout events. 
Although limited research has compared the direction and the size of the impact exerted 
by sovereign rating and bailout events on financial markets, bailout events are expected 
to have more significant and pronounced effects. One possible reason is that in contrast 
with rating events, major bailouts are relatively infrequent and tend to occur during the 
extremely stressful periods. Also, bailout events are more likely to be viewed as severe 
adverse shocks because taxpayers in the relevant countries have to assume all the costs 
(Acharya et al., 2014). However, sovereign rating events are not necessarily negative 
news, and essentially, they reflect mainly opinions about sovereign creditworthiness 
provided by a third-party. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Bailout events have stronger effects on the correlation of sovereign CDS 
and equity index than domestic sovereign rating events. 
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Based on the aforementioned literature of the spillover effect of one country’s sovereign 
rating news on financial markets in other countries, similar economic conditions, global 
business, competition in international trade, common creditor, membership in a trade 
bloc, and geographic proximity are the possible transmission channels (Ismailescu and 
Kazemi, 2010). Given that the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone members are closely 
linked by global trades and/or geographic proximity, Greek sovereign rating events are 
likely to produce spillover effect. When Greek credit risk news arrives, arbitrageurs and 
hedgers might be motivated to rebalance their positions in sovereign CDS and equity 
markets in other economies; thus, the two markets in those countries are expected to be 
more correlated (e.g., Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Brenner et al., 2009). 
Hypothesis 3: Sovereign CDS and equity index markets become more correlated at the 
arrivals of Greek sovereign rating events. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Sovereign Credit Rating Events 
4.3.1.1 Positive and Negative Rating Events 
Sovereign credit rating information of the three major rating agencies—Moody’s, S&P 
Global Ratings, and Fitch’s ratings—is employed. Historical sovereign ratings and 
outlook/watchlist assessments for local currency denominated long-term government 
debt are utilised.32 According to S&P Global Ratings, distinct from actual rating actions, 
outlooks are the assessments on the potential changes in the direction of a credit rating 
over next six months to two years, and watchlists deliver the rating agency’s opinions 
                                                          
32 As noted by Brooks et al. (2004), although there is not a 100% correspondence between local and 
foreign currency ratings, a change in one triggers a change in the other 75% of the time. Hence, this 
chapter focuses on local currency ratings for one sovereign.  
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about the potential direction of a short-term or long-term rating actions. Although 
outlooks/watchlists do not necessarily guarantee likely future rating movements, they 
can be considered as a signal or forecast of the subsequent rating changes (Gande and 
Parsley, 2005). Hence, focusing only on rating actions may omit important information 
and it is worth of considering both rating actions and outlooks/watchlists. 
This study follows Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama (2007) to construct 
a comprehensive credit rating (CCR) measure and use the changes of CCR to define 
rating events. The first step is numerically coding the explicit sovereign credit ratings 
(ECR) on a scale from 0 (the lowest rating, SD/D or RD/D) to 20 (the highest rating, 
AAA or Aaa). Next, the CCR is obtained by adding the outlook/watchlist information 
(on a scale from -1 for a negative outlook to 1 for a positive outlook) to the ECR. Third, 
any non-zero changes in the CCR is defined as rating events. Then, the rating events 
are further divided into ‘positive rating event’ (a positive change due to an upgrade, a 
positive outlook, or a positive credit watch) and ‘negative rating event’ (a negative 
change due to a downgrade, a negative outlook, or a negative credit watch). Table 4.2 
describes the CCR definition. 
However, different from Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama (2007) who 
focus on only one rating agency, this study considers all the three major rating agencies. 
One reason is that three agencies may not simultaneously release the rating information 
for one sovereign. Also, they may have divergent views about one country’s rating and 
outlook. For example, on 05/08/2011, S&P Global Ratings downgraded the U.S. long-
term sovereign rating to AA+ from AAA, with a negative outlook. However, Moody's 
and Fitch only released a negative outlook on 02/06/2011 and 28/11/2011, respectively, 
but did not downgrade the U.S. government debt. Moreover, as discussed by Alsakka 
and ap Gwilym (2010), there are lead-lag relations among three agencies to provide 
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sovereign ratings. Moody’s tends to lead upgrades, while S&P Global Ratings generally 
leads downgrades. Therefore, only relying on the rating information offered by single 
rating agency may not capture all the sovereign rating changes. To construct a relatively 
general CCR, we repeat the above four steps for each agency and then aggregate the 
CCRs of three agencies.33 For one country, if more than one rating agency releases 
rating news on the same day, the largest CCR change is adopted.  
4.3.1.2  ‘Surprise Component’ of Rating Actions 
Suppose a country’s rating at time 𝑡 − 1 is 𝑋. 𝑋 is a numerical value transformed from 
the ECR by using the method described in Section 4.3.1.1. There are three cases: a) If 
at time 𝑡 − 1, outlook is ‘Stable’ or credit watch is ‘Developing’ (CW-Dev), it would 
be surprising if the rating at 𝑡 is 𝑋 + 𝐴 or 𝑋 − 𝐵 (𝐴 and 𝐵 are positive integer). Then, 
the ‘surprise component’ is 𝐴 (= 𝑋 + 𝐴 − 𝑋) or –𝐵 (= 𝑋 − 𝐵 − 𝑋), b) If at time 𝑡 −
1, outlook is ‘Positive’ or credit watch is ‘Positive’ (CW-Pos), it would be surprising if 
the rating at 𝑡 is 𝑋 − 𝐵. Then, the ‘surprise component’ is –𝐵, and c) If at time 𝑡 − 1, 
outlook is ‘Negative’ or credit watch is ‘Negative’ (CW-Neg), it would be surprising if 
the rating at 𝑡 is 𝑋 + 𝐴. Then, the ‘surprise component’ is 𝐴. While Böninghausen and 
Zabel (2015) and Drago and Gallo (2016) use dummy variable to control anticipation 
effects of outlooks/watchlists, dummy variable indicates neither the sign nor the size of 
the predicted component of the subsequent rating actions. Table 4.3 describes the 
definition of ‘surprise component’ of one country’s sovereign rating changes. 
4.3.2 Bailout Events 
                                                          
33 Although Afonso et al. (2012) also consider applying the three agencies’ sovereign rating information, 
they assign an arbitrary weight to each agency’s CCR and calculate an average CCR. To avoid any 
possible bias induced by the arbitrary weights, this study aggregates rather than averages the three CCRs. 
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Because of the long lists of the bailouts during the recent financial crises, this chapter 
considers only the major bailouts which may significantly affect sovereign default risk 
in the United States and the United Kingdom.34 In the U.S., the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 and the bailouts of Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
and AIG are examined. In the U.K., the announcements of the second rescue package 
and the Special Resolution Regime are considered. In the euro area, due to the closely 
interconnected relationships across the members, this study focuses on the bailouts of 
indebted sovereigns instead of the domestic bailouts in individual countries.35 To be 
specific, we examine the creations of three funding facilities, the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), 
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and the bailouts of five distressed states 
(Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, and Greece). The dates and brief descriptions of these 
bailout events are presented in Appendix 4A. A dummy variable, which equals one on 
the announcement day and zero otherwise, is constructed to define bailout event. 
4.3.3 ADCC-X Model 
This study modifies Vargas’s (2008) ADCC-X model which is based on Capplello et 
al.’s (2006) ADCC model. Unlike other DCC models, the ADCC model allows for 
asset-specific news impact and smoothing parameters and permits asymmetric reactions 
in both conditional variances and correlations to negative past innovations (Capplello 
et al., 2006). Our ADCC-X model is slightly different from Vargas’s model as it 
simultaneously and directly examines the impact of exogenous variables on conditional 
returns, volatility, and covariance of assets. The model specifications are as follows: 
                                                          
34 Taken the U.S. for example, a list of bailouts is available at: http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list.  
35 Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) offer a detailed review of the rescue measures in each European country. 
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𝑅1𝑡 = 𝜃1 + ∑ 𝛾1𝑘 𝑅1𝑡−𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝜑1𝑘 𝑅2𝑡−𝑘
𝐾
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EGARCH with asymmetry model is the major univariate model applied in this study 
because it guarantees the positivity of the conditional variance and does not require any 
restrictions on parameters.36 𝑅1𝑡 and  𝑅2𝑡 are the first log-difference of sovereign CDS 
spread and equity index price, respectively. To capture autocorrelation in return series 
and possible lead-lag relation between asset returns, lags of  𝑅1𝑡 and  𝑅2𝑡 are included. 
Lag 𝐾 is selected based on Schwarz Information Criterion (SBC). ℎ1𝑡 and ℎ2𝑡 are the 
conditional variance of the returns of sovereign CDS and equity index, respectively.  
𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑡 denotes the 𝑚th macro event and 𝑀 is the total number of event categories. 
Let the covariance matrix of two asset returns be 𝐻𝑡 and 𝐻𝑡 is decomposed as: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑃𝑡𝐷𝑡                                                                   (4.5) 
𝐷𝑡 is the 2 × 2 diagonal matrix of time-varying standard deviations with √ℎ𝑖𝑡 on the 
𝑖𝑡ℎ diagonal, and 𝑃𝑡 is the time-varying correlation matrix. Standardise the residuals, 
𝜀𝑖𝑡, and use them to estimate covariance parameters. The following covariance dynamic 
allows for asset-specific news and smoothing parameters, asymmetries, and effects of 
exogenous variables: 
                                                          
36 As pointed out by Capplello et al. (2006), if the univariate models are not well specified, the correlation 
estimation would be inconsistent. Therefore, if for one country’s sovereign CDS and/or equity index, the 
EGARCH with asymmetry model has convergence issues, GARCH, EGARCH without asymmetry, GJR, 
EGARCH with/without asymmetry with student’s t innovation, and GJR with student’s t innovation 
would be tried to achieve convergent results.  
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where 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑔, and 𝑣𝑚 are scalars, and 𝐾 = [
0 1
1 0
] .37  ?̅? = 𝐸[𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡
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′𝑇
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𝑇
𝑡=1 . 𝑣𝑚 measures the magnitude and significance level of the impact of 
the 𝑚th macro event on the covariance of two assets.  
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Sovereign CDS and Equity Index 
Sovereign CDS and equity index data are obtained from DataStream. Due to sovereign 
CDS data availability, the sample period is from 01/01/2008 to 29/02/2016. Also, the 
restructuring type of sovereign CDS contract is Complete Restructuring (CR), as it is 
the only restructuring clause applied by the sovereign CDS series, and 5-year contracts 
are selected. Given the sample period, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, who joined in the 
Eurozone after 2008, are excluded. Also, Luxembourg, Malta, and Greece are removed 
due to unavailable or insufficient sovereign CDS data. The final sample consists of 14 
developed countries. The equity indices used in this study are described in Appendix 
4B. Summary statistics of CDS spreads and equity index prices are presented in Table 
4.4. Germany has the lowest and the least volatile sovereign CDS spreads, followed by 
the U.S., Finland, and Netherlands. Cyprus has the highest and the most volatile country 
                                                          
37 Vargas (2008) suggests using 𝐾 = [
1 1
1 1
] or 𝐾 = [
1 0
0 1
]. Using matrix of ones or identity matrix, one 
can examine the impact of exogenous variables on conditional variance-covariance or variance of assets. 
However, by employing 𝐾 = [
0 1
1 0
], we directly investigate the impact of exogenous variables on 
conditional covariance/correlation of assets. 
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default risk, followed by Portugal and Ireland. Regarding equity index price, Italy and 
Slovenia have the most and the least volatile index prices, respectively.  
4.4.2 Sovereign Credit Rating Events 
Table 4.5 reports the number of sovereign credit rating events in each country. As 
shown in Table 4.5, the total number of negative and positive rating events (including 
the number of Greek rating events) is 195 and 89, respectively. As the sample period 
covers the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, the number of 
negative rating events is more than two times that of positive rating events. In contrast 
with the other countries, GIIPS countries and Cyprus have more negative rating events.  
Table 4.6 reports the number of rating surprises in each country. Eight of the fourteen 
countries have sovereign rating surprises. Among them, Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain suffered from financial difficulties in the European sovereign debt crisis. The 
total number of rating surprises is 22, including 8 negative surprises and 14 positive 
surprises. Unlike the sovereign rating events reported in Table 4.5, the number of 
positive surprises is almost two times that of negative surprises, and the total number 
of rating surprises is far less than that of rating events.  
4.5 Empirical Results  
4.5.1 Impact of Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
Table 4.7 presents the test results of domestic sovereign credit rating events.38 The table 
shows that domestic sovereign rating events (𝛿1) exert impact on sovereign CDS returns 
in Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, and Slovenia. In these four Eurozone countries, sovereign 
                                                          
38 To keep brevity, this table only reports the key coefficients which are of the interest of this chapter. 
All the tables, from Table 4.7 to Table 4.18, are presented in the same manner. The full estimation results 
can be found in Appendix 4C. 
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CDS returns significantly decline when domestic sovereign rating changes, indicating 
lower sovereign default probabilities. Rating events (𝛿2) only have impact on equity 
returns in Germany and the United Kingdom. They increase Germany’s DAX 30 Index 
returns, but reduce the U.K.’s FTSE 100 Index returns. Also, rating events (𝜆1) increase 
sovereign CDS volatility in Ireland, Austria, Finland, and the U.K., but decrease that in 
Portugal and Cyprus. Except for the U.S., no significant effect of rating events (𝜆2) on 
equity volatility is discovered in the rest of 13 European members. In addition, rating 
events (𝑣) increase the negative correlation between sovereign CDS and equity index 
in Portugal, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, and the U.S., while they reduce the negative 
correlation in Finland. An increased negative correlation may suggest a lower degree 
of correlation between the two assets when domestic sovereign rating events occur.  
In roughly one third of the 13 European economies, especially the indebted states in the 
European sovereign debt crisis, domestic sovereign rating events considerably affect 
returns and volatility of sovereign CDS. However, for equity index, the rating news 
seems to be irrelevant. These results are generally inconsistent with prior findings that 
sovereign rating news can arouse considerable variations of asset prices, e.g., Hooper 
et al. (2008). This may be ascribed to several reasons. First, the domestic rating events 
examined in this section consist of positive and negative rating events. As suggested by 
previous research, e.g., Afonso et al. (2012) and Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), these 
two types of rating news present opposite influences on financial markets. Hence, their 
combined effects may explain the complex patterns of the impact of rating events. This 
confirms the necessity to analyse them separately. Second, the relevant literature to date 
employs event study method, focuses only on asset returns, or defines rating events 
based on single rating agency’s information. However, we use a multivariate GARCH 
model that allows for simultaneously testing news impact on returns, volatility, and 
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correlation of assets, and we aggregate three major agencies’ rating news. Moreover, 
except for Drago and Gallo (2016), the sample periods of previous studies do not cover 
the turmoil period after 2008, e.g., Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010). On the contrary, this 
chapter focuses on the relatively turbulent period of 2008–2016. For asset correlation, 
Hypothesis 1(a) is not well supported because limited evidence is found to support the 
expectation that two assets become more correlated at the arrivals of domestic sovereign 
rating events. However, two assets become less negatively correlated. One possible 
reason is that there are limited cross-asset trading activities at the arrival of sovereign 
rating news. This may be due to any impediments to arbitrage, e.g., funding constraints 
and market liquidity (Kapadia and Pu, 2012). Another reason is that there are cross-
asset trading activities, but the trades result in a less negative correlation between the 
two assets (Brenner et al., 2009). 
4.5.2 Impact of Domestic Positive and Negative Sovereign Rating Events 
In order to examine whether the impact of sovereign rating events on the two assets is 
depend on the nature of the news, we test the impact of domestic good and bad rating 
events. As can be seen from Table 4.839, both symmetric and asymmetric effects on two 
assets are found. In Portugal, Netherlands, Finland, and the U.S., sovereign CDS returns 
respond symmetrically to two types of rating events (𝛿11 is for positive news and 𝛿12 
is for negative news). Except the U.S., two rating events increase sovereign CDS returns. 
For equity index, two rating events (𝛿21 is for positive news and 𝛿22 is for negative 
news) reduce equity returns in Spain and Germany. The asymmetric impact of two 
rating events on sovereign CDS returns is found in Ireland, Cyprus, and Belgium, and 
their asymmetric impact on equity returns is discovered in Cyprus and the United 
                                                          
39 As no convergent univariate GARCH model estimation results of Austria and Slovenia can be obtained, 
these two countries are dropped. 
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Kingdom. Good (bad) rating events reduce (increase) sovereign CDS returns in Ireland 
and Cyprus, while the opposite case is found in Belgium. In Cyprus, good (bad) rating 
events are accompanied by higher (lower) equity returns, while in the U.K., the situation 
is reversed. The asymmetric effects marginally support the commonly held perception 
that negative (positive) rating events suggest an increase (decrease) in sovereign default 
probability or country risk, so that sovereign CDS spreads widen (narrow) and equity 
prices fall (increase) (e.g., Afonso et al., 2012; Hooper et al., 2008). Compared with 
bad rating news, good rating news generally exerts more pronounced—in absolute 
values—impact on asset returns. 
Second, the effects of two rating events (𝜆11 is for positive news and 𝜆12 is for negative 
news) on sovereign CDS volatility are discovered in eight economies. In five of these 
eight states, two rating events have calming impact on spread volatility. However, good 
(bad) rating events increase (reduce) spread volatility in Ireland and the U.K., while the 
opposite case is found in Portugal. Regarding equity volatility, two rating news (𝜆21 is 
for positive news and 𝜆22  is for negative news) resolves (creates) uncertainties in 
Ireland (Belgium). However, in Spain, Netherlands, and the U.S., equity volatility falls 
(increases) in response to positive (negative) rating events. For volatility of two assets, 
the absolute magnitudes of the effects of good rating events are greater than that of bad 
rating events. Kim et al. (2015) also document that good macro news has stronger 
impact than bad macro news on sovereign CDS volatility. They interpret that sovereign 
CDS investors may concern more about good news than bad news, especially during 
the stressful episodes. Since the sample period of this study is from 2008 to 2016, which 
covers the subprime crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis, and the turbulent post-
crisis period, our findings may be supported by Kim et al.’s (2015) argument. 
 162 
 
Finally, for the correlation between sovereign CDS and equity index, symmetric effects 
of two rating events (𝑣1 is for positive news and 𝑣2 is for negative news) exist in Spain, 
Italy, and Cyprus. When good or bad rating events occur, the negative correlation of 
the two assets drops in Spain and Italy, but it increases in Cyprus. Good (bad) rating 
events are related to a rise (decline) of asset negative correlation in Portugal, the U.S., 
and Netherlands, while an opposite situation is found in Ireland and Finland. Although 
good rating news has more pronounced effects—in absolute values—on the correlation 
between two assets, bad news shows more significant impact. These findings imply that 
the impact of domestic sovereign rating events on asset correlation might vary with the 
nature of the events, while the news impact may not be necessarily asymmetric. Using 
a DCC-IMA model, Brenner et al. (2009) reveal that increased portfolio rebalancing 
activities within or across asset classes are more likely to occur in correspondence with 
the unexpected negative macroeconomic news releases. 
4.5.3 Impact of Domestic Sovereign Rating Surprises 
Table 4.9 reports the results of domestic sovereign rating surprises.40 Rating surprises 
(𝛿1) reduce sovereign CDS returns in Cyprus and Ireland. It suggests that the arrivals 
of rating surprises may signal a decline of sovereign default risk. However, in all the 
six countries, we find no significant impact of rating surprises (𝛿2) on equity returns. 
Rating surprises (𝜆1) decrease sovereign CDS volatility in Cyprus but increase spread 
volatility in Ireland. Similar to equity returns, no significant effects of rating surprises 
(𝜆2) on equity volatility are found. Finally, in Austria, Cyprus, and Italy, the negative 
correlation of two assets goes up when rating surprises (𝑣) occur, suggesting a rise of 
the negative correlation. These results are generally consistent with the findings in 
                                                          
40 Since no convergent univariate GARCH results of Portugal and Slovenia can be obtained, they are 
excluded. 
 163 
 
Section 4.5.1. Although domestic sovereign rating surprises can affect returns and 
volatility of sovereign CDS, they have limited impact on equity index. Rating surprises 
are associated with a lower degree of correlation between the two assets.41  
Taken the findings in Section 4.5.1–4.5.3 collectively, domestic sovereign rating events 
and rating surprises generally deliver tradable information to two asset markets in less 
than half of the sample countries. It may imply that at least for equity markets in these 
countries, domestic sovereign rating news may not be as informative as emphasised by 
prior studies, such as Brooks et al. (2004). Apart from the possible reasons mentioned 
in Section 4.5.1, the ineffectiveness of sovereign rating information may also explain 
the contradictory conclusions. As stated by Masciandaro (2013), there are three reasons 
why rating news may be ineffective, especially for sovereign obligors. First, sovereign 
credit ratings may not benefit from information advantages because rating agencies are 
less likely to have the access to privileged information about sovereigns. Second, the 
adequacy of human capital and the quality of methodology used by rating agencies are 
questioned since their welfares may not be attractive to the best human capital. Finally, 
biased behaviour may hinder the rating agencies from delivering objective, timely, and 
accurate rating information.  
4.5.4 Impact of Bailout Events 
Table 4.10 shows the results of bailout events. Bailout announcements (𝛿1) increase 
sovereign CDS returns in Spain, Italy, and Cyprus, while they reduce sovereign CDS 
returns in Portugal. All these four states suffered from severe financial difficulties 
during the European sovereign debt crisis, and except for Italy, the other three states 
                                                          
41 Although rating surprises are also divided into positive and negative surprises (Table 4.6), only four 
states, Cyprus, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia, have two types of rating surprises. Moreover, convergent 
estimation results can be obtained in only Spain and Ireland. Thus, the estimation results about the impact 
of positive and negative rating surprises are not reported.  
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are the beneficiaries of the rescue plans of the Eurozone. It seems that the government 
bailouts in the euro area have more material influences on sovereign CDS returns of the 
indebted states rather than on that of the guarantors of bailouts. In Portugal, Italy, 
Germany, France, and Finland, equity market performs worse on the day when bailout 
news (𝛿2) is released. These affected countries include both receivers and providers of 
bailout funding. The increased sovereign CDS returns and the declined equity returns 
suggest that bailout events are likely to be perceived to weaken a country’s sovereign 
creditworthiness and economic condition (Acharya et al., 2014; Horváth and Huizinga, 
2015). Bailout news releases (𝜆1) increase sovereign CDS volatility in nine states and 
they (𝜆2) increase equity volatility in seven countries, confirming that investors are 
inclined to interpret bailout actions as extremely adverse shocks. Thus, this macro event 
induces more uncertainties and destabilises financial markets. Finally, except for Italy, 
Cyprus, Austria, and Netherlands, sovereign CDS and equity index become more 
negatively correlated on the bailout announcement days (𝑣), which supports Hypothesis 
1(b). The strengthened negative comovement may stem from more cross-asset arbitrage 
and/or hedging activities between sovereign CDS and equity markets on the release 
days of bailouts, which supports Chan et al. (2009) and Ngene et al. (2014). 
4.5.5 Impact of Bailouts and Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
Table 4.11 reports the results of bailouts and domestic rating events. Domestic rating 
events (𝛿11) reduce sovereign CDS returns in Portugal, Ireland, and Cyprus, while they 
increase spread returns in Belgium. They (𝛿21) increase equity returns in Germany. For 
volatility, rating events (𝜆11) are associated with higher spread volatility in Ireland, 
Austria, Slovenia, Finland, and the U.K., and they are related to lower spread volatility 
in Portugal and Cyprus. Moreover, they (𝜆21) have negative effects on equity volatility 
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in the United States. In Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, and Finland, rating events 
(𝑣1) increase the negative asset correlation. Bailout events (𝛿12) reduce sovereign CDS 
returns in Portugal, Belgium, and the U.K., but increase that in Spain. They (𝛿22) lower 
equity returns in Spain, Italy, Ireland, Germany, France, and Finland. In the majority of 
the 14 countries, bailout events (𝜆12 is for sovereign CDS and 𝜆22 is for equity) increase 
asset volatility, and they (𝑣2) are accompanied by a lower negative correlation of two 
assets. Finally, compared with domestic sovereign rating events, bailout news seems to 
exert stronger and more significant impact on asset volatility and correlation, which is 
in line with Hypothesis 2. This may suggest that relatively more cross-asset arbitrage 
and/or hedging activities between sovereign CDS and equity markets may exist on the 
release days of bailout events than on that of domestic sovereign rating events. 
4.5.6 News Spillover Effect of Greek Sovereign Rating Events 
This study also shows that Greek sovereign rating events present spillover effect on the 
sample countries’ sovereign CDS and equity markets. The results are reported in Table 
4.12.42 First, in Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, Slovenia, the U.S., and the U.K., Greek rating 
events (𝛿12) reduce sovereign CDS returns, indicating a decrease of sovereign default 
risk. In six Eurozone countries and the U.S., equity returns increase when Greek rating 
(𝛿22) changes, suggesting declined country risk. Moreover, sovereign CDS volatility 
reduces in response to Greek rating news (𝜆12) in eight Eurozone states. The news (𝜆22) 
lowers equity volatility in Ireland, but increases that in Slovenia. In Portugal, Germany, 
France, Belgium, the U.S., and the U.K., the negative correlation of two assets increases 
when Greek rating events (𝑣2) occur.  
                                                          
42 Since no convergent univariate GARCH estimations of Finland can be gained, this state is excluded. 
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These findings suggest that Greek rating news may signal the resolution of uncertainty 
about sovereign default risk. Thus, in the sample states, sovereign CDS spreads narrow 
and spread volatility declines. The negative correlation generally increases when Greek 
rating news arrivals, which conflicts with Hypothesis 3. It implies that although Greek 
rating events have spillover effect, they may not cause more cross-asset arbitrage and/or 
hedging activities between sovereign CDS and equity markets. In contrast to domestic 
rating events, equity investors seem to concern more about Greek rating news. Due to 
the important role played by Greece in the European sovereign debt crisis, Greek credit 
condition may become an important factor considered by international equity investors 
to make investment decisions. It seems to support Gande and Parsley’s (2005) argument 
of ‘common information spillovers’. Overall, our results suggest that Greek rating news 
generally delivers information to sovereign CDS and equity markets in the sample 
countries, which supports the literature of spillover effect of sovereign rating events, 
e.g., Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), Afonso et al. (2012), and Blau and Roseman (2014).  
4.5.7 Additional Analysis and Robustness Test 
There is another approach to test the impact of macro events on conditional correlation 
between two assets. An ADCC model is estimated first and then the correlation is 
extracted. After obtaining the correlation, this chapter follows Chiang et al. (2015) to 
apply a Fisher transformation on the correlation to resolve the issue that the correlation 
is bounded to an interval [-1, 1] and conducts regression analysis. The equation (4.6) is 
changed to be: 
𝑄𝑡 = (?̅? − 𝛼
2?̅? − 𝛽2?̅? − 𝑔2?̅?) + 𝛼2𝜀𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1
′ + 𝑔2𝑛𝑡−1𝑛𝑡−1
′ + 𝛽2𝑄𝑡−1      (4.7) 
The dynamic correlation of two assets and the linear regression are as follows:  
𝜌12𝑡 =
𝑞12𝑡
√𝑞11𝑡𝑞22𝑡
                                                                                              (4.8) 
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𝜌12𝑡̃ = 0.5 𝑙𝑛 [
1+𝜌12𝑡
1−𝜌12𝑡
]                                                                                 (4.9) 
𝜌12𝑡̃ = 𝜉0 + ∑ 𝜙𝑚𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 + 𝑢𝑡                                              (4.10) 
In Equation (4.10), robust errors are used to adjust for heteroskedasticity. As a two-step 
estimation process is used, the results of univariate GARCH models of sovereign CDS 
and equity index are the same as that reported in the corresponding tables (Table 4.7–
4.12). Thus, Table 4.13–4.18 only report the estimation results of Equation (4.10).  
First, as shown in Table 4.13, in Spain, Italy, France, Netherlands, Belgium, and the 
U.K., rating events rise the negative correlation of two assets. Second, Table 4.14 shows 
that in Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and Finland, two assets are more negatively 
correlated when good or bad rating news is released. Good (bad) news increase (reduce) 
two assets’ negative correlation in Netherlands, the U.S., and the U.K. Third, in Table 
4.15, rating surprises have positive impact on the negative correlation in France, Ireland, 
and Italy, suggesting a lower degree of correlation, while they have negative impact on 
the negative correlation in Austria, implying a higher degree of correlation. Table 4.16 
reports that bailout events reduce the negative correlation between the two assets in 
Portugal, Cyprus, Germany, France, and Belgium. However, bailout events increase the 
negative correlation in Austria and the U.K. In Table 4.17, contrary to domestic rating 
events, bailout events generally have stronger effects. Finally, Table 4.18 shows that, 
in Spain, Italy, and Netherlands, the two assets become more correlated when Greek 
rating news is released. Although the two methods provide slightly different results 
about the news impact on correlation in individual country, the general conclusions 
drawn from the entire sample seem to be consistent.  
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In addition, the robustness of the findings to different CCR coding methods is justified. 
Böninghausen and Zabel (2015) state that researchers have disagreements about how 
ECR is adjusted for outlook/watchlist news to obtain CCR. Gande and Parsley (2005) 
and Ferreira and Gama (2007) adjust the ECR by a notch (half a notch) of actual rating 
change according to outlook (watchlist) releases. Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) and 
Drago and Gallo (2016) equate the impact of outlook (watchlist) to half (a quarter) of a 
notch. Also, Sy (2004) and Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) consider the impact of 
outlook (watchlist) as one third (two thirds) of a notch. This chapter employs Sy’s (2004) 
coding approach which assumes the smallest (largest) informational content of outlooks 
(watchlists) among the three coding strategies. The tables in Appendix 4D describe Sy’s 
(2004) CCR definition and the number of rating events in each country. The estimation 
results related to sovereign credit rating events are reported in Table 4.19–4.22. The 
tables show that the heterogeneity in ECR adjustment approaches does not materially 
change the main conclusions. 
4.6 Conclusions  
This chapter applies ADCC-X model to investigate the impact of sovereign credit rating 
events and major bailout news on returns, volatility, and correlation of sovereign CDS 
and equity index in the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone states during the turbulent 
period of 2008–2016. The findings show that sovereign CDS market is more sensitive 
to domestic sovereign credit rating events or surprises than equity market. The arrivals 
of rating events or surprises are generally accompanied by an increase of the negative 
correlation, suggesting a lower degree of correlation between the two assets. Moreover, 
both symmetric and asymmetric impact of positive and negative rating events on the 
returns and volatility of two assets is found. Regarding asset correlation, symmetric 
impact of two rating events is found in three countries, while their asymmetric impact 
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is detected in five countries. To be specific, they reduce the negative correlation of two 
assets in Spain and Italy, while the opposite case is in Cyprus. In Portugal, Netherlands, 
and the U.S., the negative correlation increases (decreases) when positive (negative) 
sovereign rating events occur , while an opposite situation exists in Ireland and Finland. 
Generally, positive sovereign rating news has stronger impact on the returns, volatility, 
and correlation of the two assets. 
Major bailout events increase sovereign CDS returns and decrease equity returns, and 
they exaggerate both assets’ volatility. Two assets become more negatively correlated 
when bailout news is released. Compared with domestic sovereign rating news, bailout 
news exerts stronger and more significant impact. These findings may support the view 
that in contrast with sovereign rating events, bailout news is more likely to be perceived 
as extremely adverse shocks. Finally, Greek rating events produce spillover effect on 
the two assets in several sample countries and they generally have a positive impact on 
the negative correlation of two assets. Compared with domestic sovereign rating news, 
equity investors seem to pay more attention to Greek sovereign rating changes.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of Previous Literature about Macro News Impact 
 Studies  Methodology  Major Findings 
Positive news vs. 
Negative news 
Kim, Salem, and 
Wu (2015) 
Univarite EGARCH 
model 
They focus on scheduled macroeconomic news releases and study the impact of 
domestic and spillover macroeconomic news from the U.S., the Eurozone, and China 
on sovereign CDS spreads and spread volatility. They find that good news reduces 
sovereign CDS spreads, while bad news increases spreads. Good news presents 
stronger effects, especially during the crisis times. CDS spread volatility increases 
when both domestic good and bad news is released, but good news has more 
pronounced effects. Macroeconomic news from the major countries has spillover 
impact on the sovereign CDS market in other countries.  
 Galil and Soffer 
(2011) 
An event study analysis They focus only on corporate rating changes and explore the CDS market’s response 
to rating announcements after controlling for the presence of public and private 
information. They confirm the previous results that CDS spreads react substantially 
after rating changes and rating reviews announcements. Also, negative news has 
stronger impact than positive news. 
Scheduled news 
vs. Unscheduled 
news 
Chen and Gau 
(2010) 
Linear regression They use Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share and Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) 
component share to measure price discovery contribution. Also, they use linear 
regression to study which market, spot or futures for EUR-USD and JPY-USD, can 
adjust more rapidly in response of scheduled macroeconomic announcements. Their 
results show that around scheduled macroeconomic releases, futures rates move more 
rapidly than spot rates. 
 Jiang, 
Konstantinidi, and 
Skiadopoulos 
(2012) 
VAR model They examine the effect of the U.S. and the European scheduled (unscheduled) news 
announcements on volatility spillover across the U.S. and the European stock markets. 
Their unscheduled news consists of financial news that may dramatically shock 
financial markets, political news, and news about physical disasters and threats for the 
human life. They document that scheduled (unscheduled) news releases reduce 
(amplify) information uncertainty, inducing a decrease (increase) in implied volatility. 
Volatility spillovers cannot be entirely explained by news releases.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of Previous Literature about Macro News Impact (Continued) 
 Studies  Methodology Major Findings 
Macroeconomic 
news surprise  
Mun (2012) VAR-GARCH-in-
mean model 
This study analyses the joint response of stock and foreign exchange market 
returns in the U.S. and Japan to macroeconomic surprises. The findings 
show that the U.S. stock market asymmetrically reacts to domestic 
macroeconomic surprises but is not affected by Japanese macroeconomic 
surprises. Also, the surprise in the foreign exchange market affect both U.S. 
and Japanese stock markets. 
 Brenner, Pasquariello, and 
Subrahmanyam (2009) 
DCC-Integrated 
Moving Average 
(IMA) Model 
They examine the short-term response of U.S. stock, Treasury, and corporate 
bond markets to the first release of U.S. macroeconomic surprises. They 
analyse the impact of news on the level, the volatility, and comovement of 
those assets. Their results show a substantial difference between stock and 
bond markets in their reactions to the releases of macroeconomic shocks. 
Also, the conditional mean, volatility, and comovement among stock, 
Treasury, and corporate bond present different responses to the information 
content of macroeconomic surprises. 
 Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold, and Vega (2007)  
VAR-GARCH model They study the real-time impact of the U.S. macroeconomic news surprises 
on the U.S., German, and British stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets. 
They find that announcement surprises generate conditional mean jumps. 
They also document highly significant contemporaneous cross-market and 
cross-country interactions, even after controlling macroeconomic 
announcement effects. 
Notes: This table briefly summarises the previous literature about news impact on financial markets. 
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Table 4.2: Define Comprehensive Credit Rating 
Explicit Credit Rating (ECR) Credit Outlook/Watchlist 
S&P  Moody’s Fitch  Numerical code Information  Add to ECR  
AAA Aaa AAA 20 Positive  1 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 19 CW-Pos 0.5 
AA Aa2 AA 18 Stable/CW-Dev 0 
AA- Aa3 AA- 17 CW-Neg -0.5 
A+ A1 A+ 16 Negative  -1 
A A2 A 15   
A- A3 A- 14   
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 13   
BBB Baa2 BBB 12   
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 11   
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 10   
BB Ba2 BB 9   
BB- Ba3 BB- 8   
B+ B1 B+ 7   
B B2 B 6   
B- B3 B- 5   
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 4   
CCC Caa2 CCC 3   
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 2   
CC/C Ca/C CC/C 1   
SD/D  RD/D 0   
Notes: This table shows that the comprehensive credit rating is defined by adding credit outlook/watchlist 
information to the explicit credit rating. CW-Pos denotes Credit Watch-Positive, CW-Dev denotes Credit 
Watch-Developing, and CW-Neg denotes Credit Watch-Negative. 
Table 4.3: Define ‘Surprise Component’ of Sovereign Rating Actions 
Suppose for one country, rating is 𝑋 at time 𝑡 − 1. 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 are positive integer. 
Outlook at time 𝑡 − 1 Rating action 
at time 𝑡  
(No Surprise) 
Rating action at 
time 𝑡  
(With Surprise) 
The Size and the 
Sign of Surprise 
Component 
Stable/CW-Dev 𝑋 𝑋 + 𝐴 or 𝑋 − 𝐵 𝐴 or −𝐵 
Positive or CW-Pos 𝑋 + 𝐴 or 𝑋 𝑋 − 𝐵 −𝐵 
Negative or CW-Neg 𝑋 − 𝐵 or 𝑋 𝑋 + 𝐴 𝐴 
Notes: This table presents the method to define and calculate sovereign rating surprises. CW-Pos denotes 
Credit Watch-Positive, CW-Dev denotes Credit Watch-Developing, and CW-Neg denotes Credit Watch-
Negative. 
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of CDS Spreads and Equity Index Prices 
 Mean Std. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Sovereign CDS Spread 
Austria  47.36 34.67 12.18 159.23 
Belgium 72.58 61.88 14.50 341.98 
Cyprus 475.56 423.01 14.00 1,674.22 
Finland 33.01 18.47 9.25 94.00 
France 47.75 33.45 6.00 171.56 
Germany 24.21 16.97 5.20 92.50 
Ireland 241.58 229.58 29.28 1,191.16 
Italy 155.39 104.29 21.13 498.66 
Portugal 330.15 322.81 23.50 1,521.45 
Spain  149.54 103.22 19.75 492.07 
Slovenia 151.70 105.43 8.00 448.67 
Netherlands 46.55 30.20 6.25 133.84 
U.S. 32.07 15.71 6.00 95.00 
U.K. 49.41 28.37 11.66 165.00 
Panel B: Equity Index Price 
Austria  919.69 87.72 681.26 1,142.47 
Belgium 2,755.68 563.43 1,527.27 4,127.47 
Cyprus 816.39 961.56 63.85 4,880.97 
Finland 6,867.94 1,210.13 4,110.31 10,178.31 
France 3,942.99 603.98 2,519.29 5,614.08 
Germany 7,501.73 1,958.93 3,666.41 12,374.73 
Ireland 3,833.91 1,280.93 1,916.38 6,886.56 
Italy 20,393.93 4,592.56 12,362.51 38,553.67 
Portugal 6,657.05 1,411.79 4,408.73 11,368.40 
Spain  9,884.99 1,601.04 5,956.30 15,182.30 
Slovenia 358.71 66.25 199.25 509.24 
Netherlands 869.18 366.32 418.23 2,520.56 
U.S. 1,457.95 383.07 676.53 2,130.82 
U.K. 5,853.14 783.72 3,512.09 7,103.98 
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of sovereign CDS spreads and equity index prices of 
each country. CDS spreads are expressed in basis points. 
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Table 4.5: Number of Sovereign Rating Events in Each Country 
Country  No. of Rating Events No. of Negative Rating 
Events 
No. of Positive Rating 
Events 
Austria  6 5 1 
Belgium 13 9 4 
Cyprus 43 28 15 
Finland 6 5 1 
France 7 7 0 
Germany 4 2 1 
Greece 56 42 14 
Ireland 33 20 13 
Italy 15 11 4 
Portugal 33 21 12 
Spain  31 21 10 
Slovenia 23 16 7 
Netherlands 7 4 3 
U.S. 5 2 3 
U.K. 3 2 1 
Total 284 195 89 
Notes: This table reports the total number of sovereign credit rating events and the numbers of positive 
and negative rating events in each country. 
Table 4.6: Number of Sovereign Rating Surprises in Each Country 
Country No. of 
Surprises  
No. of Negative 
Surprises 
No. of Positive 
Surprises 
Austria 1 1 0 
Cyprus 6 1 5 
France 1 1 0 
Ireland 4 1 3 
Italy 1 1 0 
Portugal 1 0 1 
Spain 5 1 4 
Slovenia 3 2 1 
Total 22 8 14 
Notes: This table reports the total number of sovereign credit rating surprises and the number of positive 
and negative rating surprises in each country. 
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Table 4.7: Estimation Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝛿1 (Rating Events) 
 
-0.940* 
(0.070) 
-0.043 
(0.931) 
-0.296 
(0.647) 
-1.164*** 
(0.000) 
-0.194*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆1 (Rating Events) 
 
-0.262*** 
(0.000) 
-0.096 
(0.127) 
0.039 
(0.729) 
0.188*** 
(0.003) 
-0.352*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿2 (Rating Events) 
 
0.029 
(0.806) 
0.090 
(0.595) 
0.329 
(0.271) 
0.116 
(0.323) 
0.024 
(0.702) 
𝜆2 (Rating Events) 
 
-0.021 
(0.761) 
-0.039 
(0.453) 
-0.098 
(0.146) 
0.045 
(0.470) 
0.018 
(0.745) 
𝑣 (Rating Events) 
 
0.069** 
(0.032) 
0.012 
(0.286) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.046 
(0.114) 
-0.018 
(0.785) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝛿1 (Rating Events) 
 
2.726 
(0.503) 
0.010 
(0.996) 
-0.204 
(0.864) 
0.400 
(0.634) 
-1.216 
(0.318) 
𝜆1 (Rating Events) 
 
-0.090 
(0.929) 
0.089 
(0.686) 
0.271 
(0.482) 
-0.180 
(0.400) 
0.528*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿2 (Rating Events) 
 
1.757* 
(0.054) 
0.166 
(0.723) 
0.110 
(0.731) 
0.105 
(0.606) 
-0.368 
(0.300) 
𝜆2 (Rating Events) 
 
-0.149 
(0.724) 
-0.087 
(0.504) 
-0.318 
(0.140) 
0.034 
(0.753) 
-0.243 
(0.268) 
𝑣 (Rating Events) 
 
0.203 
(0.240) 
-0.035 
(0.541) 
0.740*** 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.739) 
0.441*** 
(0.000) 
 Slovenia Finland U.S. U.K.  
𝛿1 (Rating Events) 
 
-0.047* 
(0.085) 
0.278 
(0.555) 
-1.542 
(0.351) 
-0.086 
(0.845)  
𝜆1 (Rating Events) 
 
0.080 
(0.158) 
0.889** 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.999) 
3.836*** 
(0.003)  
𝛿2 (Rating Events) 
 
-0.072 
(0.518) 
0.159 
(0.668) 
0.416 
(0.110) 
-0.639* 
(0.056)  
𝜆2 (Rating Events) 
 
0.110 
(0.482) 
0.147 
(0.455) 
-0.747*** 
(0.001) 
-0.059 
(0.887)  
𝑣 (Rating Events) 
 
-0.009 
(0.863) 
-0.685*** 
(0.000) 
0.418*** 
(0.000) 
-0.044 
(0.345)  
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
rating events. The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.8: Estimation Results of Domestic Positive and Negative Sovereign Rating 
Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland  
(GARCH) 
Cyprus Germany 
𝛿11 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
0.027** 
(0.021) 
-0.228 
(0.810) 
-2.296 
(0.120) 
-1.835*** 
(0.001) 
-0.016*** 
(0.000) 
1.439 
(0.734) 
𝛿12 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-1.376*** 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.976) 
-0.069 
(0.888) 
-1.131** 
(0.011) 
-0.748*** 
(0.003) 
2.952 
(0.466) 
𝜆11 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
-0.333 
(0.222) 
-0.031 
(0.870) 
-0.486 
(0.248) 
1.323** 
(0.040) 
-0.857*** 
(0.000) 
-3.384 
(0.205) 
𝜆12 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-0.260*** 
(0.002) 
-0.106 
(0.167) 
0.074 
(0.484) 
0.202 
(0.843) 
0.137*** 
(0.000) 
0.369 
(0.701) 
𝛿21 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
-0.231 
(0.586) 
-0.194 
(0.471) 
0.352 
(0.644) 
-0.067 
(0.784) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
-0.875 
(0.737) 
𝛿22 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.066 
(0.612) 
0.267*** 
(0.000) 
0.328 
(0.317) 
0.139 
(0.122) 
0.012 
(0.897) 
2.426** 
(0.047) 
𝜆21 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
0.135 
(0.544) 
-0.285* 
(0.051) 
0.002 
(0.995) 
-0.125 
(0.299) 
0.034 
(0.698) 
0.382 
(0.706) 
𝜆22 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-0.041 
(0.567) 
-0.019 
(0.693) 
-0.088 
(0.203) 
0.142*** 
(0.000) 
0.013 
(0.834) 
-0.264 
(0.546) 
𝑣1 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
0.035 
(0.808) 
-0.017 
(0.348) 
-0.032 
(0.537) 
-0.001 
(0.987) 
0.097** 
(0.018) 
-0.198 
(0.691) 
𝑣2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.069** 
(0.017) 
0.015** 
(0.049) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.083* 
(0.053) 
-0.040 
(0.105) 
0.319 
(0.130) 
 France(GJR) Netherland Belgium Finland U.S. U.K. 
𝛿11 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 1.912*** 
(0.002) 
0.648 
(0.310) 
1.510*** 
(0.001) 
-2.373** 
(0.030) 
5.211 
(0.794) 
𝛿12 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.262 
(0.882) 
-2.192*** 
(0.008) 
0.462*** 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.953) 
2.110 
(0.176) 
-0.106 
(0.756) 
𝜆11 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 -0.779** 
(0.042) 
-1.454*** 
(0.000) 
-2.666*** 
(0.001) 
-0.827* 
(0.085) 
2.923* 
(0.083) 
𝜆12 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
5.072 
(0.329) 
1.340*** 
(0.000) 
0.218 
(0.282) 
1.572*** 
(0.000) 
0.672** 
(0.043) 
4.382*** 
(0.001) 
𝛿21 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 -0.426 
(0.298) 
-0.096 
(0.814) 
-0.281 
(0.731) 
0.371 
(0.261) 
-0.911*** 
(0.002) 
𝛿22 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.214 
(0.634) 
0.757 
(0.160) 
0.533 
(0.127) 
0.358 
(0.402) 
1.273 
(0.291) 
-0.191 
(0.507) 
𝜆21 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 -0.568* 
(0.066) 
0.657** 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.998) 
-0.817** 
(0.048) 
-1.093 
(0.152) 
𝜆22 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-0.189 
(0.513) 
-0.091 
(0.755) 
-0.143 
(0.312) 
0.193 
(0.422) 
-0.762*** 
(0.004) 
0.685 
(0.205) 
𝑣1 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 0.715 
(0.187) 
-0.090 
(0.286) 
-0.692*** 
(0.000) 
0.030 
(0.650) 
0.112 
(0.524) 
𝑣2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-0.025 
(0.672) 
0.593*** 
(0.000) 
0.044 
(0.424) 
-0.686 
(0.170) 
0.375*** 
(0.000) 
-0.128 
(0.179) 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
positive rating events and 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡2𝑡 is negative rating events. 
GARCH:  
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆12𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                     
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆22𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                               
GJR: 
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝑑1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀1𝑡−1) + 𝜆11𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆12𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                     
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝑑2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀2𝑡−1) + 𝜆21𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆22𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                        
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.9: Estimation Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Surprises 
 Austria Cyprus (E) France Ireland Italy (E) Spain 
𝛿1 (Rating 
Surprises) 
-2.162 
(0.379) 
-0.019*** 
(0.001) 
-0.888 
(0.904) 
-2.314* 
(0.058) 
-1.604 
(0.734) 
0.497 
(0.728) 
𝜆1 (Rating 
Surprises) 
-0.035 
(0.932) 
-1.388*** 
(0.000) 
0.400 
(0.560) 
0.567* 
(0.055) 
0.084 
(0.915) 
-0.173 
(0.609) 
𝛿2 (Rating 
Surprises) 
-0.600 
(0.380) 
-0.042 
(0.480) 
-0.571 
(0.684) 
0.076 
(0.844) 
-1.719 
(0.575) 
-0.292 
(0.657) 
𝜆2 (Rating 
Surprises) 
0.312 
(0.600) 
0.229 
(0.212) 
-0.395 
(0.414) 
0.197 
(0.401) 
-0.170 
(0.802) 
-0.295 
(0.180) 
𝑣 (Rating 
Surprises) 
0.809*** 
(0.000) 
0.262*** 
(0.000) 
0.040 
(0.857) 
-0.070 
(0.593) 
0.204*** 
(0.006) 
-0.050 
(0.144) 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
rating surprises.  
 
EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 Surprises𝑡                                                                                                                           
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 Surprises𝑡                                                                                                                               
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.10: Estimation Results of Bailout Events 
 Portugal 
(GJR) 
Spain Italy Ireland 
(GJR) 
Cyprus  
(GJR) 
𝛿1(Bailout Events) -4.781*** 
(0.000) 
1.253*** 
(0.000) 
1.997*** 
(0.000) 
-1.339 
(0.344) 
3.412*** 
(0.001) 
𝜆1(Bailout Events) -0.985 
(0.846) 
0.591*** 
(0.009) 
0.862*** 
(0.000) 
2.229 
(0.407) 
7.329 
(0.205) 
𝛿2(Bailout Events) -0.966** 
(0.044) 
-1.092 
(0.101) 
-1.297** 
(0.043) 
-0.423 
(0.243) 
-0.865 
(0.394) 
𝜆2(Bailout Events) 0.432 
(0.437) 
0.380*** 
(0.003) 
0.355** 
(0.020) 
-0.079 
(0.693) 
4.605* 
(0.067) 
𝑣(Bailout Events) -0.288*** 
(0.003) 
-0.035* 
(0.062) 
-0.032 
(0.175) 
-0.563*** 
(0.000) 
-0.204 
(0.219) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium 
(GJR) 
Austria 
(GJR) 
𝛿1(Bailout Events) 2.000 
(0.413) 
0.603 
(0.763) 
0.456 
(0.721) 
-0.571 
(0.767) 
1.546 
(0.393) 
𝜆1(Bailout Events) 0.550* 
(0.071) 
0.331* 
(0.078) 
0.009 
(0.961) 
13.923* 
(0.053) 
11.255** 
(0.011) 
𝛿2(Bailout Events) -0.779*** 
(0.000) 
-0.839* 
(0.075) 
-0.606 
(0.115) 
-0.605 
(0.191) 
-0.329 
(0.426) 
𝜆2(Bailout Events) 0.158 
(0.239) 
0.144 
(0.242) 
0.126 
(0.320) 
0.414* 
(0.092) 
0.529* 
(0.049) 
𝑣(Bailout Events) -0.087*** 
(0.000) 
-0.112*** 
(0.007) 
-0.119 
(0.622) 
-0.179*** 
(0.000) 
-0.049 
(0.801) 
 Slovenia  
(GJR) 
Finland  
(GJR) 
U.S.  
(GARCH) 
U.K.  
𝛿1(Bailout Events) -0.553 
(0.655) 
-0.214 
(0.855) 
0.043 
(0.993) 
-0.611 
(0.431) 
 
𝜆1(Bailout Events) 6.650*** 
(0.001) 
7.941** 
(0.032) 
14.671*** 
(0.000) 
-3.079*** 
(0.000) 
 
𝛿2(Bailout Events) 0.271 
(0.425) 
-0.913** 
(0.033) 
0.476 
(0.499) 
-0.631 
(0.715) 
 
𝜆2(Bailout Events) 0.398 
(0.407) 
-0.001 
(0.997) 
1.237 
(0.220) 
0.412 
(0.372) 
 
𝑣(Bailout Events) -0.362* 
(0.062) 
-0.092** 
(0.014) 
-0.305*** 
(0.000) 
-0.099*** 
(0.006) 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
bailout events. 
GJR: 
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝑑1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀1𝑡−1) + 𝜆1𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                           
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝑑2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀2𝑡−1) + 𝜆2𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                            
 
GARCH: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                      
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                     
 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.11: Estimation Results of Bailouts and Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
 Portugal (E) Spain Italy (GJR) Ireland Cyprus (E) 
𝛿11 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.925* 
(0.088) 
0.045 
(0.934) 
-0.377 
(0.567) 
-1.166*** 
(0.000) 
-0.364* 
(0.077) 
𝛿12 (Bailout 
Events) 
-4.849* 
(0.075) 
1.250*** 
(0.000) 
0.127 
(0.956) 
-1.708 
(0.180) 
1.853 
(0.247) 
𝜆11 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.314*** 
(0.000) 
-0.077 
(0.386) 
-0.061 
(0.976) 
0.196*** 
(0.000) 
-0.393*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆12 (Bailout 
Events) 
1.217*** 
(0.000) 
0.577** 
(0.011) 
33.850** 
(0.029) 
0.315* 
(0.071) 
0.351 
(0.301) 
𝛿21 (Rating 
Events) 
0.038 
(0.749) 
0.088 
(0.588) 
0.110 
(0.691) 
0.114 
(0.305) 
0.021 
(0.702) 
𝛿22 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.800 
(0.135) 
-1.097* 
(0.074) 
-0.991* 
(0.091) 
-0.518*** 
(0.000) 
-1.130 
(0.213) 
𝜆21 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.033 
(0.616) 
-0.002 
(0.971) 
-0.202 
(0.438) 
0.043 
(0.491) 
0.045 
(0.334) 
𝜆22 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.438** 
(0.015) 
0.382*** 
(0.005) 
1.407** 
(0.040) 
0.012 
(0.945) 
0.449*** 
(0.005) 
𝑣1 (Rating 
Events) 
0.045 
(0.274) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.019** 
(0.015) 
-0.050 
(0.246) 
-0.022 
(0.726) 
𝑣2 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.458*** 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.180) 
-0.020 
(0.342) 
-0.330** 
(0.023) 
-0.137 
(0.414) 
 Germany France Netherlands 
(GARCH) 
Belgium Austria 
𝛿11 (Rating 
Events) 
2.705 
(0.573) 
0.015 
(0.994) 
0.061 
(0.966) 
0.447*** 
(0.000) 
-1.210 
(0.307) 
𝛿12 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.674 
(0.801) 
0.603 
(0.772) 
0.588 
(0.579) 
-0.672*** 
(0.000) 
0.522 
(0.772) 
𝜆11 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.131 
(0.895) 
0.056 
(0.809) 
0.568 
(0.867) 
-0.208 
(0.213) 
0.477*** 
(0.006) 
𝜆12 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.565* 
(0.063) 
0.327 
(0.102) 
-0.749 
(0.771) 
0.488** 
(0.030) 
0.369*** 
(0.004) 
𝛿21 (Rating 
Events) 
1.760* 
(0.057) 
0.171 
(0.706) 
0.144 
(0.722) 
0.091 
(0.669) 
-0.369 
(0.318) 
𝛿22 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.778*** 
(0.000) 
-0.839* 
(0.050) 
-0.441 
(0.306) 
-0.496 
(0.232) 
-0.421 
(0.360) 
𝜆21 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.142 
(0.707) 
-0.090 
(0.505) 
-0.219 
 (0.445) 
0.038 
(0.720) 
-0.238 
(0.260) 
𝜆22 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.147 
(0.250) 
0.148 
(0.262) 
0.585* 
(0.057) 
0.200 
(0.152) 
0.347** 
(0.014) 
𝑣1 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.104 
(0.335) 
-0.007 
(0.905) 
0.654*** 
(0.000) 
0.068 
(0.303) 
0.223*** 
(0.000) 
𝑣2 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.090*** 
(0.000) 
-0.109** 
(0.014) 
-0.084 
(0.703) 
-0.252*** 
(0.000) 
-0.070*** 
(0.000) 
 Slovenia Finland (E) U.S. U.K. (E)  
𝛿11 (Rating 
Events) 
0.162 
(0.530) 
0.218 
(0.684) 
-0.971 
(0.574) 
-0.070 
(0.848) 
 
𝛿12 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.967 
(0.146) 
-0.278 
()0.788 
-4.298 
(0.560) 
-1.705*** 
(0.000) 
 
𝜆11 (Rating 
Events) 
0.086** 
(0.043) 
0.894** 
(0.017) 
0.310 
(0.427) 
3.765*** 
(0.000) 
 
𝜆12 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.219** 
(0.018) 
0.468** 
(0.040) 
3.065*** 
(0.000) 
0.425 
(0.662) 
 
𝛿21 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.072 
(0.456) 
0.298 
(0.483) 
0.423 
(0.188) 
-0.566 
(0.132) 
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𝛿22 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.127 
(0.671) 
-0.956** 
(0.027) 
0.593 
(0.422) 
-1.344 
(0.455) 
 
𝜆21 (Rating 
Events) 
0.109 
(0.486) 
0.059 
(0.817) 
-0.754*** 
(0.001) 
0.117 
(0.816) 
 
𝜆22 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.037 
(0.897) 
0.241* 
(0.052) 
0.674*** 
(0.001) 
0.879* 
(0.077) 
 
𝑣1 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.023 
(0.578) 
0.120** 
(0.020) 
0.032 
(0.725) 
0.190 
(0.742) 
 
𝑣2 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.257*** 
(0.000) 
-0.108*** 
(0.000) 
-0.371*** 
(0.000) 
-0.809*** 
(0.000) 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
rating events and 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡2𝑡 is bailout events. 
GARCH:  
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆12𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                      
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆22𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                           
GJR: 
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝑑1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀1𝑡−1) + 𝜆11𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆12𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                  
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝑑2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀2𝑡−1) + 𝜆21𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆22𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡               
EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆12𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                               
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆22𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                         
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.12: Estimation Results of Spillover Effect of Greek Sovereign Rating Events  
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland (ET) Cyprus 
𝛿11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.854* 
(0.071) 
0.095*** 
(0.003) 
-0.421 
(0.497) 
-0.703*** 
(0.000) 
-0.503* 
(0.057) 
𝛿12 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.262*** 
(0.000) 
-0.123 
(0.592) 
-0.083 
(0.734) 
-0.260*** 
(0.001) 
-0.050*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿13 (Bailout 
Events) 
-4.332*** 
(0.000) 
0.466 
(0.846) 
1.981*** 
(0.000) 
-1.360 
(0.162) 
1.441*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.306*** 
(0.000) 
-0.059 
(0.504) 
0.019 
(0.863) 
0.151 
(0.262) 
-0.311*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆12 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.024 
(0.700) 
-0.221*** 
(0.000) 
-0.184*** 
(0.001) 
-0.236*** 
(0.001) 
-0.327** 
(0.016) 
𝜆13 (Bailout 
Events) 
1.080*** 
(0.000) 
0.533** 
(0.038) 
0.818*** 
(0.001) 
0.686** 
(0.030) 
0.373 
(0.302) 
𝛿21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.024 
(0.802) 
0.068 
(0.642) 
0.307 
(0.299) 
0.064 
(0.524) 
0.020 
(0.743) 
𝛿22 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
0.088 
(0.301) 
0.213** 
(0.017) 
0.200** 
(0.029) 
0.078 
(0.234) 
0.032 
(0.794) 
𝛿23 (Bailout 
Events) 
-1.057* 
(0.059) 
-1.112* 
(0.072) 
-1.287* 
(0.055) 
-0.555 
(0.110) 
-1.093 
(0.238) 
𝜆21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.013 
(0.841) 
-0.001 
(0.982) 
-0.100 
(0.147) 
0.098 
(0.129) 
0.044 
(0.417) 
𝜆22 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.056 
(0.267) 
-0.023 
(0.435) 
0.003 
(0.924) 
-0.070* 
(0.079) 
0.024 
(0.608) 
𝜆23 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.346* 
(0.093) 
0.367*** 
(0.008) 
0.378** 
(0.013) 
0.055 
(0.758) 
0.471** 
(0.014) 
𝑣1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.065** 
(0.031) 
0.002  
(0.784) 
0.011 
(0.257) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.082 
(0.173) 
𝑣2 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
0.045* 
(0.063) 
0.007 
(0.121) 
0.007 
(0.277) 
0.001 
(0.544) 
0.022 
(0.686) 
𝑣3 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.403*** 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.872) 
-0.002 
(0.957) 
-0.001 
(0.932) 
-0.093 
(0.598) 
 Germany (E) France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝛿11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
2.399 
(0.559) 
-0.049 
(0.980) 
-0.229 
(0.796) 
0.459*** 
(0.000) 
-1.150 
(0.362) 
𝛿12 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.184 
(0.497) 
-0.209 
(0.329) 
-0.002 
(0.905) 
-0.058 
(0.816) 
-0.044 
(0.841) 
𝛿13 (Bailout 
Events) 
2.203 
(0.349) 
0.607 
(0.750) 
0.425 
(0.735) 
-0.692*** 
(0.000) 
0.884 
(0.649) 
𝜆11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.192 
(0.854) 
0.055 
(0.804) 
0.271 
(0.432) 
-0.179 
(0.421) 
0.491*** 
(0.001) 
𝜆12 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.233*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.653) 
-0.034 
(0.454) 
-0.205*** 
(0.000) 
-0.126*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆13 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.463* 
(0.098) 
0.297 
(0.113) 
-0.022 
(0.898) 
0.458** 
(0.029) 
0.195* 
(0.072) 
𝛿21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
1.852 
(0.136) 
0.192 
(0.685) 
0.116 
(0.723) 
0.091 
(0.664) 
-0.369 
(0.289) 
𝛿22 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
0.129* 
(0.057) 
0.141** 
(0.048) 
0.105* 
(0.089) 
0.116* 
(0.061) 
0.075 
(0.254) 
𝛿23 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.676 
(0.137) 
-0.842* 
(0.074) 
-0.621* 
(0.098) 
-0.499 
(0.193) 
-0.424 
(0.316) 
𝜆21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.012 
(0.980) 
-0.102 
(0.409) 
-0.307 
(0.180) 
0.044 
(0.688) 
-0.235 
(0.227) 
𝜆22 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.012 
(0.748) 
-0.021 
(0.543) 
-0.011 
(0.723) 
-0.029 
(0.408) 
-0.014 
(0.687) 
𝜆23 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.250* 
(0.099) 
0.149 
(0.253) 
0.113 
(0.382) 
0.192 
(0.164) 
0.340** 
(0.023) 
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𝑣1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.185 
(0.155) 
-0.029** 
(0.040) 
0.742*** 
(0.000) 
0.070 
(0.273) 
0.222*** 
(0.000) 
𝑣2 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.016 
(0.784) 
0.024** 
(0.048) 
-0.001 
(0.884) 
𝑣3 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.027 
(0.433) 
0.016 
(0.401) 
-0.101 
(0.648) 
-0.226*** 
(0.002) 
-0.074** 
(0.043) 
 Slovenia (E) U.S. U.K.   
𝛿11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.179 
(0.361) 
-0.894 
(0.695) 
-0.129 
(0.756) 
  
𝛿12 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.235** 
(0.019) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
-0.355*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝛿13 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.903*** 
(0.000) 
1.345 
(0.790) 
-1.697*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝜆11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.067 
(0.124) 
0.314 
(0.434) 
3.920*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝜆12 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.069*** 
(0.004) 
0.056 
(0.339) 
0.011 
(0.902) 
  
𝜆13 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.158 
(0.145) 
3.061*** 
(0.000) 
0.460 
(0.526) 
  
𝛿21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.055 
(0.605) 
0.419 
(0.165) 
-0.592* 
(0.077) 
  
𝛿22 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
0.021 
(0.659) 
0.166*** 
(0.002) 
0.075 
(0.158) 
  
𝛿23 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.083** 
(0.045) 
0.593 
(0.437) 
-0.626 
(0.713) 
  
𝜆21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.052 
(0.720) 
-0.766*** 
(0.001) 
-0.014 
(0.969) 
  
𝜆22 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
0.156** 
(0.039) 
-0.051 
(0.105) 
0.027 
(0.453) 
  
𝜆23 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.005 
(0.987) 
0.680*** 
(0.001) 
0.386 
(0.386) 
  
𝑣1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.010 
(0.945) 
0.206*** 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.838) 
  
𝑣2 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.071 
(0.179) 
0.040*** 
(0.000) 
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝑣3 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.276 
(0.189) 
-0.373*** 
(0.000) 
-0.104*** 
(0.001) 
  
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
domestic rating events, 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡2𝑡 is Greek rating events, and 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡3𝑡 is bailout events. 
EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆12𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆13𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                              
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆22𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆23𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                         
ET denotes Student’s t EGARCH without asymmetry. The p-values of the coefficients are in the 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.13: Linear Regression Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝜙1 (Rating Events) 
 
0.004 
(0.473) 
0.038*** 
(0.000) 
0.065*** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.960) 
0.005 
(0.308) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝜙1 (Rating Events) 
 
0.046 
(0.702) 
0.149** 
(0.012) 
0.157*** 
(0.009) 
0.084*** 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.432) 
 Slovenia Finland U.S. U.K.  
𝜙1 (Rating Events) 
 
-0.013 
(0.408) 
0.005 
(0.187) 
0.041 
(0.132) 
0.143*** 
(0.000) 
 
Notes: This table reports the key estimation results of the following equation: 
𝜌12𝑡̃ = 𝜉0 + 𝜙1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                                                                              (4.10) 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 4.14: Linear Regression Results of Domestic Negative and Positive Sovereign 
Rating Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝜙1 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
-0.008 
(0.647) 
-0.007 
(0.833) 
-0.053 
(0.608) 
0.019 
(0.160) 
0.012 
(0.406) 
𝜙2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.005 
(0.322) 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.073*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.572) 
0.001 
(0.338) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Finland 
𝜙1 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
-0.450*** 
(0.000)  
0.109*** 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.814) 
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.145 
(0.211) 
0.142** 
(0.013) 
0.211* 
(0.077) 
0.103*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
 U.S. U.K.    
𝜙1 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
0.040 
(0.548) 
0.181*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜙2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.049*** 
(0.000) 
0.124*** 
(0.000) 
   
Notes: This table reports the key estimation results of the following equation: 
𝜌12𝑡̃ = 𝜉0 + 𝜙1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙2𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                     (4.10) 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.15: Linear Regression Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Surprises 
 Austria Cyprus France Ireland Italy Spain 
𝜙1 (Rating 
Surprises)  
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.338) 
0.289*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.089*** 
(0.000) 
0.029 
(0.294) 
Notes: This table reports the key estimation results of the following equation: 
𝜌12𝑡̃ = 𝜉0 + 𝜙1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                                                                          (4.10) 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 4.16: Linear Regression Results of Bailouts Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝜙1 (Bailout Events) -0.082** 
(0.010) 
-0.041 
(0.236) 
-0.036 
(0.528) 
-0.023 
(0.360) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝜙1 (Bailout Events) -0.035** 
(0.032) 
-0.050*** 
(0.004) 
-0.066 
(0.161) 
-0.122*** 
(0.001) 
0.021* 
(0.053) 
 Slovenia Finland U.S. U.K.  
𝜙1 (Bailout Events) -0.018 
(0.425) 
0.005 
(0.511) 
-0.039 
(0.226) 
0.039*** 
(0.000)  
Notes: This table reports the key estimation results of the following equation: 
𝜌12𝑡̃ = 𝜉0 + 𝜙1𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                                                                               (4.10) 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 4.17: Linear Regression Results of Bailouts and Domestic Sovereign Rating 
Events  
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝜙1 (Rating Events) 0.006 
(0.379) 
0.038*** 
(0.000) 
0.070*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.929) 
0.004 
(0.288) 
𝜙2 (Bailout Events) -0.061** 
(0.011) 
-0.044 
(0.205) 
-0.040 
(0.507) 
-0.019 
(0.405) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝜙1 (Rating Events) 0.045 
(0.706) 
0.150** 
(0.011) 
0.112*** 
(0.007) 
0.087*** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.435) 
𝜙2 (Bailout Events) -0.035** 
(0.024) 
-0.051*** 
(0.003) 
-0.062* 
(0.056) 
-0.118*** 
(0.002) 
0.026** 
(0.038) 
 Slovenia Finland U.S. U.K.  
𝜙1 (Rating Events) -0.013 
(0.355) 
0.006 
(0.352) 
0.046 
(0.127) 
-0.008 
(0.376) 
 
𝜙2 (Bailout Events) -0.008 
(0.634) 
0.005 
(0.496) 
-0.043* 
(0.079) 
-0.076*** 
(0.000) 
 
Notes: This table reports the key estimation results of the following equation: 
𝜌12𝑡̃ = 𝜉0 + 𝜙1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝜙2𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                                    (4.10) 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.18: Linear Regression Results of Spillover Effect of Greek Sovereign Rating 
Events  
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝜙1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.001 
(0.795) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
0.065*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.451) 
0.005 
(0.297) 
𝜙2 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
0.000 
(0.867) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.033*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.611) 
-0.005 
(0.185) 
𝜙3 (Bailout Events) -0.021* 
(0.061) 
-0.037 
(0.300) 
-0.028 
(0.622) 
-0.007 
(0.848) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝜙1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.030 
(0.798) 
0.150** 
(0.011) 
0.158*** 
(0.007) 
0.086*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.425) 
𝜙2 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.001 
(0.942) 
-0.002 
(0.818) 
-0.019** 
(0.039) 
0.004 
(0.689) 
-0.002 
(0.371) 
𝜙3 (Bailout Events) -0.028* 
(0.066) 
-0.051*** 
(0.003) 
-0.066 
(0.168) 
-0.102*** 
(0.005) 
0.017** 
(0.036) 
 Slovenia U.S. U.K.   
𝜙1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.013 
(0.379) 
0.025 
(0.299) 
-0.016** 
(0.018) 
  
𝜙2 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.003 
(0.450) 
-0.004 
(0.503) 
0.007* 
(0.064) 
  
𝜙3 (Bailout Events) -0.005 
(0.789) 
-0.037* 
(0.090) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
  
Notes: This table reports the key estimation results of the following equation: 
𝜌12𝑡̃ = 𝜉0 + 𝜙1𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝜙2𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜙3𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡        
                                                                                                                                                             (4.10) 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.19: Estimation Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Events – Sy’s (2004) 
CCR Coding Method 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝛿1 (Rating Events) -0.090 
(0.685) 
0.059 
(0.729) 
0.254 
(0.322) 
-0.486*** 
(0.000) 
-0.057 
(0.617) 
𝜆1 (Rating Events) -0.148*** 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.614) 
0.020 
(0.665) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
-0.077* 
(0.052) 
𝛿2 (Rating Events) -0.018 
(0.726) 
0.023 
(0.763) 
0.048 
(0.722) 
0.054 
(0.202) 
-0.000 
(0.998) 
𝜆2 (Rating Events) 0.003 
(0.924) 
-0.022 
(0.273) 
-0.041 
(0.183) 
0.025 
(0.241) 
0.012 
(0.555) 
𝑣 (Rating Events) 0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.271) 
0.009** 
(0.010) 
-0.020* 
(0.075) 
-0.012 
(0.676) 
 Germany 
(GJR) 
France 
(GARCH) 
Netherlands Belgium Austria 
(E) 
𝛿1 (Rating Events) 0.605 
(0.509) 
0.160 
(0.723) 
-0.311 
(0.783) 
0.229*** 
(0.000) 
-0.366 
(0.371) 
𝜆1 (Rating Events) 7.446** 
(0.020) 
2.219*** 
(0.000) 
0.478*** 
(0.009) 
0.057 
(0.638) 
0.318*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿2 (Rating Events) 0.382 
(0.460) 
0.151 
(0.390) 
0.014 
(0.954) 
0.058 
(0.726) 
-0.207 
(0.180) 
𝜆2 (Rating Events) -0.756* 
(0.075) 
0.093 
(0.479) 
-0.123 
(0.406) 
0.024 
(0.695) 
0.160* 
(0.071) 
𝑣 (Rating Events) 0.069 
(0.468) 
-0.011 
(0.850) 
0.002 
(0.972) 
0.020 
(0.534) 
0.221*** 
(0.000) 
 Slovenia 
(GJR) 
Finland U.S. U.K.  
(EAT) 
 
𝛿1 (Rating Events) -0.206 
(0.121) 
0.840 
(0.167) 
-2.300*** 
(0.000) 
0.468 
(0.460) 
 
𝜆1 (Rating Events) -0.318** 
(0.015) 
-0.399* 
(0.056) 
-0.214 
(0.372) 
-0.226 
(0.847) 
 
𝛿2 (Rating Events) -0.055 
(0.209) 
0.171 
(0.517) 
0.472*** 
(0.000) 
-0.508* 
(0.097) 
 
𝜆2 (Rating Events) 0.023 
(0.616) 
0.065 
(0.607) 
-0.540*** 
(0.004) 
0.291 
(0.419) 
 
𝑣 (Rating Events) 0.011 
(0.676) 
0.320*** 
(0.000) 
0.236*** 
(0.000) 
-0.065*** 
(0.002) 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
rating events. Sy’s (2004) CCR coding method is used. 
 
GARCH:  
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                     
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡   
 
GJR: 
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝑑1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀1𝑡−1) + 𝜆1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                      
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝑑2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀2𝑡−1) + 𝜆2𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡       
 
EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                           
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡     
EAT denotes Student’s t-EGARCH with asymmetry and ET denotes Student’s t-EGARCH without 
asymmetry. The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.20: Estimation Results of Domestic Positive and Negative Sovereign Rating 
Events – Sy’s (2004) CCR Coding Method 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus (E) 
𝛿11 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
0.026*** 
(0.000) 
0.015 
(0.975) 
-1.823 
(0.239) 
-0.719** 
(0.018) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿12 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
-0.618** 
(0.016) 
0.085 
(0.642) 
0.287 
(0.268) 
-0.364** 
(0.010) 
-0.250*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆11 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
-0.784*** 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.945) 
-0.362 
(0.448) 
0.290*** 
(0.000) 
-0.301*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆12 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
-0.126*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.572) 
0.022 
(0.622) 
0.024 
(0.377) 
0.044*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿21 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
-0.233 
(0.286) 
-0.064 
(0.638) 
0.202 
(0.821) 
0.035 
(0.693) 
0.007 
(0.810) 
𝛿22 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
0.004 
(0.943) 
0.055 
(0.514) 
0.043 
(0.750) 
0.056 
(0.164) 
-0.011 
(0.549) 
𝜆21 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
0.144 
(0.195) 
-0.128* 
(0.064) 
0.110 
(0.782) 
-0.067 
(0.252) 
0.035 
(0.241) 
𝜆22 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
-0.010 
(0.720) 
-0.015 
(0.465) 
-0.042 
(0.187) 
0.039* 
(0.076) 
0.006 
(0.749) 
𝑣1 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
0.158** 
(0.035) 
-0.019* 
(0.075) 
-0.081 
(0.119) 
-0.045* 
(0.095) 
0.094*** 
(0.000) 
𝑣2 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
0.025 
(0.110) 
0.006* 
(0.056) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
-0.024 
(0.127) 
-0.031** 
(0.026) 
 Germany France (E) Belgium Finland U.K. 
𝛿11 (Positive Rating 
Events)  
 0.872 
(0.159) 
0.813 
(0.330) 
-3.233 
(0.846) 
𝛿12 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
0.675 
(0.565) 
0.299*** 
(0.000) 
0.232*** 
(0.000) 
0.895 
(0.211) 
0.948 
(0.235) 
𝜆11 (Positive Rating 
Events)  
 -1.241*** 
(0.002) 
-1.164** 
(0.022) 
2.694** 
(0.046) 
𝜆12 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
0.387 
(0.206) 
0.209** 
(0.037) 
0.181 
(0.150) 
-0.248 
(0.354) 
2.059*** 
(0.004) 
𝛿21 (Positive Rating 
Events)  
 -0.174 
(0.692) 
-0.389 
(0.508) 
-0.910*** 
(0.002) 
𝛿22 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
0.303*** 
(0.000) 
0.184*** 
(0.000) 
0.119 
(0.586) 
0.330 
(0.254) 
-0.280 
(0.322) 
𝜆21 (Positive Rating 
Events)  
 0.747*** 
(0.004) 
0.096 
(0.691) 
-1.095 
(0.124) 
𝜆22 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
-0.237 
(0.142) 
0.063 
(0.407) 
0.002 
(0.980) 
0.056 
(0.659) 
0.620* 
(0.095) 
𝑣1 (Positive Rating 
Events)  
 -0.090 
(0.331) 
0.443 
(0.375) 
0.244*** 
(0.001) 
𝑣2 (Negative Rating 
Events) 
0.083 
(0.325) 
-0.016 
(0.779) 
0.018 
(0.571) 
0.315*** 
(0.000) 
-0.155*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
positive rating events and 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡2𝑡 is negative rating events. Sy’s (2004) CCR coding method is used. 
EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆12𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                           
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆22𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡      
 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.21: Estimation Results of Bailouts and Domestic Sovereign Rating Events – 
Sy’s (2004) CCR Coding Method 
 
Portugal Spain Italy Ireland 
(GJR) 
Germany France 
(EAT) 
𝛿11(Rating 
Events) 
-0.073 
(0.707) 
0.100 
(0.547) 
0.255 
(0.280) 
-0.544*** 
(0.000) 
0.649 
(0.541) 
0.165 
(0.545) 
𝛿12 (Bailout 
Events) 
-4.329*** 
(0.000) 
1.252*** 
(0.000) 
1.998*** 
(0.000) 
-1.304 
(0.378) 
1.971 
(0.457) 
0.470 
(0.758) 
 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.141*** 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.929) 
0.007 
(0.897) 
0.523*** 
(0.000) 
0.398 
(0.218) 
-0.240 
(0.122) 
𝜆12 (Bailout 
Events) 
1.012*** 
(0.000) 
0.601** 
(0.010) 
0.859*** 
(0.000) 
3.477 
(0.233) 
0.552* 
(0.055) 
1.018*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿21 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.010 
(0.826) 
0.025 
(0.720) 
0.048 
(0.749) 
0.054 
(0.124) 
0.305*** 
(0.000) 
0.133 
(0.408) 
𝛿22 (Bailout 
Events) 
-1.042** 
(0.048) 
-1.087* 
(0.084) 
-1.307* 
(0.073) 
-0.407 
(0.260) 
-0.779*** 
(0.000) 
-0.987** 
(0.020) 
𝜆21 (Rating 
Events) 
0.010 
(0.690) 
-0.005 
(0.769) 
-0.044 
(0.173) 
0.041*** 
(0.002) 
-0.241* 
(0.080) 
0.039 
(0.642) 
𝜆22 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.388** 
(0.034) 
0.371*** 
(0.006) 
0.363** 
(0.015) 
-0.048 
(0.806) 
0.157 
(0.236) 
0.128 
(0.452) 
𝑣1 (Rating 
Events) 
0.030*** 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.971) 
0.008** 
(0.018) 
-0.027** 
(0.017) 
-0.053* 
(0.066) 
-0.080 
(0.739) 
𝑣2 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.408*** 
(0.000) 
-0.035 
(0.183) 
-0.028 
(0.232) 
-0.279*** 
(0.003) 
-0.073*** 
(0.001) 
0.025 
(0.957) 
 Netherlands Belgium 
(ET) 
Austria  
(E) 
Finland U.K. 
 
 
𝛿11(Rating 
Events) 
-0.311 
(0.574) 
0.244 
(0.445) 
-0.371 
(0.346) 
0.820 
(0.195) 
0.768 
(0.342)  
𝛿12 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.408 
(0.738) 
-0.590 
(0.674) 
0.483 
(0.801) 
-0.346 
(0.697) 
-0.586 
(0.431)  
 (Rating 
Events) 
0.478*** 
(0.006) 
0.023 
(0.878) 
0.300*** 
(0.000) 
-0.413** 
(0.038) 
2.150** 
(0.015)  
𝜆12 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.003 
(0.985) 
1.135*** 
(0.000) 
0.333*** 
(0.002) 
0.531** 
(0.017) 
-3.112*** 
(0.000)  
𝛿21 (Rating 
Events) 
0.013 
(0.957) 
0.028 
(0.855) 
-0.205 
(0.185) 
0.169 
(0.471) 
-0.608** 
(0.033)  
𝛿22 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.610 
(0.138) 
-0.641 
(0.133) 
-0.363 
(0.410) 
-0.934** 
(0.040) 
-0.627 
(0.712)  
𝜆21 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.123 
(0.412) 
0.068 
(0.481) 
0.122 
(0.145) 
0.073 
(0.551) 
0.133 
(0.686)  
𝜆22 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.120 
(0.352) 
0.304 
(0.145) 
0.462*** 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.841) 
0.397 
(0.382)  
𝑣1 (Rating 
Events) 
-0.001 
(0.985) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.222*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.009) 
-0.043 
(0.170)  
𝑣2 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.064* 
(0.064) 
0.008 
(0.687) 
-0.154 
(0.428) 
-0.111*** 
(0.000) 
-0.093*** 
(0.007)  
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
rating events and 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡2𝑡 is bailout events. Sy’s (2004) CCR coding method is used. 
EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆12𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                               
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆22𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                         
EAT denotes Student’s t-EGARCH with asymmetry and ET denotes Student’s t-EGARCH without 
asymmetry. The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4.22: Estimation Results of Spillover Effect of Greek Sovereign Rating Events 
– Sy’s (2004) CCR Coding Method 
 Portugal 
(EAT) 
Spain Italy Ireland Germany  
(ET) 
𝛿11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.106 
(0.507) 
0.246 
(0.483) 
-0.481*** 
(0.000) 
2.033*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿12 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.035 
(0.361) 
-0.106 
(0.248) 
-0.080 
(0.308) 
-0.100** 
(0.048) 
0.004 
(0.737) 
𝛿13 (Bailout 
Events) 
-3.347*** 
(0.006) 
0.369 
(0.865) 
1.974*** 
(0.000) 
-1.733 
(0.285) 
0.110 
(0.916) 
𝜆11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.093** 
(0.017) 
0.007 
(0.837) 
0.004 
(0.960) 
0.082*** 
(0.000) 
3.845*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆12 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.031 
(0.199) 
-0.066*** 
(0.001) 
-0.064*** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.728) 
-0.044*** 
(0.001) 
𝜆13 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.745** 
(0.017) 
0.622** 
(0.010) 
0.846*** 
(0.008) 
0.306 
(0.102) 
0.299** 
(0.022) 
𝛿21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.014 
(0.787) 
0.019 
(0.788) 
0.040 
(0.773) 
0.054 
(0.192) 
0.197 
(0.645) 
𝛿22 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
0.032 
(0.257) 
0.079*** 
(0.004) 
0.082** 
(0.010) 
0.050** 
(0.048) 
0.045** 
(0.025) 
𝛿23 (Bailout 
Events) 
-1.093** 
(0.034) 
-1.084* 
(0.086) 
-1.296* 
(0.056) 
-0.522 
(0.143) 
-0.760* 
(0.086) 
𝜆21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.015 
(0.588) 
-0.005 
(0.779) 
-0.045 
(0.156) 
0.026 
(0.207) 
0.054 
(0.805) 
𝜆22 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.023 
(0.186) 
-0.005 
(0.700) 
-0.001 
(0.913) 
-0.022* 
(0.099) 
-0.012 
(0.493) 
𝜆23 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.318 
(0.109) 
0.370*** 
(0.009) 
0.378** 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.988) 
0.253 
(0.188) 
𝑣1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.001 
(0.795) 
-0.000 
(0.828) 
0.002 
(0.648) 
-0.023** 
(0.017) 
-0.019  
(0.124) 
𝑣2 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.001 
(0.673) 
0.004*** 
(0.008) 
0.005** 
(0.019) 
-0.001 
(0.828) 
-0.016*** 
(0.000) 
𝑣3 (Bailout Events) 0.025 
(0.489) 
0.017 
(0.538) 
0.010 
(0.648) 
-0.296*** 
(0.001) 
-0.043  
(0.698) 
 Belgium  
(E) 
Austria  
(E) 
U.S. U.K. 
 
𝛿11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.240*** 
(0.000) 
-0.344 
(0.363) 
-2.886*** 
(0.000) 
0.771 
(0.353)  
𝛿12 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.128 
(0.183) 
-0.155 
(0.130) 
-0.052*** 
(0.000) 
-0.042*** 
(0.000)  
𝛿13 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.741*** 
(0.000) 
0.686 
(0.707) 
1.263 
(0.755) 
-0.604 
(0.409)  
𝜆11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.039 
(0.742) 
0.310*** 
(0.000) 
-0.208 
(0.384) 
2.149** 
(0.015)  
𝜆12 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.052** 
(0.021) 
-0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.079*** 
(0.000) 
-0.070* 
(0.070)  
𝜆13 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.422** 
(0.027) 
0.227** 
(0.030) 
2.984*** 
(0.000) 
-3.097*** 
(0.000)  
𝛿21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.035 
(0.837) 
-0.206 
(0.181) 
0.468*** 
(0.000) 
-0.578* 
(0.059)  
𝛿22 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
0.042* 
(0.052) 
0.022 
(0.324) 
0.056*** 
(0.001) 
0.027 
(0.109)  
𝛿23 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.512 
(0.239) 
-0.357 
(0.418) 
0.596 
(0.289) 
-0.625 
(0.716)  
𝜆21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.057 
(0.468) 
0.127 
(0.134) 
-0.549*** 
(0.001) 
0.125 
(0.706)  
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𝜆22 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.021 
(0.102) 
-0.003 
(0.792) 
-0.014 
(0.203) 
0.009 
(0.466)  
𝜆23 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.361** 
(0.016) 
0.456*** 
(0.001) 
0.691*** 
(0.001) 
0.388 
(0.392)  
𝑣1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.054* 
(0.059) 
0.218*** 
(0.000) 
0.272*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.979)  
𝑣2 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
0.004  
(0.443) 
-0.011 
(0.626) 
-0.001 
(0.818) 
0.004*** 
(0.002)  
𝑣3 (Bailout Events) -0.264*** 
(0.000) 
-0.115 
(0.539) 
-0.383*** 
(0.000) 
-0.098*** 
(0.002)  
Notes: This table reports the estimation of key parameters in equations (4.1) – (4.6), when 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡1𝑡 is 
domestic rating events, 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡2𝑡 is Greek rating events, and 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡3𝑡 is bailout events. Sy’s (2004) CCR 
coding method is used. 
EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆12𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆13𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                              
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆22𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆23𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                         
ET denotes Student’s t EGARCH without asymmetry. EAT denotes Student’s t EGARCH with 
asymmetry. The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 4A: Major Bailouts in the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone  
Table 4A: Major Bailouts in the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone 
Major Bailouts in the U.S. 
The Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 
(3/10/2008) 
It is referred to as a bailout of the U.S. financial system. It is a law enacted to address the subprime mortgage crisis. It 
authorises the United States Secretary of the Treasury to use $700 billion to buy distressed assets, especially mortgage-
backed securities, and provide cash directly to banks.  
Bear Stearns (24/03/2008) The Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced that it will provide financing support to help J.P. Morgan’s acquisition 
of the Bear Stearns. Maiden Lane was formed to control $30 billion of the Bear Stearns assets. J.P. Morgan assumed the 
first $1 billion of any losses on the portfolio. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(7/09/2008, 18/02/2009, 
24/12/2009) 
In 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in government conservatorship. In 
2009, the U.S. Treasury Department raised its preferred stock purchase agreements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
$200 billion and increased the limits on the size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's portfolios to $900 billion. The U.S. 
Treasury Department announced the removal of caps on the amount of preferred stock that the Treasury may purchase in 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure that each firm maintains a positive net worth. 
AIG (16/09/2008, 2/03/2009, 
25/06/2009) 
The Federal Reserve Board authorised the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American 
International Group (AIG) under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The U.S. Treasury Department and Federal 
Reserve Board announced a restructuring of the government's assistance to the AIG. The AIG announced that it has entered 
into an agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to reduce the debt the AIG owes the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York by $25 billion.  
Major Bailouts in the U.K. 
The second rescue package 
(19/01/2009) 
Based on the first rescue package announced by the HM Treasury on 08/10/2008, the U.K. government announced a 
second rescue package for the U.K. banks. It includes the asset-based securities guarantee scheme and the asset protection 
scheme.  
Special Resolution Regime 
(21/02/2009) 
The Banking Act 2009 introduced a special resolution regime (SRR) giving power to the HM Treasury, the Bank of 
England and the Financial Services Authority to deal with distressed banks and building societies. 
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Table 4A: Major Bailouts in the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone (Continued) 
Major Bailouts in the Eurozone 
The European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) 
(09/05/2010, 10/05/2010) 
The EU finance chiefs, in a 14-hour overnight session in Brussels, agreed to set up a 750 billion-euros rescue mechanism 
for the countries facing financial difficulties. The ECB promised to buy government and private debt to curb the sovereign 
debt crisis. The meeting agreed to establish the European Financial Stability Facility, the region’s temporary bailout 
mechanism, with initial capital of €440 billion. 
The European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM) (11/05/2010) 
It was established under Regulation (EU) No 407/2010. The regulation gave the European Commission the power to 
provide financial support to the euro countries. It was a temporary funding mechanism. 
European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) 
(11/07/2011, 19/10/2012) 
Finance ministers of the 17 euro-area countries signed to establish the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is a permanent rescue mechanism and replaces the EFSF and the EFSM. It is 
currently the sole mechanism for providing financial assistance to euro area member states. 
Greece bailout (02/05/2010, 
21/07/2011) 
In 2010, the Euro-region agreed on a 110 billion-euro rescue package for Greece. In 2011, the EU summit passed the 
second bailout package for Greece and agreed to expand the powers of the EFSF.  
Ireland bailout (28/11/2010) Ireland got 85 billion-euro bailout from the IMF, the European Commission, and the EFSF.  
Portugal bailout (16/05/2011) Portugal’s 78 billion-euro bailout was approved by finance ministers of the Eurozone and the IMF.  
Spain bailout (09/06/2012) Spain announced that it needs financial assistance of up to €100 billion. By the end of July, the Eurozone approved to 
provide financial assistance to Spain. 
Cyprus bailout (25/06/2012) Due to exposure to Greek debt, Cyprus requested a bailout. In March 2013, Cyprus obtained €10 billion bailout from the 
ESM and the IMF.  
Notes: This table briefly presents the details of the major bailouts analysed in this chapter. The news announcement dates and news descriptions are available at the crisis 
timeline provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Petrovic and Tutsch (2009), the European crisis timelines provided by Bloomberg, the ESM, and the EFSF.
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Appendix 4B: National Equity Index of Each Country  
Table 4B: National Equity Index of Each Country 
Country  National Equity Index 
Austria  Austrian Traded Index (ATX) 
Belgium BEL 20 Index 
Cyprus Stock Exchange General Index 
Finland Nordic Exchange OMX Helsinki (OMXH) Index 
France France CAC 40 Index 
Germany DAX 30 Performance Index 
Ireland Stock Exchange Overall (ISEQ) Index 
Italy Financial Times Stock Exchange MIB Index 
Netherlands Aex Index(AEX) 
Portugal PSI-20 Index 
Slovenia Slovenian Stock Exchange (SBI) Index 
Spain IBEX 35 Index 
U.K. Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 Index 
U.S. S&P 500 Index 
Notes: This table reports the name of the national equity index of each examined country used in this 
study. 
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Appendix 4C: Full Estimation Results of Table 4.7—Table 4.18 
Table 4C.1: Full Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝜃1 0.028 
(0.596) 
-0.044*** 
(0.000) 
-0.093*** 
(0.000) 
-0.124*** 
(0.006) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾11 0.171*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
0.130*** 
(0.000) 
0.172*** 
(0.000) 
0.054*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑11 -0.294*** 
(0.000) 
-0.360*** 
(0.000) 
-0.345*** 
(0.000) 
-0.130*** 
(0.001) 
-0.219*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿1 
(Rating Events) 
-0.940* 
(0.070) 
-0.043 
(0.931) 
-0.296 
(0.647) 
-1.164*** 
(0.000) 
-0.194*** 
(0.000) 
𝑐1 0.034* 
(0.061) 
-0.031 
(0.133) 
-0.048** 
(0.032) 
-0.123*** 
(0.000) 
0.311*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.209*** 
(0.000) 
0.220*** 
(0.000) 
0.281*** 
(0.000) 
0.248*** 
(0.000) 
0.281*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.934*** 
(0.000) 
0.958*** 
(0.000) 
0.947*** 
(0.000) 
0.981*** 
(0.000) 
0.829*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 0.059*** 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.119) 
0.043*** 
(0.008) 
0.020* 
(0.074) 
-0.077*** 
(0.001) 
𝜆1 
(Rating Events) 
-0.262*** 
(0.000) 
-0.096 
(0.127) 
0.039 
(0.729) 
0.188*** 
(0.003) 
-0.352*** 
(0.000) 
𝜃2 -0.040 
(0.122) 
-0.050** 
(0.015) 
-0.044 
(0.157) 
0.050* 
(0.046) 
-0.052** 
(0.040) 
𝛾21 -0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.039) 
0.006 
(0.454) 
-0.015 
(0.184) 
𝜑21 0.082*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.915) 
-0.049* 
(0.062) 
0.042* 
(0.076) 
0.100*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿2 
(Rating Events) 
0.029 
(0.806) 
0.090 
(0.595) 
0.329 
(0.271) 
0.116 
(0.323) 
0.024 
(0.702) 
𝑐2 -0.094*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054*** 
(0.000) 
-0.051*** 
(0.000) 
-0.122*** 
(0.000) 
-0.167*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.156*** 
(0.000) 
0.097*** 
(0.000) 
0.105*** 
(0.000) 
0.167*** 
(0.000) 
0.270*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.946*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.968*** 
(0.000) 
0.985*** 
(0.000) 
0.986*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 -0.134*** 
(0.000) 
-0.139*** 
(0.000) 
-0.122*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054*** 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.877) 
𝜆2 
(Rating Events) 
-0.021 
(0.761) 
-0.039 
(0.453) 
-0.098 
(0.146) 
0.045 
(0.470) 
0.018 
(0.745) 
𝛼 0.167*** 
(0.000) 
0.087*** 
(0.000) 
0.096*** 
(0.000) 
0.139*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.883*** 
(0.000) 
0.995*** 
(0.000) 
0.994*** 
(0.000) 
0.967*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑔 -0.158 
(0.101) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.383*** 
(0.005) 
𝑣 
(Rating Events) 
0.069** 
(0.032) 
0.012 
(0.286) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.046 
(0.114) 
-0.018 
(0.785) 
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Table 4C.1: Full Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Events (Continued) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝜃1 0.258*** 
(0.000) 
-0.084 
(0.261) 
0.098*** 
(0.000) 
-0.140*** 
(0.000) 
-0.141*** 
(0.020) 
𝛾11 -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.080*** 
(0.002) 
0.149*** 
(0.000) 
0.024*** 
(0.000) 
-0.153*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑11 -0.583*** 
(0.000) 
-0.497*** 
(0.000) 
-0.324*** 
(0.000) 
-0.430*** 
(0.000) 
-0.862*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿1 
(Rating Events) 
2.726 
(0.503) 
0.010 
(0.996) 
-0.204 
(0.864) 
0.400 
(0.634) 
-1.216 
(0.318) 
𝑐1 0.292*** 
(0.000) 
-0.029 
(0.106) 
-0.063*** 
(0.000) 
-0.012 
(0.556) 
-0.001 
(0.902) 
𝑎1 0.261*** 
(0.000) 
0.243*** 
(0.000) 
0.257*** 
(0.000) 
0.294*** 
(0.000) 
0.100*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.861*** 
(0.000) 
0.958*** 
(0.000) 
0.962*** 
(0.000) 
0.940*** 
(0.000) 
0.982*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 0.047*** 
(0.009) 
0.020 
(0.135) 
0.082*** 
(0.000) 
-0.020 
(0.134) 
-0.002 
(0.834) 
𝜆1 
(Rating Events) 
-0.090 
(0.929) 
0.089 
(0.686) 
0.271 
(0.482) 
-0.180 
(0.400) 
0.528*** 
(0.000) 
𝜃2 0.008 
(0.681) 
-0.026 
(0.297) 
-0.006 
(0.802) 
-0.013 
(0.560) 
-0.007 
(0.782) 
𝛾21 -0.002 
(0.691) 
-0.005 
(0.467) 
-0.002 
(0.835) 
-0.008* 
(0.093) 
0.005 
(0.416) 
𝜑21 0.002 
(0.941) 
-0.036*** 
(0.001) 
0.024 
(0.304) 
0.019 
(0.367) 
0.126*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿2 
(Rating Events) 
1.757* 
(0.054) 
0.166 
(0.723) 
0.110 
(0.731) 
0.105 
(0.606) 
-0.368 
(0.300) 
𝑐2 -0.074*** 
(0.000) 
-0.057*** 
(0.000) 
-0.075*** 
(0.000) 
-0.086*** 
(0.000) 
-0.087*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.114*** 
(0.000) 
0.095*** 
(0.000) 
0.104*** 
(0.000) 
0.122*** 
(0.000) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.976*** 
(0.000) 
0.972*** 
(0.000) 
0.984*** 
(0.000) 
0.974*** 
(0.000) 
0.973*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 -0.127*** 
(0.000) 
-0.166*** 
(0.000) 
-0.142*** 
(0.000) 
-0.139*** 
(0.000) 
-0.095*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆2 
(Rating Events) 
-0.149 
(0.724) 
-0.087 
(0.504) 
-0.318 
(0.140) 
0.034 
(0.753) 
-0.243 
(0.268) 
𝛼 0.106*** 
(0.000) 
0.132*** 
(0.000) 
-0.136* 
(0.097) 
0.171*** 
(0.000) 
0.143 
(0.120) 
𝛽 0.989*** 
(0.000) 
0.988*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.643 
(0.122) 
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.333** 
(0.014) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.230** 
(0.014) 
𝑣 
(Rating Events) 
0.203 
(0.240) 
-0.035 
(0.541) 
0.740*** 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.739) 
0.441*** 
(0.000) 
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Table 4C.1: Full Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Events (Continued) 
 Slovenia Finland U.S. U.K. 
𝜃1 0.090*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018*** 
(0.000) 
-0.075*** 
(0.000) 
-0.074*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾11 0.040*** 
(0.000) 
0.020*** 
(0.000) 
-0.037*** 
(0.000) 
-0.151*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾12 0.102*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛾13 0.077*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛾14 0.034* 
(0.056) 
   
𝜑11 -0.223*** 
(0.000) 
-0.300*** 
(0.000) 
-0.957*** 
(0.000) 
-0.656*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑12 -0.229*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜑13 -0.139*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜑14 -0.110*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛿1 
(Rating Events) 
-0.047* 
(0.085) 
0.278 
(0.555) 
-1.542 
(0.351) 
-0.086 
(0.845) 
𝑐1 -0.061*** 
(0.000) 
-0.026* 
(0.056) 
0.016 
(0.487) 
0.904*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.150*** 
(0.000) 
0.313*** 
(0.000) 
0.318*** 
(0.000) 
0.300*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.930*** 
(0.000) 
0.929*** 
(0.000) 
0.654*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 0.020* 
(0.068) 
-0.020 
(0.166) 
0.066*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.513) 
𝜆1 
(Rating Events) 
0.080 
(0.158) 
0.889** 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.999) 
3.836*** 
(0.003) 
𝜃2 0.013 
(0.378) 
-0.006 
(0.785) 
0.018 
(0.256) 
-0.011 
(0.604) 
𝛾21 -0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.007 
(0.420) 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.525) 
𝛾22 -0.041*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛾23 -0.041*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛾24 -0.025*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜑11 0.008 
(0.491) 
0.045* 
(0.072) 
-0.049** 
(0.022) 
-0.013 
(0.607) 
𝜑22 -0.037 
(0.104) 
   
𝜑23 -0.008 
(0.746) 
   
𝜑24 -0.005 
(0.823) 
   
𝛿2 
(Rating Events) 
-0.072 
(0.518) 
0.159 
(0.668) 
0.416 
(0.110) 
-0.639* 
(0.056) 
𝑐2 -0.415*** 
(0.000) 
-0.050*** 
(0.000) 
-0.104*** 
(0.000) 
-0.106*** 
(0.000) 
 𝑎2 0.694*** 
(0.000) 
0.073*** 
(0.000) 
0.137*** 
(0.000) 
0.139*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.869*** 
(0.000) 
0.989*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.977*** 
(0.000) 
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𝑑2 0.185*** 
(0.000) 
-0.088*** 
(0.000) 
-0.160*** 
(0.000) 
-0.129*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆2 
(Rating Events) 
0.110 
(0.482) 
0.147 
(0.455) 
-0.747*** 
(0.001) 
-0.059 
(0.887) 
𝛼 0.192*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.073*** 
(0.000) 
𝛽 0.950*** 
(0.000) 
0.346 
(0.265) 
0.990*** 
(0.000) 
0.998*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.334** 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑣 
(Rating Events) 
-0.009 
(0.863) 
-0.685*** 
(0.000) 
0.418*** 
(0.000) 
-0.044 
(0.345) 
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.7. The p-values of the coefficients are in 
the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4C.2: Full Results of Domestic Positive and Negative Sovereign Rating Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland  
(GARCH) 
Cyprus Germany 
𝜃1 0.013 
(0.531) 
-0.033 
(0.674) 
-0.051*** 
(0.000) 
-0.134*** 
(0.005) 
0.034*** 
(0.000) 
0.251*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾11 0.172*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.004) 
0.143*** 
(0.000) 
0.181*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑11 -0.296*** 
(0.000) 
-0.359*** 
(0.000) 
-0.346*** 
(0.000) 
-0.122*** 
(0.002) 
-0.180*** 
(0.000) 
-0.590*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿11 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
0.027** 
(0.021) 
-0.228 
(0.810) 
-2.296 
(0.120) 
-1.835*** 
(0.001) 
-0.016*** 
(0.000) 
1.439 
(0.734) 
𝛿12 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-1.376*** 
(0.000) 
0.017 
(0.976) 
-0.069 
(0.888) 
-1.131** 
(0.011) 
-0.748*** 
(0.003) 
2.952 
(0.466) 
𝑐1 0.033* 
(0.086) 
-0.032 
(0.136) 
-0.017 
(0.527) 
0.076*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.824) 
0.318*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.209*** 
(0.000) 
0.219*** 
(0.000) 
0.292*** 
(0.000) 
0.118*** 
(0.000) 
0.105*** 
(0.000) 
0.271*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.935*** 
(0.000) 
0.958*** 
(0.000) 
0.935*** 
(0.000) 
0.888*** 
(0.000) 
0.987*** 
(0.000) 
0.851*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 0.061*** 
(0.002) 
0.023 
(0.102) 
0.042*** 
(0.009)  
-0.039*** 
(0.000) 
0.046*** 
(0.006) 
𝜆11 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
-0.333 
(0.222) 
-0.031 
(0.870) 
-0.486 
(0.248) 
1.323** 
(0.040) 
-0.857*** 
(0.000) 
-3.384 
(0.205) 
𝜆12 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-0.260*** 
(0.002) 
-0.106 
(0.167) 
0.074 
(0.484) 
0.202 
(0.843) 
0.137*** 
(0.000) 
0.369 
(0.701) 
𝜃2 -0.038 
(0.130) 
-0.047** 
(0.024) 
-0.031 
(0.351) 
0.076*** 
(0.006) 
-0.053** 
(0.036) 
0.009 
(0.700) 
𝛾21 -0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.044) 
0.004 
(0.613) 
-0.015 
(0.217) 
-0.002 
(0.693) 
𝜑21 0.083*** 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.756) 
-0.043 
(0.108) 
0.037 
(0.143) 
0.100*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.953) 
𝛿21 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
-0.231 
(0.586) 
-0.194 
(0.471) 
0.352 
(0.644) 
-0.067 
(0.784) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
-0.875 
(0.737) 
𝛿22 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.066 
(0.612) 
0.267*** 
(0.000) 
0.328 
(0.317) 
0.139 
(0.122) 
0.012 
(0.897) 
2.426** 
(0.047) 
𝑐2 -0.096*** 
(0.000) 
-0.048*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054*** 
(0.000) 
0.026*** 
(0.002) 
-0.168*** 
(0.000) 
-0.074*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.157*** 
(0.000) 
0.092*** 
(0.000) 
0.102*** 
(0.000) 
0.080*** 
(0.000) 
0.270*** 
(0.000) 
0.114*** 
()0.000 
𝑏2 0.946*** 
(0.000) 
0.974*** 
(0.000) 
0.972*** 
(0.000) 
0.909*** 
(0.000) 
0.986*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 -0.134*** 
(0.000) 
-0.141*** 
(0.000) 
-0.114*** 
(0.000)  
0.002 
(0.874) 
-0.127*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆21 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
0.135 
(0.544) 
-0.285* 
(0.051) 
0.002 
(0.995) 
-0.125 
(0.299) 
0.034 
(0.698) 
0.382 
(0.706) 
𝜆22 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-0.041 
(0.567) 
-0.019 
(0.693) 
-0.088 
(0.203) 
0.142*** 
(0.000) 
0.013 
(0.834) 
-0.264 
(0.546) 
𝛼 0.161*** 
(0.000) 
0.080 *** 
(0.000) 
0.087*** 
(0.000) 
0.125*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.123*** 
(0.000) 
𝛽 0.895*** 
(0.000) 
0.995*** 
(0.000) 
0.995*** 
(0.000) 
0.968*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.982*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.146 
(0.110) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑣1 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
0.035 
(0.808) 
-0.017 
(0.348) 
-0.032 
(0.537) 
-0.001 
(0.987) 
0.097** 
(0.018) 
-0.198 
(0.691) 
𝑣2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.069** 
(0.017) 
0.015** 
(0.049) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.083* 
(0.053) 
-0.040 
(0.105) 
0.319 
(0.130) 
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Table 4C.2: Full Results of Domestic Positive and Negative Sovereign Rating Events 
(Continued) 
 France 
(GJR) 
Netherlands Belgium Finland U.S. U.K. 
𝜃1 -0.125 
(0.136) 
0.072 
(0.163) 
-0.137*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.291) 
-0.072 
(0.459) 
𝛾11 0.076*** 
(0.005) 
0.150*** 
(0.000) 
0.023* 
(0.067) 
0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.150*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑11 -0.410*** 
(0.000) 
-0.306*** 
(0.000) 
-0.423*** 
(0.000) 
-0.293*** 
(0.000) 
-0.942*** 
(0.000) 
-0.650*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿11 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 
1.912*** 
(0.002) 
0.648 
(0.310) 
1.510*** 
(0.001) 
-2.373** 
(0.030) 
5.211 
(0.794) 
𝛿12 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.262 
(0.882) 
-2.192*** 
(0.008) 
0.462*** 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.953) 
2.110 
(0.176) 
-0.106 
(0.756) 
𝑐1 0.469*** 
(0.000) 
-0.057*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.341) 
-0.021 
(0.119) 
0.021 
(0.500) 
0.936*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.117*** 
(0.000) 
0.254*** 
(0.000) 
0.271*** 
(0.000) 
0.299*** 
(0.000) 
0.311*** 
(0.000) 
0.302*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.877*** 
(0.000) 
0.962*** 
(0.000) 
0.948*** 
(0.000) 
0.932*** 
(0.000) 
0.930*** 
(0.000) 
0.644*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 -0.005 
(0.776) 
0.083*** 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.149) 
-0.022 
(0.143) 
0.066*** 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.483) 
𝜆11 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 
-0.779** 
(0.042) 
-1.454*** 
(0.000) 
-2.666*** 
(0.001) 
-0.827* 
(0.085) 
2.923* 
(0.083) 
𝜆12 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
5.072 
(0.329) 
1.340*** 
(0.000) 
0.218 
(0.282) 
1.572*** 
(0.000) 
0.672** 
(0.043) 
4.382*** 
(0.001) 
𝜃2 -0.016 
(0.552) 
-0.003 
(0.905) 
-0.008 
(0.308) 
-0.005 
(0.808) 
0.018 
(0.301) 
-0.002 
(0.880) 
𝛾21 -0.005 
(0.431) 
-0.002 
(0.785) 
-0.008* 
(0.099) 
0.007 
(0.415) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.906) 
𝜑21 -0.041* 
(0.097) 
0.020 
(0.364) 
0.024 
(0.233) 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
-0.049** 
(0.021) 
-0.014 
(0.540) 
𝛿21 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 
-0.426 
(0.298) 
-0.096 
(0.814) 
-0.281 
(0.731) 
0.371 
(0.261) 
-0.911*** 
(0.002) 
𝛿22 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.214 
(0.634) 
0.757 
(0.160) 
0.533 
(0.127) 
0.358 
(0.402) 
1.273 
(0.291) 
-0.191 
(0.507) 
𝑐2 0.039*** 
(0.000) 
-0.074*** 
(0.000) 
-0.091*** 
(0.000) 
-0.050*** 
(0.000) 
-0.103*** 
(0.000) 
-0.115*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 -0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.103*** 
(0.000) 
0.125*** 
(0.000) 
0.073*** 
(0.000) 
0.136*** 
(0.000) 
0.151*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.913*** 
(0.000) 
0.984*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.989*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.970*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 0.201*** 
(0.000) 
-0.142*** 
(0.000) 
-0.144*** 
(0.000) 
-0.088*** 
(0.000) 
-0.161*** 
(0.000) 
-0.137*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆21 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 
-0.568* 
(0.066) 
0.657** 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.998) 
-0.817** 
(0.048) 
-1.093 
(0.152) 
𝜆22 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-0.189 
(0.513) 
-0.091 
(0.755) 
-0.143 
(0.312) 
0.193 
(0.422) 
-0.762*** 
(0.004) 
0.685 
(0.205) 
𝛼 0.137*** 
(0.000) 
-0.168** 
(0.014) 
0.170*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.051* 
(0.088) 
𝛽 0.987*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.329 
(0.283) 
0.995*** 
(0.000) 
0.999*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.411*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.340*** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑣1 (Positive 
Rating Events) 
 
0.715 
(0.187) 
-0.090 
(0.286) 
-0.692*** 
(0.000) 
0.030 
(0.650) 
0.112 
(0.524) 
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𝑣2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
-0.025 
(0.672) 
0.593*** 
(0.000) 
0.044 
(0.424) 
-0.686 
(0.170) 
0.375*** 
(0.000) 
-0.128 
(0.179) 
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.8. 
GARCH:  
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆12𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                     
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆22𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                               
GJR: 
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝑑1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀1𝑡−1) + 𝜆11𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆12𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                     
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝑑2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀2𝑡−1) + 𝜆21𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆22𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                                        
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4C.3: Full Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Surprises 
 Austria Cyprus 
(E) 
France Ireland Italy  
(E) 
Spain 
𝜃1 -0.133*** 
(0.000) 
0.043** 
(0.022) 
-0.082 
(0.299) 
-0.137 
(0.568) 
-0.124*** 
(0.000) 
-0.046 
(0.580) 
𝛾11 -0.153*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007** 
(0.013) 
0.081*** 
(0.002) 
0.177*** 
(0.000) 
0.124*** 
(0.000) 
0.076*** 
(0.004) 
𝜑11 -0.882*** 
(0.000) 
-0.216*** 
(0.000) 
-0.495*** 
(0.000) 
-0.122 
(0.574) 
-0.353*** 
(0.000) 
-0.360*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿1 (Rating 
Surprises) 
-2.162 
(0.379) 
-0.019*** 
(0.001) 
-0.888 
(0.904) 
-2.314* 
(0.058) 
-1.604 
(0.734) 
0.497 
(0.728) 
𝑐1 -0.002 
(0.884) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
-0.029 
(0.101) 
-0.126*** 
(0.000) 
-0.055** 
(0.013) 
-0.031 
(0.204) 
𝑎1 0.108*** 
(0.000) 
0.108*** 
(0.000) 
0.243*** 
(0.000) 
0.255*** 
(0.000) 
0.289*** 
(0.000) 
0.223*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.980*** 
(0.000) 
0.974*** 
(0.000) 
0.958*** 
(0.000) 
0.980*** 
(0.000) 
0.948*** 
(0.000) 
0.957*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 -0.007 
(0.526) 
 
0.020 
(0.124) 
0.018 
(0.470) 
 0.021 
(0.161) 
𝜆1 (Rating 
Surprises) 
-0.035 
(0.932) 
-1.388*** 
(0.000) 
0.400 
(0.560) 
0.567* 
(0.055) 
0.084 
(0.915) 
-0.173 
(0.609) 
𝜃2 -0.005 
(0.842) 
-0.041* 
(0.068) 
-0.026*** 
(0.000) 
0.050** 
(0.032) 
0.014 
(0.652) 
-0.049** 
(0.039) 
𝛾21 0.005 
(0.417) 
-0.012 
(0.281) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.006 
(0.414) 
-0.019** 
(0.027) 
-0.019*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑21 0.124*** 
(0.000) 
0.104*** 
(0.000) 
-0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.042* 
(0.083) 
-0.068*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.844) 
𝛿2 (Rating 
Surprises) 
-0.600 
(0.380) 
-0.042 
(0.480) 
-0.571 
(0.684) 
0.076 
(0.844) 
-1.719 
(0.575) 
-0.292 
(0.657) 
𝑐2 -0.087*** 
(0.000) 
-0.168*** 
(0.000) 
-0.056*** 
(0.000) 
-0.122*** 
(0.000) 
-0.107*** 
(0.000) 
-0.049*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.270*** 
(0.000) 
0.094*** 
(0.000) 
0.167*** 
(0.000) 
0.174*** 
(0.000) 
0.092*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.986*** 
(0.000) 
0.973*** 
(0.000) 
0.984*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.974*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 -0.086*** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.165*** 
(0.000) 
-0.056*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
-0.139*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆2 (Rating 
Surprises) 
0.312 
(0.600) 
0.229 
(0.212) 
-0.395 
(0.414) 
0.197 
(0.401) 
-0.170 
(0.802) 
-0.295 
(0.180) 
𝛼 0.162* 
(0.063) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.137*** 
(0.000) 
0.150*** 
(0.000) 
0.098*** 
(0.000) 
0.090*** 
(0.000) 
𝛽 -0.451 
(0.281) 
0.810*** 
(0.000) 
0.986*** 
(0.000) 
0.961*** 
(0.000) 
0.995*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.221** 
(0.046) 
-0.227 
(0.151) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑣 (Rating 
Surprises) 
0.809*** 
(0.000) 
0.262*** 
(0.000) 
0.040 
(0.857) 
-0.070 
(0.593) 
0.204*** 
(0.006) 
-0.050 
(0.144) 
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.9. 
EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                            
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡                                                                                                                                
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4C.4: Full Results of Bailout Events 
 Portugal (GJR) Spain Italy Ireland (GJR) Cyprus (GJR) 
𝜃1 0.035 
(0.655) 
-0.045*** 
(0.000) 
-0.095** 
(0.029) 
-0.132** 
(0.010) 
0.064 
(0.363) 
𝛾11 0.188*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
0.134*** 
(0.000) 
0.183*** 
(0.000) 
0.030 
(0.347) 
𝜑11 -0.249*** 
(0.000) 
-0.360*** 
(0.000) 
-0.350*** 
(0.000) 
-0.120*** 
(0.004) 
-0.137*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿1 
(Bailout Events) 
-4.781*** 
(0.000) 
1.253*** 
(0.000) 
1.997*** 
(0.000) 
-1.339 
(0.344) 
3.412*** 
(0.001) 
𝑐1 0.790*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.709) 
-0.024 
(0.289) 
0.093*** 
(0.000) 
2.767*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.159*** 
(0.000) 
0.224*** 
(0.000) 
0.275*** 
(0.000) 
0.132*** 
(0.000) 
0.077*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.838*** 
(0.000) 
0.949*** 
(0.000) 
0.938*** 
(0.000) 
0.886*** 
(0.000) 
0.688*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 -0.071*** 
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.364) 
0.032* 
(0.067) 
-0.026 
(0.199) 
0.152*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆1 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.985 
(0.846) 
0.591*** 
(0.009) 
0.862*** 
(0.000) 
2.229 
(0.407) 
7.329 
(0.205) 
𝜃2 -0.034 
(0.194) 
-0.047* 
(0.083) 
-0.040** 
(0.014) 
0.049* 
(0.091) 
-0.050** 
(0.046) 
𝛾21 -0.025*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.009) 
-0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.677) 
-0.018 
(0.168) 
𝜑21 0.079*** 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.844) 
-0.050** 
(0.026) 
0.043* 
(0.080) 
0.117*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿2 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.966** 
(0.044) 
-1.092 
(0.101) 
-1.297** 
(0.043) 
-0.423 
(0.243) 
-0.865 
(0.394) 
𝑐2 0.105*** 
(0.000) 
-0.051*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054*** 
(0.000) 
0.031*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.007) 
𝑎2 0.005 
(0.741) 
0.091*** 
(0.000) 
0.106*** 
(0.000) 
0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.136*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.839*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.969*** 
(0.000) 
0.906*** 
(0.000) 
0.885*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 0.198*** 
(0.000) 
-0.134*** 
(0.000) 
-0.116*** 
(0.000) 
0.075*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.942) 
𝜆2 
(Bailout Events) 
0.432 
(0.437) 
0.380*** 
(0.003) 
0.355** 
(0.020) 
-0.079 
(0.693) 
4.605* 
(0.067) 
𝛼 0.169*** 
(0.000) 
-0.074*** 
(0.000) 
0.103*** 
(0.000) 
0.133* 
(0.065) 
0.040 
(0.944) 
𝛽 0.881*** 
(0.000) 
0.997*** 
(0.000) 
0.994*** 
(0.000) 
0.808*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑔 0.137* 
(0.072) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.284*** 
(0.000) 
-0.389** 
(0.007) 
𝑣 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.288*** 
(0.003) 
-0.035* 
(0.062) 
-0.032 
(0.175) 
-0.563*** 
(0.000) 
-0.204 
(0.219) 
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Table 4C.4: Full Results of Bailout Events (Continued) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium (GJR) Austria (GJR) 
𝜃1 0.255** 
(0.011) 
-0.082 
(0.300) 
0.084 
(0.111) 
-0.091 
(0.230) 
-0.178* 
(0.059) 
𝛾11 0.002 
(0.936) 
0.082*** 
(0.001) 
0.145*** 
(0.000) 
0.059** 
(0.028) 
-0.107*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑11 -0.582*** 
(0.000) 
-0.501*** 
(0.000) 
-0.327*** 
(0.000) 
-0.333*** 
(0.000) 
-0.513*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿1 
(Bailout Events) 
2.000 
(0.413) 
0.603 
(0.763) 
0.456 
(0.721) 
-0.571 
(0.767) 
1.546 
(0.393) 
𝑐1 0.326*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.238) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
0.409*** 
(0.001) 
0.247*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.261*** 
(0.000) 
0.242*** 
(0.000) 
0.259*** 
(0.000) 
0.078*** 
(0.000) 
0.035*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.849*** 
(0.000) 
0.955*** 
(0.000) 
0.961*** 
(0.000) 
0.889*** 
(0.000) 
0.940*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 0.051*** 
(0.006) 
0.020 
(0.148) 
0.082*** 
(0.000) 
0.040** 
(0.027) 
0.039*** 
(0.001) 
𝜆1 
(Bailout Events) 
0.550* 
(0.071) 
0.331* 
(0.078) 
0.009 
(0.961) 
13.923* 
(0.053) 
11.255** 
(0.011) 
𝜃2 0.011 
(0.460) 
-0.023 
(0.317) 
-0.001 
(0.955) 
-0.001 
(0.972) 
-0.002 
(0.945) 
𝛾21 -0.003 
(0.617) 
-0.005 
(0.373) 
-0.002 
(0.762) 
-0.006 
(0.253) 
0.003 
(0.635) 
𝜑21 0.001 
(0.949) 
-0.036 
(0.115) 
0.022 
(0.376) 
0.026 
(0.283) 
0.122*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿2 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.779*** 
(0.000) 
-0.839* 
(0.075) 
-0.606 
(0.115) 
-0.605 
(0.191) 
-0.329 
(0.426) 
𝑐2 -0.075*** 
(0.000) 
-0.057*** 
(0.000) 
-0.076*** 
(0.000) 
0.030*** 
(0.000) 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
𝑎2 0.114*** 
(0.000) 
0.095*** 
(0.000) 
0.105*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.262) 
0.005 
(0.578) 
𝑏2 0.976*** 
(0.000) 
0.972*** 
(0.000) 
0.985*** 
(0.000) 
0.908*** 
(0.000) 
0.926*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 -0.127*** 
(0.000) 
-0.164*** 
(0.000) 
-0.138*** 
(0.000) 
0.168*** 
(0.000) 
0.096*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆2 
(Bailout Events) 
0.158 
(0.239) 
0.144 
(0.242) 
0.126 
(0.320) 
0.414* 
(0.092) 
0.529* 
(0.049) 
𝛼 0.036 
(0.177) 
0.124*** 
(0.000) 
-0.144* 
(0.062) 
0.143*** 
(0.000) 
0.167** 
(0.012) 
𝛽 0.997*** 
(0.000) 
0.988*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
-0.452 
(0.340) 
𝑔 -0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.360*** 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.188* 
(0.091) 
𝑣 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.087*** 
(0.000) 
-0.112*** 
(0.007) 
-0.119 
(0.622) 
-0.179*** 
(0.000) 
-0.049 
(0.801) 
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Table 4C.4: Full Results of Bailout Events (Continued) 
 Slovenia (GJR) Finland (GJR) U.S. (GARCH) U.K. 
𝜃1 -0.027 
(0.564) 
-0.034 
(0.505) 
-0.145** 
(0.016) 
-0.102 
(0.227) 
𝛾11 0.022 
(0.422) 
0.063** 
(0.041) 
0.018 
(0.580) 
-0.090*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾12 0.093*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛾13 0.072*** 
(0.006) 
   
𝛾14 0.003 
(0.912) 
   
𝜑11 -0.107*** 
(0.005) 
-0.244*** 
(0.000) 
-0.338*** 
(0.000) 
-0.559*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑12 -0.090** 
(0.023) 
   
𝜑13 -0.033 
(0.397) 
   
𝜑14 -0.046 
(0.250) 
   
𝛿1 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.553 
(0.655) 
-0.214 
(0.855) 
0.043 
(0.993) 
-0.611 
(0.431) 
𝑐1 0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.387*** 
(0.000) 
0.724*** 
(0.001) 
3.985*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.046*** 
(0.000) 
0.123*** 
(0.000) 
0.122*** 
(0.000) 
0.420*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.955*** 
(0.000) 
0.829*** 
(0.000) 
0.836*** 
(0.000) 
-0.363*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 0.001 
(0.917) 
0.063** 
(0.011) 
 -0.107*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆1 
(Bailout Events) 
6.650*** 
(0.001) 
7.941** 
(0.032) 
14.671*** 
(0.000) 
-3.079*** 
(0.000) 
𝜃2 -0.019 
(0.434) 
0.009 
(0.703) 
0.063*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.820) 
𝛾21 -0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.608) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.866) 
𝛾22 -0.048*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛾23 -0.041*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛾24 -0.027*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜑11 -0.009 
(0.777) 
0.032 
(0.172) 
-0.062*** 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.538) 
𝜑22 -0.054* 
(0.040) 
   
𝜑23 -0.018 
(0.437) 
   
𝜑24 -0.003 
(0.885) 
   
𝛿2 
(Bailout Events) 
0.271 
(0.425) 
-0.913** 
(0.033) 
0.476  
(0.499) 
-0.631 
(0.715) 
𝑐2 0.210*** 
(0.000) 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
-0.109*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.919*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.972) 
0.113*** 
(0.000) 
0.141*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.462*** 
(0.000) 
0.943*** 
(0.000) 
0.869*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
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𝑑2 -0.480*** 
(0.000) 
0.095*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.129*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆2 
(Bailout Events) 
0.398 
(0.407) 
-0.001 
(0.997) 
1.237 
(0.220) 
0.412 
(0.372) 
𝛼 0.260*** 
(0.000) 
0.071*** 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.051*** 
(0.000) 
𝛽 0.430** 
(0.029) 
0.994*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
0.999*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.062 
(0.142) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑣 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.362* 
(0.062) 
-0.092** 
(0.014) 
-0.305*** 
(0.000) 
-0.099*** 
(0.006) 
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.10. 
GJR: 
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝑑1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀1𝑡−1) + 𝜆1𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                           
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝑑2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀2𝑡−1) + 𝜆2𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                            
 
GARCH: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                      
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                     
 
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4C.5: Full Results of Bailouts and Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
 Portugal (E) Spain Italy (GJR) Ireland Cyprus (E) 
𝜃1 0.044*** 
(0.000) 
-0.046*** 
(0.000) 
-0.047 
(0.552) 
-0.123*** 
(0.000) 
0.104*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾11 0.178*** 
(0.000) 
0.078*** 
(0.000) 
0.138*** 
(0.000) 
0.171*** 
(0.000) 
0.042*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑11 -0.271*** 
(0.000) 
-0.361*** 
(0.000) 
-0.341*** 
(0.000) 
-0.130*** 
(0.000) 
-0.188*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿11 
 (Rating Events) 
-0.925* 
(0.088) 
0.045 
(0.934) 
-0.377 
(0.567) 
-1.166*** 
(0.000) 
-0.364* 
(0.077) 
𝛿12 
 (Bailout Events) 
-4.849* 
(0.075) 
1.250*** 
(0.000) 
0.127 
(0.956) 
-1.708 
(0.180) 
1.853 
(0.247) 
𝑐1 0.104*** 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.818) 
0.918*** 
(0.000) 
-0.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.408*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.272*** 
(0.000) 
0.225*** 
(0.000) 
0.191*** 
(0.000) 
0.251*** 
(0.000) 
0.290*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.890*** 
(0.000) 
0.947*** 
(0.000) 
0.796*** 
(0.000) 
0.978*** 
(0.000) 
0.789*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 
 
0.015 
(0.337) 
-0.048 
(0.108) 
0.020** 
(0.023)  
𝜆11 
(Rating Events) 
-0.314*** 
(0.000) 
-0.077 
(0.386) 
-0.061 
(0.976) 
0.196*** 
(0.000) 
-0.393*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆12 
(Bailout Events) 
1.217*** 
(0.000) 
0.577** 
(0.011) 
33.850** 
(0.029) 
0.315* 
(0.071) 
0.351 
(0.301) 
𝜃2 0.032 
(0.239) 
-0.046 
(0.120) 
-0.037 
(0.251) 
0.053** 
(0.042) 
-0.053*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾21 -0.023*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019** 
(0.014) 
-0.020** 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.495) 
-0.012*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑21 0.062** 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.857) 
-0.058** 
(0.026) 
0.041** 
(0.041) 
0.101*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿21 
(Rating Events) 
0.038 
(0.749) 
0.088 
(0.588) 
0.110 
(0.691) 
0.114 
(0.305) 
0.021 
(0.702) 
𝛿22 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.800 
(0.135) 
-1.097* 
(0.074) 
-0.991* 
(0.091) 
-0.518*** 
(0.000) 
-1.130 
(0.213) 
𝑐2 -0.159*** 
(0.000) 
-0.051*** 
(0.000) 
0.081*** 
(0.000) 
-0.122*** 
(0.000) 
-0.167*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.234*** 
(0.000) 
0.090*** 
(0.000) 
-0.021** 
(0.013) 
0.168*** 
(0.000) 
0.270*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.957*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.909*** 
(0.000) 
0.984*** 
(0.000) 
0.985*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 
 
-0.134*** 
(0.000) 
0.160*** 
(0.000) 
-0.055*** 
(0.000)  
𝜆21 
(Rating Events) 
-0.033 
(0.616) 
-0.002 
(0.971) 
-0.202 
(0.438) 
0.043 
(0.491) 
0.045 
(0.334) 
𝜆22 
(Bailout Events) 
0.438** 
(0.015) 
0.382*** 
(0.005) 
1.407** 
(0.040) 
0.012 
(0.945) 
0.449*** 
(0.005) 
𝛼 0.198*** 
(0.000) 
-0.079*** 
(0.000) 
0.080*** 
(0.000) 
0.131*** 
(0.005) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.827*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
0.954*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑔 0.211*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.983) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.103 
(0.449) 
-0.355** 
(0.013) 
𝑣1 
(Rating Events) 
0.045 
(0.274) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.019** 
(0.015) 
-0.050 
(0.246) 
-0.022 
(0.726) 
𝑣2 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.458*** 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.180) 
-0.020 
(0.342) 
-0.330** 
(0.023) 
-0.137 
(0.414) 
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Table 4C.5: Full Results of Bailouts and Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
(Continued) 
 Germany France Netherlands (GARCH) Belgium Austria 
𝜃1 0.275*** 
(0.000) 
-0.084*** 
(0.000) 
-0.059 
(0.296) 
-0.140*** 
(0.000) 
-0.147*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾11 0.000 
(0.758) 
0.081*** 
(0.002) 
0.120*** 
(0.000) 
0.024*** 
(0.000) 
-0.150*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑11 -0.569*** 
(0.000) 
-0.502*** 
(0.000) 
-0.321*** 
(0.000) 
-0.432*** 
(0.000) 
-0.835*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿11 
 (Rating Events) 
2.705 
(0.573) 
0.015 
(0.994) 
0.061 
(0.966) 
0.447*** 
(0.000) 
-1.210 
(0.307) 
𝛿12 
 (Bailout Events) 
-0.674 
(0.801) 
0.603 
(0.772) 
0.588 
(0.579) 
-0.672*** 
(0.000) 
0.522 
(0.772) 
𝑐1 0.329*** 
(0.000) 
-0.023 
(0.220) 
0.236*** 
0.000) 
0.004 
(0.877) 
0.005 
(0.633) 
𝑎1 0.262*** 
(0.000) 
0.242*** 
(0.000) 
0.140*** 
0.000) 
0.301*** 
(0.000) 
0.095*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.848*** 
(0.000) 
0.955*** 
(0.000) 
0.868*** 
(0.000) 
0.932*** 
(0.000) 
0.980*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 0.051*** 
(0.009) 
0.020 
(0.169)  
-0.026* 
(0.081) 
-0.007 
(0.546) 
𝜆11 
(Rating Events) 
-0.131 
(0.895) 
0.056 
(0.809) 
0.568 
(0.867) 
-0.208 
(0.213) 
0.477*** 
(0.006) 
𝜆12 
(Bailout Events) 
0.565* 
(0.063) 
0.327 
(0.102) 
-0.749 
(0.771) 
0.488** 
(0.030) 
0.369*** 
(0.004) 
𝜃2 0.012** 
(0.029) 
-0.023 
(0.361) 
0.053** 
(0.029) 
-0.009 
(0.669) 
0.003 
(0.910) 
𝛾21 -0.002 
(0.730) 
-0.004 
(0.444) 
-0.005 
(0.582) 
-0.008 
(0.100) 
0.005 
(0.413) 
𝜑21 0.001 
(0.957) 
-0.036* 
(0.096) 
0.010 
(0.673) 
0.020 
(0.375) 
0.124*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿21 
(Rating Events) 
1.760* 
(0.057) 
0.171 
(0.706) 
0.144 
(0.722) 
0.091 
(0.669) 
-0.369 
(0.318) 
𝛿22 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.778*** 
(0.000) 
-0.839* 
(0.050) 
-0.441 
(0.306) 
-0.496 
(0.232) 
-0.421 
(0.360) 
𝑐2 -0.075*** 
(0.000) 
-0.057*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.001) 
-0.086*** 
(0.000) 
-0.084*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.114*** 
(0.000) 
0.095*** 
(0.000) 
0.092*** 
(0.000) 
0.121*** 
(0.000) 
0.112*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.976*** 
(0.000) 
0.972*** 
(0.000) 
0.897*** 
(0.000) 
0.974*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 -0.127*** 
(0.000) 
-0.164*** 
(0.000)  
-0.135*** 
(0.000) 
-0.086*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆21 
(Rating Events) 
-0.142 
(0.707) 
-0.090 
(0.505) 
-0.219 
 (0.445) 
0.038 
(0.720) 
-0.238 
(0.260) 
𝜆22 
(Bailout Events) 
0.147 
(0.250) 
0.148 
(0.262) 
0.585* 
(0.057) 
0.200 
(0.152) 
0.347** 
(0.014) 
𝛼 0.026 
(0.416) 
0.124*** 
(0.000) 
-0.154** 
(0.025) 
0.160*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.998*** 
(0.000) 
0.988*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.964*** 
(0.000) 
-0.997*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.462*** 
(0.000) 
0.107 
(0.153) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑣1 
(Rating Events) 
-0.104 
(0.335) 
-0.007 
(0.905) 
0.654*** 
(0.000) 
0.068 
(0.303) 
0.223*** 
(0.000) 
𝑣2 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.090*** 
(0.000) 
-0.109** 
(0.014) 
-0.084 
(0.703) 
-0.252*** 
(0.000) 
-0.070*** 
(0.000) 
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Table 4C.5: Full Results of Bailouts and Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
(Continued) 
 Slovenia Finland (E) U.S. U.K. (E) 
𝜃1 0.091*** 
(0.000) 
-0.102*** 
(0.000) 
-0.148*** 
(0.000) 
-0.067*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾11 0.042*** 
(0.006) 
0.030 
(0.273) 
-0.038 
(0.283) 
-0.153*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾12 0.105*** 
(0.000) 
 
  
𝛾13 0.081*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛾14 0.032*** 
(0.006) 
   
𝜑11 -0.212*** 
(0.000) 
-0.281*** 
(0.000) 
-0.495*** 
(0.000) 
-0.657*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑12 -0.228*** 
(0.000) 
 
  
𝜑13 -0.144*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜑14 -0.116*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛿11 
 (Rating Events) 
0.162 
(0.530) 
0.218 
(0.684) 
-0.971 
(0.574) 
-0.070 
(0.848) 
𝛿12 
 (Bailout Events) 
-0.967 
(0.146) 
-0.278 
()0.788 
-4.298 
(0.560) 
-1.705*** 
(0.000) 
𝑐1 -0.060*** 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.122) 
0.060*** 
(0.000) 
0.882*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.147*** 
(0.000) 
0.325*** 
(0.000) 
0.265*** 
(0.000) 
0.301*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.925*** 
(0.000) 
0.916*** 
(0.000) 
0.661*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 0.018* 
(0.051) 
 
0.095*** 
(0.000) 
 
𝜆11 
(Rating Events) 
0.086** 
(0.043) 
0.894** 
(0.017) 
0.310 
(0.427) 
3.765*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆12 
(Bailout Events) 
0.219** 
(0.018) 
0.468** 
(0.040) 
3.065*** 
(0.000) 
0.425 
(0.662) 
𝜃2 0.012 
(0.516) 
0.038 
(0.117) 
0.019 
(0.293) 
0.051*** 
(0.009) 
𝛾21 -0.069*** 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.321) 
-0.013*** 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.646) 
𝛾22 -0.041*** 
(0.000) 
 
  
𝛾23 -0.041*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛾24 -0.025*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜑11 0.008 
(0.758) 
0.033 
(0.154) 
-0.048** 
(0.026) 
-0.018 
(0.445) 
𝜑22 -0.039* 
(0.099) 
 
  
𝜑23 -0.004 
(0.853) 
   
𝜑24 -0.003 
(0.882) 
   
𝛿21 
(Rating Events) 
-0.072 
(0.456) 
0.298 
(0.483) 
0.423 
(0.188) 
-0.566 
(0.132) 
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𝛿22 
(Bailout Events) 
0.127 
(0.671) 
-0.956** 
(0.027) 
0.593 
(0.422) 
-1.344 
(0.455) 
𝑐2 -0.416*** 
(0.000) 
-0.095*** 
(0.000) 
-0.086*** 
(0.000) 
-0.168*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.695*** 
(0.000) 
0.132*** 
(0.000) 
0.109*** 
(0.000) 
0.222*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.869*** 
(0.000) 
0.989*** 
(0.000) 
0.976*** 
(0.000) 
0.974*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 0.185*** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.150*** 
(0.000) 
 
𝜆21 
(Rating Events) 
0.109 
(0.486) 
0.059 
(0.817) 
-0.754*** 
(0.001) 
0.117 
(0.816) 
𝜆22 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.037 
(0.897) 
0.241* 
(0.052) 
0.674*** 
(0.001) 
0.879* 
(0.077) 
𝛼 0.134*** 
(0.001) 
-0.039  
(0.243) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.255*** 
(0.000) 
𝛽 0.974*** 
(0.000) 
0.997*** 
(0.000) 
0.994*** 
(0.000) 
0.801*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.044***  
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑣1 
(Rating Events) 
-0.023 
(0.578) 
0.120** 
(0.020) 
0.032 
(0.725) 
0.190 
(0.742) 
𝑣2 
(Bailout Events) 
-0.257*** 
(0.000) 
-0.108*** 
(0.000) 
-0.371*** 
(0.000) 
-0.809*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.11. 
GARCH:  
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆12𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                      
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆22𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                                                                                           
GJR: 
ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏1ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝑑1𝜀1𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀1𝑡−1) + 𝜆11𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆12𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                  
ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝑑2𝜀2𝑡−1
2 𝐼𝜀<0(𝜀2𝑡−1) + 𝜆21𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆22𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡               
EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆12𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                               
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆22𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                         
The p-values of the coefficients are in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4C.6: Full Results of Spillover Effect of Greek Sovereign Rating Events  
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland (ET) Cyprus 
𝜃1 0.056 
(0.247) 
-0.048** 
(0.045) 
-0.084*** 
(0.000) 
-0.051** 
(0.011) 
0.092*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾11 0.176*** 
(0.000) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
0.136*** 
(0.000) 
0.107*** 
(0.000) 
0.072*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑11 -0.277*** 
(0.000) 
-0.360*** 
(0.000) 
-0.351*** 
(0.000) 
-0.067*** 
(0.000) 
-0.198*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.854* 
(0.071) 
0.095*** 
(0.003) 
-0.421 
(0.497) 
-0.703*** 
(0.000) 
-0.503* 
(0.057) 
𝛿12 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.262*** 
(0.000) 
-0.123 
(0.592) 
-0.083 
(0.734) 
-0.260*** 
(0.001) 
-0.050*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿13 (Bailout 
Events) 
-4.332*** 
(0.000) 
0.466 
(0.846) 
1.981*** 
(0.000) 
-1.360 
(0.162) 
1.441*** 
(0.000) 
𝑐1 0.097*** 
(0.004) 
0.021 
(0.527) 
-0.009 
(0.719) 
0.031 
(0.662) 
0.480** 
(0.012) 
𝑎1 0.248*** 
(0.000) 
0.226*** 
(0.000) 
0.273*** 
(0.000) 
13.025*** 
(0.000) 
0.330*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.898*** 
(0.000) 
0.936*** 
(0.000) 
0.932*** 
(0.000) 
0.968*** 
(0.000) 
0.750*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 0.045** 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.531) 
0.033** 
(0.047) 
 
-0.075** 
(0.023) 
𝜆11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.306*** 
(0.000) 
-0.059 
(0.504) 
0.019 
(0.863) 
0.151 
(0.262) 
-0.311*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆12 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.024 
(0.700) 
-0.221*** 
(0.000) 
-0.184*** 
(0.001) 
-0.236*** 
(0.001) 
-0.327** 
(0.016) 
𝜆13 (Bailout 
Events) 
1.080*** 
(0.000) 
0.533** 
(0.038) 
0.818*** 
(0.001) 
0.686** 
(0.030) 
0.373 
(0.302) 
Shape     2.000*** 
(0.000) 
 
𝜃2 -0.035* 
(0.089) 
-0.044 
(0.134) 
-0.036 
(0.260) 
0.086*** 
(0.001) 
-0.053*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾21 -0.022*** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.007) 
-0.016* 
(0.089) 
0.007 
(0.388) 
-0.012*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑21 0.088*** 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.755) 
-0.049* 
(0.059) 
0.032 
(0.163) 
0.100*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.024 
(0.802) 
0.068 
(0.642) 
0.307 
(0.299) 
0.064 
(0.524) 
0.020 
(0.743) 
𝛿22 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
0.088 
(0.301) 
0.213** 
(0.017) 
0.200** 
(0.029) 
0.078 
(0.234) 
0.032 
(0.794) 
𝛿23 (Bailout 
Events) 
-1.057* 
(0.059) 
-1.112* 
(0.072) 
-1.287* 
(0.055) 
-0.555 
(0.110) 
-1.093 
(0.238) 
𝑐2 -0.090*** 
(0.000) 
-0.053*** 
(0.000) 
-0.052*** 
(0.000) 
-0.117*** 
(0.000) 
-0.168*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.150*** 
(0.000) 
0.093*** 
(0.000) 
0.103*** 
(0.000) 
0.159*** 
(0.000) 
0.271*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.943*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.968*** 
(0.000) 
0.988*** 
(0.000) 
0.985*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 -0.137*** 
(0.000) 
-0.135*** 
(0.000) 
-0.119*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.002 
(0.883) 
𝜆21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.013 
(0.841) 
-0.001 
(0.982) 
-0.100 
(0.147) 
0.098 
(0.129) 
0.044 
(0.417) 
𝜆22 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
-0.056 
(0.267) 
-0.023 
(0.435) 
0.003 
(0.924) 
-0.070* 
(0.079) 
0.024 
(0.608) 
𝜆23 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.346* 
(0.093) 
0.367*** 
(0.008) 
0.378** 
(0.013) 
0.055 
(0.758) 
0.471** 
(0.014) 
Shape     8.689*** 
(0.000) 
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𝛼 0.158*** 
(0.000) 
0.071*** 
(0.000) 
0.079*** 
(0.000) 
0.183 
(0.108) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.849*** 
(0.000) 
0.998*** 
(0.000) 
0.997*** 
(0.000) 
0.837*** 
(0.000) 
-0.804*** 
(0.003) 
𝑔 -0.211*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.352*** 
(0.007) 
-0.164 
(0.624) 
𝑣1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.065** 
(0.031) 
0.002 
(0.784) 
0.011 
(0.257) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.082 
(0.173) 
𝑣2 (Greek Rating 
Events) 
0.045* 
(0.063) 
0.007 
(0.121) 
0.007 
(0.277) 
0.001 
(0.544) 
0.022 
(0.686) 
𝑣3 (Bailout Events) -0.403*** 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.872) 
-0.002 
(0.957) 
-0.001 
(0.932) 
-0.093 
(0.598) 
Table 4C.6: Full Results of Spillover Effect of Greek Sovereign Rating Events 
(Continued) 
 Germany (E) France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝜃1 0.185*** 
(0.000) 
-0.085*** 
(0.000) 
0.087*** 
(0.002) 
-0.127*** 
(0.000) 
-0.126*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾11 0.001 
(0.972) 
0.079*** 
(0.000) 
0.144*** 
(0.000) 
0.033*** 
(0.001) 
-0.141*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑11 -0.597*** 
(0.000) 
-0.504*** 
(0.000) 
-0.333*** 
(0.000) 
-0.420*** 
(0.000) 
-0.735*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
2.399 
(0.559) 
-0.049 
(0.980) 
-0.229 
(0.796) 
0.459*** 
(0.000) 
-1.150 
(0.362) 
𝛿12 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.184 
(0.497) 
-0.209 
(0.329) 
-0.002 
(0.905) 
-0.058 
(0.816) 
-0.044 
(0.841) 
𝛿13 (Bailout 
Events) 
2.203 
(0.349) 
0.607 
(0.750) 
0.425 
(0.735) 
-0.692*** 
(0.000) 
0.884 
(0.649) 
𝑐1 0.307*** 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.181) 
-0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.024 
(0.379) 
0.004 
(0.620) 
𝑎1 0.270*** 
(0.000) 
0.241*** 
(0.000) 
0.257*** 
(0.000) 
0.299*** 
(0.000) 
0.083*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.852*** 
(0.000) 
0.956*** 
(0.000) 
0.963*** 
(0.000) 
0.924*** 
(0.000) 
0.982*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑1 
 
0.020* 
(0.090) 
0.081*** 
(0.000) 
-0.029* 
(0.071) 
-0.002 
(0.805) 
𝜆11 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
-0.192 
(0.854) 
0.055 
(0.804) 
0.271 
(0.432) 
-0.179 
(0.421) 
0.491*** 
(0.001) 
𝜆12 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.233*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022 
(0.653) 
-0.034 
(0.454) 
-0.205*** 
(0.000) 
-0.126*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆13 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.463* 
(0.098) 
0.297 
(0.113) 
-0.022 
(0.898) 
0.458** 
(0.029) 
0.195* 
(0.072) 
𝜃2 0.073*** 
(0.004) 
-0.021 
(0.369) 
-0.002 
(0.920) 
-0.007 
(0.717) 
0.005 
(0.836) 
𝛾21 -0.002 
(0.740) 
-0.004 
(0.499) 
-0.002 
(0.815) 
-0.009* 
(0.082) 
0.005 
(0.413) 
𝜑21 -0.012 
(0.639) 
-0.036 
(0.124) 
0.024 
(0.317) 
0.018 
(0.430) 
0.123*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
1.852 
(0.136) 
0.192 
(0.685) 
0.116 
(0.723) 
0.091 
(0.664) 
-0.369 
(0.289) 
𝛿22 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
0.129* 
(0.057) 
0.141** 
(0.048) 
0.105* 
(0.089) 
0.116* 
(0.061) 
0.075 
(0.254) 
𝛿23 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.676 
(0.137) 
-0.842* 
(0.074) 
-0.621* 
(0.098) 
-0.499 
(0.193) 
-0.424 
(0.316) 
𝑐2 -0.124*** 
(0.000) 
-0.057*** 
(0.000) 
-0.077*** 
(0.000) 
-0.086*** 
(0.000) 
-0.084*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.176*** 0.094*** 0.106*** 0.120*** 0.111*** 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑏2 0.983*** 
(0.000) 
0.973*** 
(0.000) 
0.984*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 
 
-0.163*** 
(0.000) 
-0.142*** 
(0.000) 
-0.134*** 
(0.000) 
-0.086*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆21 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.012 
(0.980) 
-0.102 
(0.409) 
-0.307 
(0.180) 
0.044 
(0.688) 
-0.235 
(0.227) 
𝜆22 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.012 
(0.748) 
-0.021 
(0.543) 
-0.011 
(0.723) 
-0.029 
(0.408) 
-0.014 
(0.687) 
𝜆23 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.250* 
(0.099) 
0.149 
(0.253) 
0.113 
(0.382) 
0.192 
(0.164) 
0.340** 
(0.023) 
𝛼 -0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(0.952) 
0.127 
(0.133) 
0.148*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.999*** 
(0.000) 
0.999*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.966*** 
(0.000) 
-0.997*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.312** 
(0.036) 
0.118* 
(0.066) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑣1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.185 
(0.155) 
-0.029** 
(0.040) 
0.742*** 
(0.000) 
0.070 
(0.273) 
0.222*** 
(0.000) 
𝑣2 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.016 
(0.784) 
0.024** 
(0.048) 
-0.001 
(0.884) 
𝑣3 (Bailout 
Events) 
0.027 
(0.433) 
0.016 
(0.401) 
-0.101 
(0.648) 
-0.226*** 
(0.002) 
-0.074** 
(0.043) 
Table 4C.6: Full Results of Spillover Effect of Greek Sovereign Rating Events 
(Continued) 
 Slovenia (E) U.S. U.K. 
𝜃1 0.048*** 
(0.000) 
-0.079*** 
(0.000) 
-0.084*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾11 0.056*** 
(0.000) 
0.025*** 
(0.000) 
-0.150*** 
(0.000) 
𝛾12 0.103*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝛾13 0.079*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝛾14 -0.031*** 
(0.001) 
  
𝜑11 -0.230*** 
(0.000) 
-0.498*** 
(0.000) 
-0.658*** 
(0.000) 
𝜑12 -0.243*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝜑13 -0.164*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝜑14 -0.108*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝛿11 (Domestic Rating Events) 0.179 
(0.361) 
-0.894 
(0.695) 
-0.129 
(0.756) 
𝛿12 (Greek Rating Events) -0.235** 
(0.019) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
-0.355*** 
(0.000) 
𝛿13 (Bailout Events) -0.903*** 
(0.000) 
1.345 
(0.790) 
-1.697*** 
(0.000) 
𝑐1 -0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.870*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎1 0.147*** 
(0.000) 
0.260*** 
(0.000) 
0.303*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏1 0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.916*** 
(0.000) 
0.664*** 
(0.000) 
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𝑑1 
 
0.099*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.493) 
𝜆11 (Domestic Rating Events) 0.067 
(0.124) 
0.314 
(0.434) 
3.920*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆12 (Greek Rating Events) -0.069*** 
(0.004) 
0.056 
(0.339) 
0.011 
(0.902) 
𝜆13 (Bailout Events) 0.158 
(0.145) 
3.061*** 
(0.000) 
0.460 
(0.526) 
𝜃2 -0.085*** 
(0.000) 
0.023 
(0.193) 
-0.011 
(0.583) 
𝛾21 -0.072*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013** 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.808) 
𝛾22 -0.048*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝛾23 -0.056*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝛾24 -0.027*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝜑21 0.023 
(0.231) 
-0.050** 
(0.031) 
-0.013 
(0.594) 
𝜑22 -0.063*** 
(0.000) 
  
𝜑23 -0.030 
(0.243) 
  
𝜑24 -0.009 
(0.698) 
  
𝛿21 (Domestic Rating Events) -0.055 
(0.605) 
0.419 
(0.165) 
-0.592* 
(0.077) 
𝛿22 (Greek Rating Events) 0.021 
(0.659) 
0.166*** 
(0.002) 
0.075 
(0.158) 
𝛿23 (Bailout Events) 0.083** 
(0.045) 
0.593 
(0.437) 
-0.626 
(0.713) 
𝑐2 -0.421*** 
(0.000) 
-0.087*** 
(0.000) 
-0.105*** 
(0.000) 
𝑎2 0.703*** 
(0.000) 
0.108*** 
(0.000) 
0.139*** 
(0.000) 
𝑏2 0.862*** 
(0.000) 
0.976*** 
(0.000) 
0.977*** 
(0.000) 
𝑑2 
 
-0.147*** 
(0.000) 
-0.131*** 
(0.000) 
𝜆21 (Domestic Rating Events) 0.052 
(0.720) 
-0.766*** 
(0.001) 
-0.014 
(0.969) 
𝜆22 (Greek Rating Events) 0.156** 
(0.039) 
-0.051 
(0.105) 
0.027 
(0.453) 
𝜆23 (Bailout Events) 0.005 
(0.987) 
0.680*** 
(0.001) 
0.386 
(0.386) 
𝛼 0.248*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(0.999) 
𝛽 0.506** 
(0.012) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.999*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(0.999) 
𝑣1 (Domestic Rating Events) 0.010 
(0.945) 
0.206*** 
(0.000) 
0.010 
(0.838) 
𝑣2 (Greek Rating Events) -0.071 
(0.179) 
0.040*** 
(0.000) 
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
𝑣3 (Bailout Events) -0.276 
(0.189) 
-0.373*** 
(0.000) 
-0.104*** 
(0.001) 
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.12. 
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EGARCH without asymmetry (E): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝑎1
|𝜀1𝑡−1|
√ℎ1𝑡−1
+ 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1𝑡−1 + 𝜆11𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆12𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆13𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                              
𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝑎2
|𝜀2𝑡−1|
√ℎ2𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2𝑡−1 + 𝜆21𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 +
𝜆22𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜆23𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡                         
ET denotes Student’s t EGARCH without asymmetry. The p-values of the coefficients are in the 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 4C.7: Full Linear Regression Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝛼 0.179*** 
(0.001) 
0.087*** 
(0.000) 
0.113*** 
(0.000) 
0.152*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.851*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.959*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑔 -0.181 
(0.247) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.385*** 
(0.007) 
𝜉0 -0.419*** 
(0.000) 
-0.513*** 
(0.000) 
-0.564*** 
(0.000) 
-0.270*** 
(0.000) 
-0.077*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1  
(Rating Events) 
0.004 
(0.473) 
0.038*** 
(0.000) 
0.065*** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.960) 
0.005 
(0.308) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝛼 0.101*** 
(0.001) 
0.136*** 
(0.000) 
-0.103*** 
(0.000) 
0.171*** 
(0.000) 
0.172** 
(0.037) 
𝛽 0.991*** 
(0.000) 
0.987*** 
(0.000) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.975*** 
(0.000) 
-0.419 
(0.352) 
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.107*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.225** 
(0.044) 
𝜉0 -0.205*** 
(0.000) 
-0.260*** 
(0.000) 
-0.280*** 
(0.000) 
-0.323*** 
(0.000) 
-0.218*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1  
(Rating Events) 
0.046 
(0.702) 
0.149** 
(0.012) 
0.157*** 
(0.009) 
0.084*** 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.432) 
 Slovenia Finland U.S. U.K.  
𝛼 0.192*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.240*** 
(0.000) 
0.074*** 
(0.000) 
 
𝛽 0.949*** 
(0.000) 
0.353 
(0.419) 
0.952*** 
(0.000) 
0.998*** 
(0.000) 
 
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.276** 
(0.045) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
 
𝜉0 -0.100*** 
(0.000) 
-0.233*** 
(0.000) 
-0.118*** 
(0.000) 
-0.208*** 
(0.000) 
 
𝜙1  
(Rating Events) 
-0.013 
(0.408) 
0.005 
(0.187) 
0.041 
(0.132) 
0.143*** 
(0.000) 
 
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.13. The p-values of the coefficients are in 
the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4C.8: Full Linear Regression Results of Domestic Negative and Positive 
Sovereign Rating Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝛼 0.176*** 
(0.000) 
0.088*** 
(0.000) 
0.112*** 
(0.000) 
0.1462*** 
(0.000) 
0.144 
(0.110) 
𝛽 0.857*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.9548*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑔 -0.175 
(0.219) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.0000 
(1.000) 
-0.305** 
(0.047) 
𝜉0 -0.418*** 
(0.000) 
-0.514*** 
(0.000) 
-0.561*** 
(0.000) 
-0.274*** 
(0.000) 
-0.067*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
-0.008 
(0.647) 
-0.007 
(0.833) 
-0.053 
(0.608) 
0.019 
(0.160) 
0.012 
(0.406) 
𝜙2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.005 
(0.322) 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.073*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.572) 
0.001 
(0.338) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Finland 
𝛼 0.101*** 
(0.002) 
0.139*** 
(0.000) 
-0.102*** 
(0.000) 
0.171*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.991*** 
(0.000) 
0.986*** 
(0.000) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.976*** 
(0.000) 
0.379 
(0.218) 
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.105*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.338*** 
(0.007) 
𝜉0 -0.205*** 
(0.000) 
-0.259*** 
(0.000) 
-0.277*** 
(0.000) 
-0.324*** 
(0.000) 
-0.233*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
-0.450*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.109*** 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.814) 
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.145 
(0.211) 
0.142** 
(0.013) 
0.211* 
(0.077) 
0.103*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.000) 
 U.S. U.K.    
𝛼 0.237*** 
(0.000) 
0.074*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛽 0.954*** 
(0.000) 
0.998*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
   
𝜉0 -0.119*** 
(0.000) 
-0.206*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜙1 (Positive Rating 
Events) 
0.040 
(0.548) 
0.181*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜙2 (Negative 
Rating Events) 
0.049*** 
(0.000) 
0.124*** 
(0.000) 
   
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.14. The p-values of the coefficients are in 
the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4C.9: Full Linear Regression Results of Domestic Sovereign Rating Surprises 
 Austria Cyprus France Ireland Italy Spain 
𝛼 0.166* 
(0.059) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.136*** 
(0.000) 
0.153*** 
(0.000) 
0.114*** 
(0.000) 
0.086*** 
(0.000) 
𝛽 0.403 
(0.411) 
-0.248 
(0.856) 
0.987*** 
(0.000) 
0.958*** 
(0.000) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
𝑔 -0.218* 
(0.058) 
-0.273* 
(0.069) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝜉0 -0.215*** 
(0.000) 
-0.073*** 
(0.000) 
-0.260*** 
(0.000) 
-0.269*** 
(0.000) 
-0.573*** 
(0.000) 
-0.516*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1 (Rating 
Surprises) 
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.338) 
0.289*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.089*** 
(0.000) 
0.029 
(0.294) 
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.15. The p-values of the coefficients are in 
the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 4C.10: Full Linear Regression Results of Bailouts 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝛼 0.175*** 
(0.000) 
0.088*** 
(0.000) 
0.112*** 
(0.000) 
0.155*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.922*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.955*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑔 -0.072 
(0.583) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.397*** 
(0.009) 
𝜉0 -0.422*** 
(0.000) 
-0.510*** 
(0.000) 
-0.559*** 
(0.000) 
-0.271*** 
(0.000) 
-0.075*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1  
(Bailout Events) 
-0.082** 
(0.010) 
-0.041 
(0.236) 
-0.036 
(0.528) 
-0.023 
(0.360) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝛼 0.098*** 
(0.002) 
0.135*** 
(0.000) 
0.102*** 
(0.000) 
0.161*** 
(0.000) 
0.167** 
(0.013) 
𝛽 0.991*** 
(0.000) 
0.987*** 
(0.000) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.977*** 
(0.000) 
0.446 
(0.277) 
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.109*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.188* 
(0.088) 
𝜉0 -0.202*** 
(0.000) 
-0.259*** 
(0.000) 
-0.278*** 
(0.000) 
-0.324*** 
(0.000) 
-0.229*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1  
(Bailout Events) 
-0.035** 
(0.032) 
-0.050*** 
(0.004) 
-0.066 
(0.161) 
-0.122*** 
(0.001) 
0.021* 
(0.053) 
 Slovenia Finland U.S. U.K.  
𝛼 0.249*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.239*** 
(0.000) 
0.070*** 
(0.000)  
𝛽 0.514** 
(0.013) 
0.415 
(0.257) 
0.967*** 
(0.000) 
0.998*** 
(0.000)  
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.338*** 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000)  
𝜉0 -0.103*** 
(0.000) 
-0.227*** 
(0.000) 
-0.133*** 
(0.000) 
-0.213*** 
(0.000)  
𝜙1  
(Bailout Events) 
-0.018 
(0.425) 
0.005 
(0.511) 
-0.039 
(0.226) 
0.039*** 
(0.000)  
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.16. The p-values of the coefficients are in 
the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4C.11: Full Linear Regression Results of Bailouts and Domestic Sovereign 
Rating Events 
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝛼 0.177*** 
(0.002) 
0.089*** 
(0.000) 
0.116*** 
(0.000) 
0.150*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.902*** 
(0.000) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.960*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑔 0.072 
(0.750) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.361** 
(0.011) 
𝜉0 -0.421*** 
(0.000) 
-0.510*** 
(0.000) 
-0.566*** 
(0.000) 
-0.268*** 
(0.000) 
-0.075*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1  
 (Rating Events) 
0.006 
(0.379) 
0.038*** 
(0.000) 
0.070*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.929) 
0.004 
(0.288) 
𝜙2  
(Bailout Events) 
-0.061** 
(0.011) 
-0.044 
(0.205) 
-0.040 
(0.507) 
-0.019 
(0.405) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝛼 0.096*** 
(0.007) 
0.135*** 
(0.000) 
-0.090*** 
(0.000) 
0.167*** 
(0.000) 
0.155* 
(0.060) 
𝛽 0.992*** 
(0.000) 
0.987*** 
(0.000) 
-0.995*** 
(0.000) 
0.977*** 
(0.000) 
-0.452 
(0.251) 
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.233** 
(0.018) 
𝜉0 -0.203*** 
(0.000) 
-0.258*** 
(0.000) 
-0.270*** 
(0.000) 
-0.319*** 
(0.000) 
-0.216*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1  
 (Rating Events) 
0.045 
(0.706) 
0.150** 
(0.011) 
0.112*** 
(0.007) 
0.087*** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.435) 
𝜙2  
(Bailout Events) 
-0.035** 
(0.024) 
-0.051*** 
(0.003) 
-0.062* 
(0.056) 
-0.118*** 
(0.002) 
0.026** 
(0.038) 
 Slovenia Finland U.S. U.K.  
𝛼 0.189*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.231*** 
(0.000) 
0.239*** 
(0.000)  
𝛽 0.946*** 
(0.000) 
-0.402 
(0.182) 
0.962*** 
(0.000) 
0.822*** 
(0.000)  
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.340*** 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000)  
𝜉0 -0.101*** 
(0.000) 
-0.233*** 
(0.000) 
-0.125*** 
(0.000) 
-0.160*** 
(0.000)  
𝜙1  
 (Rating Events) 
-0.013 
(0.355) 
0.006 
(0.352) 
0.046 
(0.127) 
-0.008 
(0.376)  
𝜙2  
(Bailout Events) 
-0.008 
(0.634) 
0.005 
(0.496) 
-0.043* 
(0.079) 
-0.076*** 
(0.000)  
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.17. The p-values of the coefficients are in 
the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4C.12: Full Linear Regression Results of Spillover Effect of Greek Sovereign 
Rating Events  
 Portugal Spain Italy Ireland Cyprus 
𝛼 0.196*** 
(0.000) 
0.088*** 
(0.000) 
0.110*** 
(0.000) 
0.276*** 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝛽 0.643** 
(0.043) 
0.996*** 
(0.000) 
0.994*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
𝑔 0.290** 
(0.023) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.407*** 
(0.004) 
𝜉0 -0.421*** 
(0.000) 
-0.510*** 
(0.000) 
-0.560*** 
(0.000) 
-0.247*** 
(0.000) 
-0.076*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.001 
(0.795) 
0.037*** 
(0.000) 
0.065*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.451) 
0.005 
(0.297) 
𝜙2 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
0.000 
(0.867) 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.033*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.611) 
-0.005 
(0.185) 
𝜙3 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.021* 
(0.061) 
-0.037 
(0.300) 
-0.028 
(0.622) 
-0.007 
(0.848) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
 Germany France Netherlands Belgium Austria 
𝛼 0.097*** 
(0.002) 
0.134*** 
(0.000) 
0.101*** 
(0.000) 
0.164*** 
(0.000) 
0.110 
(0.263) 
𝛽 0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.987*** 
(0.000) 
0.993*** 
(0.000) 
0.978*** 
(0.000) 
-0.557 
(0.160) 
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.108*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.221** 
(0.017) 
𝜉0 -0.199*** 
(0.000) 
-0.258*** 
(0.000) 
-0.280*** 
(0.000) 
-0.317*** 
(0.000) 
-0.220*** 
(0.000) 
𝜙1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.030 
(0.798) 
0.150** 
(0.011) 
0.158*** 
(0.007) 
0.086*** 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.425) 
𝜙2 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.001 
(0.942) 
-0.002 
(0.818) 
-0.019** 
(0.039) 
0.004 
(0.689) 
-0.002 
(0.371) 
𝜙3 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.028* 
(0.066) 
-0.051*** 
(0.003) 
-0.066 
(0.168) 
-0.102*** 
(0.005) 
0.017** 
(0.036) 
 U.S. U.K.    
𝛼 0.219*** 
(0.000) 
0.223*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝛽 0.963*** 
(0.000) 
0.843*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝑔 0.000 
(1.000) 
-0.000 
(1.000) 
   
𝜉0 -0.125*** 
(0.000) 
-0.158*** 
(0.000) 
   
𝜙1 (Domestic 
Rating Events) 
0.025 
(0.299) 
-0.016** 
(0.018) 
   
𝜙2 (Greek 
Rating Events) 
-0.004 
(0.503) 
0.007* 
(0.064) 
   
𝜙3 (Bailout 
Events) 
-0.037* 
(0.090) 
-0.062*** 
(0.000) 
   
Notes: This table reports the full estimation results of Table 4.18. The p-values of the coefficients are in 
the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 4D: Sy’s (2004) CCR Coding Method 
Table 4D.1: Comprehensive Credit Rating Definition of Sy (2004) 
Explicit Credit Rating (ECR) Credit Outlook/Watchlist 
S&P Moody’s Fitch Numerical code Information Add to ECR 
AAA Aaa AAA 58 Positive 1 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 55 CW-Pos 2 
AA Aa2 AA 52 Stable/CW-Dev 0 
AA- Aa3 AA- 49 CW-Neg -2 
A+ A1 A+ 46 Negative -1 
A A2 A 43   
A- A3 A- 40   
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 37   
BBB Baa2 BBB 34   
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 31   
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 28   
BB Ba2 BB 25   
BB- Ba3 BB- 22   
B+ B1 B+ 19   
B B2 B 16   
B- B3 B- 13   
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 10   
CCC Caa2 CCC 7   
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 4   
CC/C Ca/C CC/C 1   
SD/D  RD/D 0   
Notes: This table shows Sy’s (2004) CCR coding method. CW-Pos denotes Credit Watch-Positive, CW-
Dev denotes Credit Watch-Developing, and CW-Neg denotes Credit Watch-Negative. 
Table 4D.2: Sovereign Credit Rating Events of Sy’s (2004) Method 
Country  No. of rating events No. of Negative rating 
events 
No. of Positive rating 
events 
Austria  6 5 1 
Belgium 13 9 4 
Cyprus 44 31 13 
Finland 7 5 2 
France 10 10 0 
Germany 4 4 0 
Greece 56 42 14 
Ireland 37 22 15 
Italy 16 14 2 
Portugal 33 24 9 
Spain  31 23 8 
Slovenia 24 19 5 
Netherlands 8 4 4 
US 5 3 2 
UK 4 3 1 
Total 298 218 80 
Notes: This table reports the total number of sovereign credit rating events and the numbers of positive 
and negative rating events in each examined country by using Sy’s (2004) CCR coding method. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of the Findings and the Implications 
This thesis investigates three issues related to the informational role of CDS from the 
perspectives of discovering credit risk news and directly indicating market expectation 
of the credit risk of the underlying reference entity. Chapter 2 investigates credit risk 
discovery between CDS and stock of the U.S. non-financial firms. Chapter 3 studies 
credit risk connectedness across multinational systemically important financial firms. 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of sovereign default risk events on sovereign CDS and 
equity index in major developed economies. In this section, the major findings of each 
empirical study are summarised and the implications of the findings are discussed.  
Chapter 2 uses Lien and Shrestha’s (2014) generalised information share (GIS) because 
CDS spread and the implied credit spread from stock price may not satisfy the one-to-
one cointegration relation assumed by Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share (IS) and 
Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component share (GG). By comparing the results of GIS 
and that of IS and GG, this chapter contributes to the current understanding of GIS, e.g., 
Shrestha (2014), by showing that at least in the case of two assets, GIS may not alter 
empirical results substantially even though it is theoretically stronger than IS and GG. 
Second, this chapter documents that the stock market generally leads the CDS market 
in incorporating credit risk news, which is in line with several previous literature, e.g., 
Forte and Peña (2009). However, similar to Xiang et al. (2013), over the crisis period 
of 2008–2010, the CDS market is found to dominate the stock market. This chapter also 
finds that in the U.S., eliminating transitory components from CDS quotes and stock 
prices has a relatively greater impact on the informational efficiency of CDS and stock 
markets in the earlier sample period. This complements the study of Forte and Lovreta 
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(2015) who discuss the similar issue in the European markets. Moreover, this chapter 
extends the existing understanding of the determinants of credit risk discovery process 
of CDS and stock markets. The more stressful the economy condition is, the more credit 
risk discovery the CDS market contributes. An increased funding cost is accompanied 
with a decline of the credit risk discovery contribution of CDS. The central clearing 
counterparty (CCP) in the CDS market cannot strengthen this market’s informational 
efficiency and transparency.  
Overall, the findings of Chapter 2 bear some important implications for the researchers, 
investors, and policymakers. For example, the more robust price discovery contribution 
techniques may not necessarily provide qualitatively different conclusions in credit risk 
discovery research. The CDS market provides price discovery over the crisis times. The 
negative impact of funding cost on credit risk discovery of CDS implies that similar to 
financing cost, any factor which influences investors’ trading decisions may also affect 
the informational efficiency of CDS, which may inspire further research. Also, the CDS 
market seems to have a higher proportion of insiders; thus, introducing central clearing 
service may not practically improve market efficiency and transparency. Policymakers 
may need to ameliorate the CCP policy and rethink about how to effectively introduce 
CCP in the other OTC markets which are similar to the CDS market.  
Chapter 3 uses Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2015a) connectedness measures based on VECM 
model to study the transmission of credit risk across a special group of financial firms, 
the designated G-SIFIs, from 2006 to 2014. It extends the existing understanding of 
credit risk transmission across financial institutions by indicating that the total credit 
risk connectedness (CRC) across G-SIFIs significantly increases since mid-2006 and 
moves around a relatively high level, 90%, until the end of 2014. Unlike Diebold and 
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Yilmaz (2015a), we find that the empirical results of the VECM-based connectedness 
measures and that of the VAR-based connectedness measures are qualitatively similar. 
This implies that although the VECM model may account for the cointegration relations, 
it may not suggest different results in empirical applications. To quantify to what extent 
the total CRC of G-SIFIs would threaten the global financial stability, we compute a 
scored CRC (𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶). The peaks of  𝑍𝐶𝑅𝐶 (larger than 2) generally indicate the critical 
financial events in the sample period. Moreover, in contrast to the G-SIFIs from Europe 
or Asia, the G-SIFIs from the U.S. are major credit risk senders. Although bidirectional 
credit risk spillovers between G-SIBs and G-SIIs are found, G-SIBs are generally credit 
risk providers. Based on dynamic net directional credit risk spillovers of each G-SIFI, 
we provide a yearly ‘Too-interconnected-to-fail’ ranking. This ranking complements 
the official list released by the FSB since our ranking is derived directly from the CDS 
market data. The two lists can be combined together to design a ‘composite’ ranking 
which considers not only market judgement of G-SIBs’ credit risk importance, but also 
G-SIBs’ general business risk importance. Finally, it extends the current understanding 
of the factors explaining the role of financial firm in credit risk transmission, e.g., Yang 
and Zhou (2013). It finds that interbank lending, non-interest income (especially trading 
account income), and extra capital surcharge are positively related to G-SIBs’ systemic 
credit risk importance. The Tier 1 leverage ratio or leverage ratio may help lower the 
G-SIBs’ credit risk spillovers, whereas the situation is opposite for Tier 1 capital ratio 
or capital adequacy ratio. The G-SII with more non-traditional non-insurance activity, 
larger size, and more global sales is more systemically relevant.  
Overall, the results of Chapter 3 yield important insight into credit risk transmission 
across the designated G-SIFIs and bring forward several suggestions to the worldwide 
regulatory authorities. For instance, it is crucial for regulators to assess the sources and 
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directions of credit risk transmissions among the important financial institutions, so that 
they can deepen their understanding about the complex structure of risk connections 
among the financial firms. Also, regulators can adopt the scored CRC to timely monitor 
any abnormal and destructive increase in credit risk spillovers among the G-SIFIs, so 
that they can take prompt actions to maintain the global financial stability. Moreover, 
the ‘composite’ ranking suggests an innovative and simple approach for regulators to 
devise a more comprehensive methodology to identify G-SIBs or even G-SIIs. Last but 
not least, the discovered factors driving G-SIFIs’ credit risk transmission may provide 
regulators insight into how to design more effective policies to reduce the systemic risk 
posed by G-SIFIs, such as make further efforts to refine the design and implementation 
of the Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratio requirement.   
Chapter 4 applies ADCC-X model to extend the existing understanding of the impact 
of sovereign rating events and major bailout news on returns, volatility, and correlation 
of sovereign CDS and equity index in the U.S., the U.K., and the Eurozone states during 
the relatively turbulent period of 2008–2016. It adopts a more general measure of 
sovereign rating events and computes rating surprises, which complements Gande and 
Parsley (2005) and Drago and Gallo (2016). The results show that compared with equity 
market, sovereign CDS market is more sensitive to domestic rating events or surprises. 
Two assets become less correlated when rating events/surprises occur. Both asymmetric 
and symmetric impact exerted by good and bad rating events on returns and volatility 
of individual assets is found, as well as correlation. Symmetric impact of two rating 
news on asset correlation is found in Spain, Italy, and Cyprus. In Portugal, Netherlands, 
and the U.S., the two assets are more (less) negatively correlated on the release days of 
bad (good) rating news, but the opposite situation exists in Ireland and Finland. Good 
rating news generally presents stronger impact. Major bailout events increase sovereign 
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CDS returns and reduce equity returns. Asset volatility raises and two assets are more 
correlated. In contrast with domestic rating events, bailout news has more pronounced 
impact on not only individual assets, but also asset correlation. These above findings 
provide further supports to Andersen et al. (2007) and Brenner et al. (2009) who suggest 
that asset correlation can be driven by the releases of macro events. Finally, this chapter 
contributes to the extant literature of the spillover effect of sovereign rating events, e.g., 
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), by showing that Greek sovereign rating events have 
information spillover effect on the two assets in several sample countries. The negative 
correlation increases along with the arrival of Greek rating news. Equity investors seem 
to concern more about Greek rating changes than domestic rating events.  
International portfolio managers and policymakers may find valuable implications from 
the results of Chapter 4. For example, unlike the investors in sovereign CDS market, 
investors in equity market seem to pay less attention to domestic sovereign rating events. 
It suggests that in equity market, at least after 2008 and in the sample states, domestic 
sovereign rating events may not be as informative as highlighted by previous studies. 
It may also reveal the tendency of investors to reduce overreliance on sovereign rating 
information provided by rating agencies. Given the criticisms about rating agencies, the 
FSB (2010) requires institutional investors, regulators, and banks to reduce overreliance 
on external rating agencies and to have own evaluations of their credit risk exposures. 
More importantly, our results suggest that the announcements of major bailouts exert 
destabilising impact on both sovereign CDS and equity markets through reducing asset 
returns and increasing asset volatility. Abnormal cross-asset trading activities may exist 
at the arrival of bailout news, since the two markets become more correlated. As widely 
agreed by international policymakers, bailouts could not be a priority to guarantee the 
resilience and stability of domestic or regional financial system.  
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5.2 Limitations and Further Research 
This thesis can be improved in several ways. First, in Chapter 2, due to data availability, 
there are 113 non-financial companies from the U.S. in the sample. This small sample 
problem may be addressed if we have the access to more CDS market data. Second, 
Chapter 3 focuses on CDS return spillovers across the designated G-SIFIs. However, 
Diebold and Yilmaz’s (2014) connectedness measures can also be used to investigate 
volatility spillovers by employing volatility as dependent variables of VAR or VECM 
model. To obtain volatility, non-parametric approaches are usually used, such as range-
based volatility and realised volatility (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009, 2012, and 2014). 
However, these methods require intraday market information. Due to the thin intraday 
trading problem of single-name CDS (Chen et al., 2011) and data scarcity, this chapter 
cannot obtain sufficient information to calculate CDS volatility. Finally, to ensure that 
the ADCC-X model is relatively parsimonious, Chapter 4 focuses only on the news 
announcement days and does not consider the days before and after the news releases. 
Previous studies have shown that before and after news releases, financial markets can 
also have reactions, e.g., Brenner et al. (2009). Therefore, it may be better to consider 
these two periods.   
Besides the above limitations, several further research agenda could be pursued. First, 
whether CCP exerts impact on CDS contracts of European firms has not been explored. 
Further research can investigate this issue from several aspects, such as market liquidity, 
counterparty risk, credit risk discovery, etc. Also, all the price discovery measures used 
in Chapter 2 are based on linear cointegration framework and rolling-window method 
is used to obtain the time-varying price discovery contributions. However, as suggested 
by Cai et al. (2011, 2015) and Ngene et al. (2014), price discovery process may be state 
or regime dependent. Thus, it is also important to study credit risk discovery mechanism 
 226 
 
in a nonlinear cointegration framework. Second, on March 4, 2015, the FSB and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) proposed to identify 
the third group of G-SIFIs which includes non-bank non-insurer financial firms (NBNI 
G-SIFIs), such as large hedge funds and important asset management firms. Therefore, 
further study can analyse credit risk transmission across the existing G-SIFIs and the 
newly identified NBNI G-SIFIs to provide a more comprehensive ‘too-interconnected-
to-fail’ ranking. Finally, while sovereign default risk of major developed countries has 
drawn much attention since the European sovereign debt crisis, sovereign credit risk of 
emerging markets remains important. Market microstructures, regulatory policies, and 
levels of investor sophistication widely vary across two types of economies. Hence, it 
may be a promising research topic to investigate news impact of sovereign rating events, 
political shocks, and other macro events on the correlation between sovereign CDS and 
equity index in emerging countries. Also, although the GARCH-type models have the 
merit of revealing volatility persistence, they may fail to identify the directions of the 
interactions across assets (Cai et al., 2016). Therefore, the final suggestion for future 
research is to use a nonlinear Markov switching framework to study the directional and 
dynamic causality relationship between the returns of sovereign CDS and equity index 
in both advanced and emerging economies. 
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